Abstract

Despite the International Criminal Court’s increased prominence in international politics, there remains marked variation in states’ cooperation with the ICC. This article asks why do states cooperate with the ICC following an indictment, arrest warrant or request for information, and how do these patterns of cooperation affect the Court’s ability to constrain state behavior? Using comparative case studies from Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Libya, we suggest that states’ cooperation with the ICC is a function of domestic political calculations, tempered by states’ international partners and ambitions and the ICC’s own learning process.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1085-794X
Print ISSN
0275-0392
Pages
pp. 162-188
Launched on MUSE
2017-02-08
Open Access
No
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