The Theory of Democracy

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY PART II THE END oF PoLITICAL AcTIVITY: THE CoMMON GooD T HIS is the second in a series of articles devoted to understanding, as well as demonstrating, the truth that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government. In a prefatory note to the whole series, we pointed out that" the word' democracy,' through its use in propaganda of all sorts, has come to stand for almost anything that one can be politically for or against." We mention this again in order to remind the reader of our plea: that he " avoid a too hasty or a too simple application of our thesis to current events, ... by not identifying Democracy with the existing governments of England or the United States." In this article, we shall try to answer that objection to our theory, which argues from the unity of the common good as the end of political activity to the impossibility of a moral hierarchy of forms of government. We find it necessary, therefore , to begin by clarifying the terms in which. the objection must be stated. 1. In the practical order, the last end is the first principle. As the first truth is that without which no others can be known, so the ultimate good is that upon which depends the goodness of everything else we seek. But the last end is not the only principle in the practical order. Just as, in speculative matters, there are secondary truths-secondary in the sense that their knowability depends on knowledge of the first truth-so, in practical matters, there are subordinate ends, goods which are sought for their own sake as well as for the ultimate good they also serve as means. We customarily speak of such goods as intermediate ends, thereby indicating their dual character: as 588 THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 589 ends, though not ultimate; as means, though not merely so. Such goods always function as secondary principles: as indispensable means, in the order of execution, to the achievement of the ultimate good or last end. But they may also sometimes function as first principles: as the ultimate good to be achieved in a certain, restricted sphere of activity. Here is another point of comparison between the practical and the speculative. The principle of contradiction is the first principle, without qualification or restriction, whereas an axiom of geometry is a first principle, though first only in a restricted subject-matter. Similarly, the ultimate good is the last end simpliciter, but other goods may be last ends secundum quid. There is no difficulty about viewing the same good both as an end secundum quid and as a means to the end simpliciter. But not all intermediate ends are first principles, though all are secondary principles. Thus, the moral virtues are intermediate ends: they are indispensable means to happiness; they are also perfections worth having for their own sake, and, as such, they are bonum honestum, not bonum utile; but they are not also first principles secundum quid because moral activity, without qualification, is defined by happiness as the first principle simpliciter. In contrast, the common good is not only an indispensable means to happiness, but also the end of political activity as such.35 It is, therefore, the first principle in a certain sphere of moral activity, qualified as political, though happiness remains the first principle of moral activity considered without •• It may be objected that the virtues, moral and intellectual, can also be regarded as first principles secundum quid. They are the proximate ends of education IllS a special sphere of activity. But it should be noted that education is a special sphere of activity, it is not moral activity taken without qualification. The sphere of moral activity without qualification is the individual pursuit of happiness, and here the virtues are always secondary principles: intermediate ends and indispensable means. Here, then, is the case in which an intermediate end cannot be regarded as if it were just an end and not a means. Although the common good is a means in the moral order, taken without qualification, it must also be regarded as the end, and not a means, in the political...