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  • The Limits of Partnership U.S.-Russian Relations In the Twenty-First Century by Angela E. Stent
  • James Biedzynski
Stent, Angela E. The Limits of Partnership U.S.-Russian Relations In the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

In 1984, General Brent Scowcroft gave a lecture on Russian-American relations at Ohio University, where I was then a graduate student. He made the point Russia is a problem that will never go away and one that cannot be solved. We just have to cope with it as best we can. Since then, many changes have occurred in Russia and the problem remains: How do we deal with Russia?

Angela Stent is an academic who has done government service as well. As a major expert on contemporary Russia, she participated in some of the events she writes about in The Limits of Partnership. She provides a very useful overview of Russian-American relations since the Cold War ended. What she sees are three resets, one by President Bill Clinton, another by President George W. Bush and a third by President Barack Obama. Each reset fell short of its goals and Russian-American relations have gradually gotten worse. There is clearly fault on both sides. The Americans largely ignored Russian concerns and interests while the Russians were embittered by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire. At times, it seems the Americans and Russians have talked at each other rather than to each other.

Americans failed to grasp how traumatic the Soviet Union’s collapse was to Russia’s elite and how the Russians came to regard NATO expansion and growing Western presence in the former Republics that made up the USSR. If NATO was to expand to Poland’s eastern borders and the Baltic States, why not include Russia? The fact Russia was never seriously considered for NATO membership strongly suggested to Moscow that the West did not trust them. The color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia were frightening to Russian elites. The fear arose a similar upheaval could occur inside Russia and topple its ruling class. Perhaps the most glaring oversight on the West’s part was the failure to understand how much Ukraine means to Russia. Granted the Russians harmed Ukraine tremendously over the centuries, but the fact remains they still consider it as their kith and kin. Clearly, there is huge communications problem.

It is safe to say Russia did not develop after 1991 as the United States had hoped. Russia did not transform herself into an American style democracy nor did she adopt American and Western culture wholesale. Russia’s economy is now capitalist, but it is a type of capitalism few Americans could accept if it occurred here in the United States. Russia’s system has more popular participation than in Soviet times but many things are decided by just two [End Page 359] men: Vladimir Putin and Dimitri Medvedev. There is the element of Czardom in Vladimir Putin’s rule and style. He is indeed the Vozhd (boss) in the Stalinist tradition, even if in a watered down sense. After 1991, too many Americans forgot that Russia has its own traditions and culture and an acute sense of pride. Humiliation and threats are things the Russians do not take well. At the same, though, the Russians often fail to grasp how they frighten and bully their neighbors.

I hope American officials and diplomats read this book carefully. We cannot alter President Putin’s behavior or policies but we need to understand them better. For better or worse, Russia is here to stay and remains a great power. How it will use that power is what the rest of the world needs to concern itself about. [End Page 360]

James Biedzynski
Middlesex County College
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