The Kantian Theory of Sense-Intuition: A Critique

THE KANTIAN THEORY OF SENSE-INTUITION: A CRITIQUE IT HAS been said that Immanuel Kant is " without doubt the most seminal influence in modern philosophy." 1 Sir Arthur Eddington confirms this view when he writes: . . . if it were necessary to choose a leader from among the older philosophers, there can be no doubt that our choice would be Kant. We do not accept the Kantian label; out, as a matter of acknowledgment , it is right to say that Kant anticipated to a remarkable extent the ideas to which we are now being impelled by the modern developments of physics.2 If these observations are accurate, a study of the Kantian synthesis is not a purely academic exercise executed upon a museum piece. It stands rather as a challenging area of research to those who would understand better the more ultimate directives of our times. In a necessarily brief study of this kind, an analysis of the entire Critical Philosophy would be an extremely ambitious, if not presumptuous, undertaking. It is preferable, therefore, to isolate what appears to be, at first glance, only a minor incident in the development of the Kantian system: the analysis of sensuous experience. However, this initial, almost introductory, moment of the Critique of Pure Reason is in reality a focal point whose significance can scarcely be exaggerated . Kant himself points out that the correctness of his " Copernican hypothesis," the validity of his a priori conclusions regarding the world of nature, and the truth of his subsequent metaphysical doctrines all depend upon the cogency of this examination of ordinary perception.3 1 Leighton, Joseph, " Kant, the Seminal Thinker " in Immanuel Kant (Chicago, 1925). p. 78. • Sir Arthur Eddington, The Philosophy of Physical Science (New York, 1989), Chap. XII, pp. 188-189. 8 Kant, Selections (Scribners, 1929. Edited by T. M. Green), p. :xxxix. 506 THE KANTIAN THEORY OF SENSE-INTUITION: A CRITIQUE 507 SENSE-INTUITION AccoRDING TO KANT Indicative of its commanding position with respect to what follows is the placement of the analysis of sense experience at the beginning of the first Critique. The Transcendental Aesthetic occupies only a few first pages, but the entire ulterior development of Kantian thought is conditioned by it. Here reality is limited to " the sum of all possible objects of experience ." 4 Of these objects only the phenomenal aspects are declared-knowable.5 What is more, they are knowable only by way of a " pure intuition," 6 although they are dependent upon an empirical moment for their givenness.7 It is true that reason must postulate a noumenal ground for these phenomenal ap-· pearances, but it can know nothing of its nature.8 Moral and aesthetic judgments alone suffice to penetrate it, and it is the work of the second and third Critiques to illuminate their achievements in this realm as it was the task of the first Critique to assign limits to, and declare the impotency of, the speculative reason here. Having synoptically noted the position of the Transcendental Aesthetic in the general context of the Critical Philosophy, we must observe at closer range the precise formulation of the specific theory under discussion: sensuous intuition. Which of several possible meanings does Kant attach to the term "intuition"? Does he, with Descartes, define intuition as a purely intellectual conception indifferent to the actual existence of an object and certified only by its distinctness and clarity? 9 Obviously not, for Kant is careful to insist that, although all thought relates directly or indirectly to intuitions, these are possible for man only on the condition that they affect his sensibility.10 Is he, then, simply reaffirming • Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (New York, 1900), p. 43. • Ibid., p. 85. • Ibid. 7 Ibid., p. 36. • Ibid., p. 164. • Descartes, Oeuvres Choisies (Paris, n. d.), p. 306. 1 °Kant, C1·itique of Pure Reason, p. 1. 508 SISTER MARY ALOYSIUS the traditional teaching of the ancients and medievals that intuition, in its primary meaning, is an act of the external sense terminating immediately in a physicaily present existent? Even a cursory reading of the Aesthetic forbids such an interpretation . Kant uncompromisingly affirms that sensible intuition reaches only the appearances of a thing and not...