Abstract

ABSTRACT:

In this paper I argue against A. W. Moore’s claim that metaphysics needs to be anthropocentric. The arguments will be based on Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy. The point is to explain why his metaphysics has an ambiguous position in Moore’s work on the history of metaphysics. The main focus of the argument is to question the grounds for the necessity of an anthropocentric aspect on the basis of Deleuze’s arguments for discontinuous change in conceptual frames. The paper will also raise points about different ways of thinking about the danger of metaphysics in relation to anthropocentrism and in relation to the opposition between Deleuze and Moore. I will conclude with some suggestions, based on Deleuze’s work on Foucault, as to why the anthropocentric aspect might be a bad choice, once it is shown to lack necessity.

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Additional Information

ISSN
2154-154X
Print ISSN
0276-2080
Pages
pp. 301-317
Launched on MUSE
2017-03-19
Open Access
No
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