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Kant on Cognition, Givenness, and Ignorance
- Journal of the History of Philosophy
- Johns Hopkins University Press
- Volume 55, Number 1, January 2017
- pp. 131-142
- 10.1353/hph.2017.0005
- Article
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My goal in this paper is to examine two central aspects of Kant’s theory of cognition (Erkenntnis) in the context of the account offered by Eric Watkins and Marcus Willaschek. I first focus on what it is for an object to be “given” to the mind and how such “givenness” (allegedly) underwrites both mental representation and reference. I then consider Watkins and Willaschek’s interpretation of Kant’s claim that we cannot cognize things-in-themselves, and conclude by sketching an alternative (and less empiricistic) account of that claim.