Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning

ANOTHER APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF MEANING T HERE are at least two ways to approach the problem of meaning. One approach lies through an analysis of the modern writers on the problem; it is the one we chose to follow in a previous article.* It is not the better approach, but is imposed upon anyone who wishes to communicate with the moderns. The essential condition of modern communication is first to relapse exclusively into dialectic (not necessarily polemical) by way of attempting as far as possible to come to terms with anybody who has anything to offer on the matter. This need not be purely negative; it may also be the occasion for understanding better the general subject concerned. In this case of the current problem of meaning, the attempt at initial communication has had to be largely negative; this, however, is not the primary aim, for through it much can be learned, not so much of the particular problem discussed as of the current status of philosophy, particularly in its relation to experimental science. The issues which may subsequently rise from this must go beyond the dimension of what has been called the " problem of meaning," and hence cannot be resolved even in the present scope. But much can be suggested by way of anticipating the' eventual issue-the modern problem of knowledge, and in particular the distinction of philosophy and experimental science. It is only in that dimension that the real difficulties here will be fully faced. · The second way of approaching again what has been covered is necessary for several reasons. First, it is the way the problem might better have been approached had not the problem of communication required consideration (and because of the current statement of the problem, this other way is stated in *"The Problem of Meaning," THE TaoMIST, Vol. VI, No. ~ (July, 1948), pp. ISO fl'. ~33 234 JOHN A. OESTERLE terms of it). Second the benefit of an exact terminology, which can dispense with such an ambiguous word as " meaning," permits seeing more clearly the general confusion which has been exhibited. What is involved in the previous article, then, can be translated into this more careful terminology. Third, it emphasizes the benefit of taking account of what has been already worked out in the past and can be employed to help here. Consequently, this second approach shows, secondarily, that the tradition of thought, available to everyone, can be of assistance in facing what may be considered problems now as well as what really are problems at present. This exacts docility on the part of the philosophically interested (as it should have exacted of everyone since the Greeks), but a docility which would make possible real " daring " and advance . It is regrettable that much of current writing is proud in its ignorance. What follows, therefore, in this present article, is nothing more than a brief exposition of a couple of points in John of St. Thomas' Cursus Philosophicus. I employ him here simply because I owe to him (as well as what he learned from others) the perception of several distinctions which happen to be crucial in connection with the current problem of meaning. He states in a few words what endless pages of indiscriminate writing at the present time have failed to cover. This is not an attempt to enlarge any credit due John of St. Thomas, which is, as should be evident, completely unimportant; it is only gratification at finding something so helpful and to the point. Hence, the work of John of St. Thomas is employed as an aid and as a teacher for what it is worth, which was his intention in writing his Cursus Philosophicus.1 1 Perhaps this explanation of why John of St. Thomas is employed is unnecessary. But so often the use of an " authority " is misunderstood, as there is a popular notion that any use of authority is uncritical and unoriginal. It is, fortunately, unoriginal if by " original " is meant one who has learned only from himself. It is not uncritical, since if there is any authority in a particular philosopher, this can be discerned to the extent that he has contributed something...