Acting on the North Korea Playbook: Japan’s Responses to North Korea’s Provocations

In 2009, when a series of nuclear and missile tests conducted by North Korea led some analysts to argue that Pyongyang had abandoned diplomacy and aimed to reunify the Korean Peninsula militarily, a highly respected North Korea watcher, Narushige Michishita, opined that Pyongyang was still “playing the same game.”¹ While North Korea has continued to upgrade its nuclear and missile capabilities since then, Japan has ironically developed its own playbook on how to respond to Pyongyang’s repeated provocations. Tokyo’s responses to Pyongyang’s defiant actions in 2016 are faithfully based on this playbook: seeking enhanced sanctions, ensuring U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, and enhancing security cooperation with South Korea. Unfortunately, this playbook contains no silver lining that may lead to the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat. Furthermore, the effects of Japan’s policies based on its North Korea playbook may be undermined by unexpected domestic turmoil in its security partners.

In this essay, I elaborate on the three main components of Japan’s responses to North Korea’s provocations and discuss the problems of each component. In the concluding remarks, I point out two immediate challenges for which Japan needs to be prepared and then propose how Japan may be able to overcome the problems with its existing North Korea policies.

Seeking Enhanced Sanctions

When North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test on September 9, 2016, Japan’s denunciation was swift. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called the nuclear test “totally unacceptable” and promised to “consider further measures against North Korea including further action in the United Nations Security Council.”² At the UN General Assembly on September 21, he argued that “the nature of the military provocations North Korea has persisted with…are substantially more serious than before” and declared that Japan would lead the Security Council discussions on how to confront North Korea.³ On the sidelines of the General Assembly, Abe met Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and requested that Iran sever ties with North Korea in military cooperation.⁴ Given the fact that arms exports are an important source of North Korea’s foreign currency and that Iran is one of Pyongyang’s largest customers, it certainly makes sense to try to undermine Iran’s ties with North Korea.⁵

However, it is unclear whether these calls for more effective sanctions against North Korea will be heeded internationally, or even whether they may prove effective if adopted. Needless to say, the most significant impediment to enhanced economic sanctions is China, which provides the lifeline for the Kim Jong-un regime. China prioritizes stability on the Korean Peninsula and opposes North Korea’s nuclear program, which it considers a threat that could destabilize the region and potentially risk further nuclear proliferation there. Precisely because Beijing prioritizes the peninsula’s stability, however, it adamantly refuses to take any action, such as cutting North Korea’s energy supply, that could either prompt more aggressive reactions from Pyongyang or lead to the regime’s collapse.⁶ In addition, Chinese officials suspect that taking tough actions against North Korea could open a gate for Washington to approach Pyongyang, which has sought better relations with the United States from the beginning. For these reasons, it would be extremely difficult to persuade China to comply with Japan’s and the international community’s wish to coerce North Korea economically.

Ensuring U.S. Extended Deterrence

Following North Korea’s nuclear test on September 9, Prime Minister Abe called President Barack Obama and expressed his desire for maintaining close security cooperation with the United States. In response, President Obama “explained that he hopes to convey to Prime Minister Abe and the people of Japan that the U.S.-Japan alliance is solid and the United States security commitment to Japan including its extended deterrence is unshakable.”⁷

Obtaining such explicit assurances from the United States is necessary not only for policy reasons but also for political reasons. With the increasing evidence that North Korea has been mastering technologies needed for the miniaturization of nuclear warheads and the...