Ernst Cassirer: The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science and History since Hegel by W. H. Woglom and C. W. Hendel, The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer ed. by Paul A. Schilpp (review)

BOOK REVIEWS Ernst Cassirer: The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science and HistONJ since Hegel. Translated by W. H. Woglom and C. W. Hendel. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. Pp. 350 with index. $5.00. The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. Edited by Paul A. Schilpp. Evanston: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949. Pp. 954 with index. $6.00. One of the most important works of the late Ernst Cassirer, and an outstanding contribution to the history of modern philosophy, particularly in regard to the problem of knowledge, is his monumental " Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neuren Zeit," in four volumes, the first of which appeared in 1906, the last now appearing in English even before its German edition. The manuscript was completed in 1940, during the author's sojourn in Sweden, and was'brought to the United States by his widow in 1946; no better memorial of a great scholar could be offered to his many friends and admirers in the United States and England than this fine translation, and one hopes that this volume will be followed by the three companion volumes, as well produced and printed as this one. Cassirer's idea in this series was not just to write another history of philosophy; he is concerned principally with the problem of knowledge, and aims at showing how modern thought developed in antithesis to mediaeval systems, primarily on account of the influence of modern science, and particularly of the growth and spread of the mathematical mentality from Descartes onwards. He traces the origin of the rationalistic as opposed to the theological view of reality, and draws largely on the works of scientists; one of the most remarkable qualities of this series is the va.it erudition of the author, as evidenced by the references and footnotes which testify to his wide reading and make this work one of the chief examples of philosophical historiography in this century. It is perhaps unfortunate that this volume deals far less with pure philosophy than the other three. In the preceding volumes the classical philosophers were considered in their relation to the scientific thought of their day; in this volume Cassirer abandons the pure philosophers, in order to treat of the scientific advances that influenced philosophers. As he himself says "We shall not follow out the findings attained in the theory of knowledge by reference to the philosophical classics of the period under discussion, but. shall try to penetrate the motives that led to their discovery ." (p. 18) Such a study is very necessary and very opportune, but 64~ BOOK REVIEWS 648 it does seem rather misleading to describe such a work as giving us. " philosophy , science and history since .Hegel." The philosophy of science, however important it may be, does not exhaust the problem of knowledge. It does treat in some detail of logic, and of one part of critical metaphysics; it supposes general critics and the psychology of knowledge, as well as the general ontologies underlying various systems, and none of these is touched on in this work, except in a brief way in the introduction. (pp. 1-19) Cassirer's aim is strictly limited; his theme is the problem of the relation of philosophy to science since Hegel. He rightly insists that philosophy has been profoundly influenced by science, and that to understand much of modern philosophy one has first to take account of developments within the various sciences. Ever since Galileo and Descartes, mathematics and mathematical physics have more and more influenced the development of philosophy, so that the first part of this work is dedicated to those sciences. The last century and the present age saw the development of two sciences that have increasingly affected the course of philosophic thought, namely biology and history; in the second and third parts Cassirer traces the development of these sciences. His method throughout is mainly historical, though he does let his own preferences appear from time to time, and he is more interested in epistemological problems raised by the advances in science than in the progress of science itself. He has a rare gift of situating past theories in their historical context and of penetrating to the core...