Concerning a “Critical Review”

CONCERNING A "CRITICAL REVIEW" 1 " It must be presupposed that every good Christian should be readier to excuse than to condemn a proposition advanced by his neighbour; and i:f he cannot justify it, let him enquire into the meaning of the author: if thEllatter be in error, corr~ct him lovingly ; should that not suffice, then let him employ every suitable means, so that his neighbour, rightly understanding it, may be saved from error."-8t. Ignatius Loyola. WHEN I wrote the Foreword to The Problem of Species, by Mortimer J. Adler, and when I noted in that foreword, along with my esteem and admiration for the author, the divergences which separate usand to which I do not have to return here-concerning the problems studied in his book, I thought that everyone would see, in this dialogue between two philosophers who are attached to the same principles but take different stands on certain conclusions, an example of what a discussion at once free and respectful on things of the mind could be. I was too much of an optimist. Certain critics, apparently little desirous of thus understanding philosophical discussion, have misused the foreword to decry the value of the work. Since Mr. Muller-Thym does me the honor of quoting me, he might also have done me the honor of thinking that I do not intend my introductions to torpedo the books of my friends, and that if The Problem of Species had as little merit as he says, I should not have cared to recommend its being read. It is left for me to apologize to Mortimer Adler for the abuse thus made of the liberality with which he permitted a discussion of his views to take place in his own book. The central question of Mr. Adler's book concerns the philosophy of nature. It is to determine whether real species are reducible to a small number of large classes or if they form a vast multiplicity, and also to determine the order or hierarchy 1 Bernard J. Muller-Thym, "Dr. Adler's 'Problem of Species': A Critical Review," TkeJ Modern Sckoolman, November, 1940. 45 46 JACQUES ~TAIN of real species.2 The fact that the taxonomic species of the positive sciences do not necessarily coincide with real species is ground for asking this question-without denying, for this reason, that there exist many sciences of nature, which correspond in a sense to the Aristotelian notion of science. (Even if Mr. Adler had denied this last point, he would not have committed heresy against principles. In the eyes of Aristotle and St. Thomas, the philosophy of nature embraced in its unity aU the sciences of nature: and it is precisely this conception which, in my opinion, the developments of empiriological science oblige us to revise.) But the problem of the number of species presupposes, as a necessary preamble, a more profound question, that of the relation between the " species " of the logician and the " species " of the philosopher of nature. On this preliminary question I think that Mr. Adler subscribed in advance to many of the views expounded by Mr. MullerThym in order to destroy, not so much Mr. Adler's book (the argumentation of which he does not discuss), as Mr. Adler himself, whose competence he claims to deny. Misled by Mr. Adler's terminology, Mr. Muller-Thym has not accomplished the very duty of a critic, which is, in such a case, to elucidate the obscurities due to the vocabulary and to try to see whether and at what precise point these obscurities have brought about some confusion in the doctrinal elaboration of the work. Mr. Adler said "ontological species" and "logical species" instead of saying" species understood in the ontological sense" or "species understood in the logical sense." It is regrettable that Mr. Muller-Thym did not follow the rules of interpretation outlined by St. Ignatius, who advises us in such cases to have regard to the thought rather than the words; and that he did not try to surmount the obstacles created by the words in the present discussion.3 In any event, the distinction be- • This question is too complicated to be...