Sense Consciousness According to St. Thomas

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDIToRs: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoVINCE OF ST. JoSEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXI OCTOBER, 1958 SENSE CONSCIOUSNESS ACCORDING TO ST. THOl\fAS No.4 A concept of consciousness would seem to be an Integral part of a theory of knowledge as well as a crucial element in any theory of human nature. Our capacity to know ourselves is necessarily bound up inextricably with the question of our capacity to know in general, and in turn underlies many such problems as those of self-realization and the validity of self-criticism, the nature of psychological personality, the foundation of ethics and morality, and other related points. Traditionally accepted as an evident object of psychological study, both by philosophers and early empirical psychologists, the notion of consciousness began to suffer a certain diminution in the latter half of the nineteenth century, until in some schools of thought its reality came to be wholly denied. At the same time, through the influence of psychoanalysis, the 415 416 MICHAEL STOCK important role of the unconscious mind was made strikingly manifest, and the question of the respective influence of conscious and unconscious motivation became a central issue in psychology and ethics. At the present time, with the reality of consciousness generally accepted again, and some of the early over-statements of the force of the unconscious somewhat modified, the time seems ripe for an extensive investigation of the relationships obtaining between the conscious and unconscious spheres of men's minds. In this context, it seems useful to state more fully the ideas on consciousness held by St. Thomas, not only because his insights are hound to be of value in discussing current problems, but also because such doctrine should be explicitly understood if many of the implications of Thomistic psychology and moral theology are to be fully appreciated. Certainly many aspects of the doctrine of consciousness have been treated in one form or another, but, so far as I know, there is no complete and exhaustive statement. In working towards such a statement, it seems useful to sketch first, as in general outline, a broader conspectus of the points which will have to be raised and solved before an integral statement can be offered. For the sake of analysis, the matter may be divided under three main headings; the questions of strictly sense consciousness, the questions of purely intellectual consciousness, and the questions of intellectual reflection on the senses. Our immediate purpose here is to raise and discuss some of the problems involved in sense consciousness. By way of preliminary notes, some of the ambiguity which attaches itself to the notion of consciousness should be removed. In common usage, consciousness often means nothing more than knowledge, for instance, when we ask someone whether or not he was conscious of some noise or sight. For St. Thomas, however, consciousness always had a note of cognitive complexity about it; it was knowJedge as applied to something.1 1 " Nomen enim conscientiae significat applicationem scientiae ad aliquid; unde conscire dicitur quasi simul scire." De Ve:rit., q. 17, a. l; cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 18; ll Sent., d. ~4, q. ~. a. 4. SENSE CONSCIOUSNESS ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS 417 In the moral order, it was knowledge applied to deliberate actions as they measured up to or failed to measure up to rules of reason and Faith; what is today called conscience. This moral consciousness was necessarily founded on psychological consciousness, which, in its strictest sense, was knowledge of knowledge, or the awareness of an act of knowledge. It thus involved two elements-an apprehension of some knowable object and a separate cognitive realization that that object was apprehended. By extension, however, the word " consciousness " could be used to signify the things of which one has consciousness, that is, the things known which are known to be known.2 By extension, again, in another direction, consciou~ ness may signify the·act of being aware of other psychological states or operations besides those which are cognitive, that is, the actual awareness of emotions, feelings, performances and the like. Under this...