U.S.-Japan Relations in a Trump Administration

Donald Trump shocked many in Japan during his presidential campaign. Trump suggested in a New York Times interview that Japan and South Korea should develop their own nuclear weapons to contend with North Korea, stating that “if we’re attacked, they do not have to come to our defense, if they’re attacked, we have to come totally to their defense. And…that’s a real problem.”¹ On the campaign trail, he repeatedly returned to the topic of Japan to note the lack of reciprocity in the security relationship. At a rally in Iowa on August 6, Trump claimed he was told that Japan pays 50% of the costs of basing U.S. troops there, but he then asked, “Why don’t they pay 100%?”²

These assertions, however, may have little to do with how the Trump administration manages the U.S. relationship with Japan. What may be most important is how it envisions U.S. interests in Asia and how it approaches the United States’ relationship with Japan’s neighbor, China.

This essay will first discuss the likely changes in U.S. strategy toward Asia under Trump and the implications for U.S.-Japan relations. The next section will then offer several policy options for the Trump administration to consider, while the conclusion will assess the impact of Russia’s relations with both the United States and Japan on the alliance.

Changes in U.S. Strategy toward Asia and the Implications for Japan

The incoming Trump administration’s approach will differ from the Obama administration’s “rebalance” to Asia. Several broad areas of policy change seem likely. First, U.S. policy toward China will be more fraught, and the trade relationship is likely to be the first target of the new administration. Indeed, designating China as a currency manipulator was high on the list of what Trump stated he would do in the first hundred days of his presidency. But since the election, Trump has taken this idea of shaking up the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) a step further by suggesting that he would be willing to abandon the one-China policy that has guided Washington’s relationship with Beijing since normalization in the 1970s. Accepting a phone call from Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen on December 2 was the first departure, but his statements that followed were even more explicit about his intention to recalibrate the U.S. relationship with the PRC.

Second, the Trump administration seems interested in building up U.S. military capabilities, including in the Asia-Pacific. Trump’s Asia advisers have used President Ronald Reagan’s “peace through strength” concept to advocate for a demonstration of U.S. military power. At face value, this strategy may not be all that alarming for allies such as Japan, who prefer that the United States maintain a strong military presence in Asia. How the incoming president intends to use those forces, however, could be more worrisome in the context of a far more contentious U.S.-PRC relationship.

Finally, it seems unlikely that the incoming administration will prioritize the Asia-Pacific’s annual multilateral gatherings to the same degree as its predecessor. Support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its related regional meetings, such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, is likely to diminish. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Barack Obama have been strong supporters of ASEAN’s efforts to institutionalize a regional summit meeting, and their administrations have supported the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus that seek to find common ground between regional security and military leaders.

These broad changes in the U.S. approach to the Asia-Pacific will shape President Trump’s relationship with Japan. First, Washington’s relationship with Beijing will have a significant impact on bilateral ties between Tokyo and Beijing. Should tensions with Beijing rise, Tokyo will feel the impact. A trade war with China would of course be a disaster for most of the Asia-Pacific economies, and Japan’s...