Abstract

My goal in this paper is to examine two central aspects of Kant’s theory of cognition (Erkenntnis) in the context of the account offered by Eric Watkins and Marcus Willaschek. I first focus on what it is for an object to be “given” to the mind and how such “givenness” (allegedly) underwrites both mental representation and reference. I then consider Watkins and Willaschek’s interpretation of Kant’s claim that we cannot cognize things-in-themselves, and conclude by sketching an alternative (and less empiricistic) account of that claim.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 131-142
Launched on MUSE
2017-01-19
Open Access
No
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