The Cognitive Aspect of Emotions

THE COGNITIVE ASPECT OF EMOTIONS T RADITIONAL psychology considers emotiqnal states as the conscious reflexes, so to speak, of the movements of the sensory appetites. Whenever a value embodied in some particular is apprehended by the cogitative power (vis cogitativa) and a correspondent movement of the appetite ensues, there is in the consciousness one of the passions of the soul (passiones animae) , varying according to the objective relation between the good and the person. It has, perhaps, been too little emphasized that this psychology takes into account, not only the subjective side, but also the total situation in which the person is involved. In this sense, Thomistic psychology is very " modern." It is only recently that psychology has discovered this dependence of mental states and total behavior sets on the general situation. In traditional psychology, the apprehension of the moving agent, the good or the evil, as embodied in some object, is achieved by the fourth internal sense, the cogitative power (vis cogitativa) .1 The cognition of the goodness or badness of the object, event, or situation, precedes the movement of the appetite and, therefore, the consciousness of an emotional state. Thus far, the old conception agrees with certain recent theories. If, however, these theories conceive of the emotions as a mere mirroring of a biologically relevant set of circumstances or even-as did the famous James-Langi-Sergi theory-consider emotions as the awareness of bodily changes, wrought by biological forces released in their turn by the environmental circumstances , Scholastic tradition disagrees. A mental cognitive factor has to enter into play. For the appetites, and their emotional effects too, the proposition is valid that nothing can be willed but what is previously known. Replace " willed " by " sought " and the statement applies to the appetites not less than to rational will. 1 R. Allers, "The Vis Cogitativa and Evaluation," The New Scholasticism, XV (1941)' p. 195. 589 590 RUDOLF .ALLERS There is a great divergence of opinions regarding the nature and definition of emotions. The Wittenberg Symposion on Feelings and Emotions, of 1928, lists as many definitions as there are contributors. And things have not changed since then. It seems, therefore, advisable to summarize briefly the conception of emotion underlying the present discussion. An emotion is a mental state of peculiar character by which an individual responds to the awareness of a pleasant or unpleasant situation, or any other aspect of a situation entailing goodness or badness. This response is of the whole individual, mental and bodily, not of the mind or of consciousness alone. Emotion, therefore, presupposes the awareness of the valueaspect of a situation. This awareness may be purely sensory apprehension such as is found also in animals and credited, by traditional psychology, to the vis aestimativa, one of the internal senses. Such a mere sensory awareness may occur also with man. UsuaHy, however, the value-awareness is, in man, of a higher order, namely an intellectual apprehension, founded on the sensory awareness of a particular value as embodied in the actually present situation. The bodily alterations associated with emotion become partly conscious and color the emotional consciousness. Emotion may be described as the consciousness of a change " affecting " the whole human person. It refers to objects as causes, not in the way of cognition nor in the way of appetition. Contrary to some modern notions, traditional psychology does not credit emotion with any cognitive power. Nor is it the foundation of evaluation. Neither " interest " nor " pleasure " constitutes the awareness of value or goodness. A thing is of " interest " because it is good, or bad; it does not become good or bad because the person is interested. The philosophy of values, as conceived by R. B. Perry/ is as much a reversal of the true state of things, as James' theory is such a reversal in regard to the relation between emotion and bodily changes. Professor Perry has remained true to the spirit of his master. "For a criticism of .Perry's philosophy of values, cf. H. E. Cory, "Value, Beauty, and Professor Perry," THE THOMIST, IV (194~), 1. THE COGNITIVE ASPECT OF EMOTIONS 591 The only thing which is indubitably true is that there obtains a close...