Whitehead’s Theory of Experience by Ewing P. Shahan (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 178 The other essay which would seem to diverge somewhat from the other specimens of analysis is one by Mr. Feigl. It is true that his paper could hardly be said to be about beings rather than meanings. Besides, it is a confusing and, perhaps, somewhat confused discussion, so that one hesitates to characterize it too definitely. And yet, it would seem that what Feigl is concerned to do is not to analyze specific meanings, so much as to broach the much more general question as to how ultimate philosophical principles may be justified. Moreover, in pondering the volume as a whole, one is tempted to ask whether such is not precisely the sort of thing that needs to be done with regard to.philo.Sophical analysis itself. What are its principles? Can they be justified? Is its apparent attempt to m&ke philosophers concentrate on meanings rather than being really defensible? After all, the mere exhibition of specimens just does not suffice. Besides, one cannot suppress the feeling that if analysts continue to do little more than just analyze more and more meanings, or the same meanings over and over again, their whole movement will eventually come to have the look of a very sterile scholasticism. Indiana Ufiiveraity, Bloomington, Ind. HENRY VEATCH Whitehead's Theory of Ezperience. By EWING P. SIIAHAN. New York: King's Crown Press, 1950. Pp. 150, With index. $2.50. Any book on Alfred North Whitehead seems infected with that author's own obscurity. Prof. Shahan's small volume on one aspect of the philosophy of organism is, for the most part, a healthy exception. Nevertheless , this recent book on Whitehead's theory of experience is intended mainly for the clientele of Whitehead and presupposes at least some rudimentary knowledge of his system of thought. Thanks to an excellent first chapter, Dr. Shahan states clearly the problem he intends to solve. The author is of the opinion that Whitehead had two views of experience . He calls them the limited or narrow view and the broad or general view. Each corresponds to two periods in the development of Whitehead's thought, namely, to the extension analysis of nature, wherein Whitehead emphasized space and timfi, and the process analysis, wherein he concentrated on the becomingness of nature or his notion called " feeling." The terminology, extension and process analysis, is that of Shahan's. Had he wished he could have cited Whitehead to justify the present study. In a note in the appendix of the second edition of Concept of Nature, Whitehead admits that he was not too clear on some of his early theories but that his later works attempt to remove the obscurities. In the course of 174 BOOK REVIEWS his study, Dr. Shahan comes to the conclusion that Professor Whitehead was not completely successful. Shahan designates " creativity " and " life " as the fundamental notions of the philosophy of organism. " Life " is of main interest for Shahan since it is, for all practical purposes, synonymous with experience. " Life " contains three elements. The first is self-enjoyment or what the Thomist would call the unity or self-identity of an organism. Secondly, there is creative activity which roughly corresponds to a thing's nature and its process of development. For the benefit of Thomists it might be added that "self-creative" is not a contradiction for Whitehead since creation simply means the growth of an organism according to its nature. In reading Whitehead one must resign himself to that author's annoying habit of switching generally accepted meanings of words to fit his fancy. Finally, there is aim. This is the teleological aspect of the organism. From the Thomistic view this properly belongs to creative activity. Shahan is hard pressed to concede that Whitehead is justified in giving an organism so arbitrary a faculty as that of being able to change the end intended by its nature. Whitehead's initial position, as explained by Dr. Shahan, consists in viewing nature exclusively in itself. He concentrates entirely on what is known and gives no consideration of the knower nor the role of thought in reaching the known. He sees in nature only two things: events and objects. An event...