Mao's Role in the Korean Conflict: A Revision

In October 1950, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was only one year old, and the Beijing regime faced daunting tasks of regime consolidation and economic reconstruction. Thus, the CIA consistently predicted that China would not enter the Korean War, even if the United States crossed the 38th parallel. Acting on the CIA's prediction, US forces invaded North Korea on October 8, 1950. China proved the CIA's analysis wrong by sending masses of troops into Korea late in October, pushing the US force back south of the 38th parallel before the end of 1950. This article uncovers historical evidence to revise the existing literature on the topic of the Chinese intervention in Korea. Why did China intervene despite all the odds against Beijing? This study demonstrates the historical role of "agents," that is, individual with various personal attributes. By using newly available sources from China and Russia as well as a new interpretation, this article breaks new ground on a significant topic in the fields of international relations and the Cold War international history.