Aristotle’s Notion of Being

ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF BEING IT is today a commonplace that Aristotle's Metaphysics suffers from a defect that is fundamental and thus pervasive . The defect in his doctrine, which he termed the science of Being qua Being, is located in his very grasp of Being. As a philosopher, it· is claimed, Aristotle viewed Being in a wholly non-existential manner. In the chosen language, the Stagirite was an essentialist pure and simple. For, it is said, not as possessed of existence but solely with respect to the act of essence was the real perceived and characterized by Aristotle; the existence of things was either not attained or not felt worthy of mention. And thus was determined at its very roots the Aristotelian science of Being qua Being. For, having abandoned natural, and perforce lacking biblical, illumination upon the character of Being, his ordered speculations on reality took their departure from and were limited to the quidditative and its derivatives. In the forefront of those who so interpret Aristotle's thought are M. Etienne Gilson and Fr. Joseph Owens, G. SS. R. M. Gilson's principal efforts here are to be found in his Being And Some Philosophers; 1 those of Fr. Owens, in his work The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics.2 Many of the arguments developed by these thinkers merit careful study. Among them are Fr. Owens' discussion of the Posterior Analytics II, 1-10, where Aristotle distinguishes between whether a thing is and what it is; his discourse on the non-existential nature of the Aristotelian principle of contradiction, and M. Gilson's interpretation of Gamma 2, in which Aristotle considers the transcendentals, ens, unum and res. However, afair beginning will be made if the present discussion is limited to their 1 Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1949. 2 Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1951. 29 30 JOHN D. BEACH commentaries on one key text, Chapter 1 of Book Zeta. It is a decisive text for the question in hand, because in it Aristotle treats, briefly but penetratingly, of substantial and accidental Being. Of the two, M. Gilson offers the more lengthy commentary ; in fact, Fr. Owens' views on the passage will have to be filled out by referring back to his interpretation of a related passage in Gamma 2. However, in both cases the intent of the author is clear. The argument of each turns upon the meaning, as employed by Aristotle, of " is," " to be " and "Being." The thesis maintained is that these words mean something altogether different from their ordinary English equivalents-" exists," " to exist " and " that which exists." Rather, it is held, these words signify or are taken from the act of essence. * * * Among all such introductory passages, Zeta 1 contains Aristotle 's most probing analysis of Being. Its goal is to establish the primacy of substance as Being, and, along with that, the entirely relative status as Beings of the other categories. The primary Being is spoken of as both a " this " and the " whatis ." 3 This fact makes for a certain confusion, since it is not evident whether " what-is " signifies the individual substance or its essence. The solution to this problem is not pertinent to our inquiry. However, it does, quite mistakenly, take on importance for M. Gilson. The first argument showing the primacy of Entity rests on the fact that when we express what a thing is, we speak in terms of substance o.r essence. While Being is expressed in so many ways, it is obvious that of these primary Being is the what-is, which signifies the Entity. For when we say of what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or bad, not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do not say" white" or" hot" or" three cubits long," but a " man " or a " god." Substance, then, is the fundamental and the principal reality, • Z 1, 1028all-12. ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF BEING 31 that which primarily is. The remaining categories, on the other hand, are Beings only insofar as they inhere in substance. And...