Cittamātra as Conventional Truth from Śāntarakṣita to Mipham (review)

Introduction

Śāntarakṣita is best known for his synthesis of the apparently conflicting schools of Madhyamaka and Cittamātra in his Madhyamakālaṃkāra, or Ornament of the Middle Way.¹ In that text, he famously argues that while Cittamātra is true conventionally, Madhyamaka reveals the ultimate truth. Hence, the rubric of the two truths, a familiar device for reconciling apparent contradictions in Buddhist doctrine, used since the Pāli canon, comes to the rescue once again, demonstrating that even Mahāyāna schools whose proponents had been debating vigorously for at least two centuries could be reconciled.

So much is agreed upon by all scholars, canonical or modern. There is no consensus, however, regarding how to understand that synthesis, or whether it is successful. Is the sense in which Śāntarakṣita wants us to take Cittamātra seriously merely provisional? Is it to be abandoned for the Madhyamaka view by an advanced practitioner? In this case, this is hardly I think that Śāntarakṣita has hit upon some important insights in his synthesis and that we can make good sense of it as a genuine synthesis. But defending it as a genuine synthesis requires us in turn to read Cittamātra phenomenologically instead of idealistically. When we read it in that way, we discover, as Mipham did, surprising implications regarding the epistemology of introspection and self-knowledge. These implications in turn vindicate certain important dGe lugs ideas on these matters, and force us to think hard about such matters dear to Śāntarakṣita’s heart as reflexive awareness.

I begin by considering the standard dGe lugs pa reading of Śāntarakṣita’s synthesis and the problems it raises. I then suggest an alternative reading of Cittamātra and show that this understanding paves the way for a more sensible reading of Madhyamakālaṃkāra. I then turn to a detailed examination of Ju Mipham Rinpoche’s commentary on the central verses of Madhyamakālaṃkāra where Śāntarakṣita takes on this issue, and explore Mipham’s understanding of what it is to take the mind to be merely conventionally existent. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of this reading of Śāntarakṣita for the philosophy of mind and the epistemology of self-knowledge.

The Siddhānta Reading and the Problem

In the dGe lugs lineage, as reflected in the commentary of rGyal tshab rje, and in the philosophical systems (grub mtha’) of lCang skya and ‘Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, there is a straightforward way of understanding what Śāntarakṣita is up to in Madhyamakālaṃkāra when he defends Cittamātra as conventional truth and Madhyamaka as ultimate truth. Conventional truth is, as Nāgārjuna notes, the necessary stepping stone to ultimate truth. And, as Candrakīrti notes, conventional truth is always deceptive. Now, if Madhyamaka is taken to be the authoritative doctrine regarding ultimate truth, and if a doxographic framework in which Cittamātra is the penultimate doctrine on the way to Madhyamaka is taken for granted, then it is natural to take Cittamātra as the (albeit deceptive) conventional truth that is the stepping stone to the ultimate truth revealed in Madhyamaka.

In the following verses toward the end of Madhyamakālaṃkāra, Śāntarakṣita invites such a reading:

92. On the basis of Cittamātra,One should understand the absence of external objects.On the basis of our system,One should understand that there is also a complete absence of self.93. Whoever rides the chariot of these two systemsGuiding them with the reins of logic,Will thereby attain the goal,The realization of the Mahāyāna itself.²

The two systems are consistent, Śāntarakṣita states, because one explains conventional reality, and the other ultimate reality.³ But rGyal tshab rje’s incisive comments on these verses themselves should give us pause, for they suggest a much more interesting, more radical possibility than the more traditional reading to which he reverts following (94):

Consider all phenomena comprised under...