“Abstractio Totius” and “Abstractio Totalis”

"ABSTRACTIO TOTIUS" AND "ABSTRACTIO TOTALIS" THE topic o£ abstraction has probably attracted more attention in recent years than ever previously in the Thomistic tradition. I do not intend to recapitulate here the history o£ the controversy/ but rather to go back to its source. It seems that this difference o£ opinion on the topic of abstraction takes its origin from the distinctions o£ certain traditional commentators on the writings o£ Saint Thomas. These commentators are Thomas de Vio Cajetan and John o£ Saint Thomas.2 It can be said, with some degree o£ probability , that without their interpretations, the doctrine of Saint Thomas on abstraction would not have been subjected to the amount of critical examination that has come to it, particularly in more recent years. In itself, this preoccupation with the topic of abstraction is beneficial to the Thomistic tradition, and this for two main reasons. Firstly, such criticism and controversy preclude the purely passive acceptance of an important element in the traditional philosophy. Secondly, and not entirely separated from the first reason, abstraction is the basis of intellectual knowl1 An extensive list of the recent literature on this topic is to be found in the first foot-note of Edward D. Simmons' article--" The Thomistic Doctrine of the Three Degrees of Formal Abstraction" in The Thamist, XXII (1959), 87-67. 2 For present purposes, the following quotation may be taken as summarizing the doctrine of John of Saint Thomas on abstractio totalis with which we will be concerned here--" Et non loquimur de abstractione ' totali ' quae abstrahit aliquid ut praedicabile ab inferioribus; sic enim ista abstractio est communis conditio sCientiarum, quae non agunt de singularibus sed de universalibus." (John of St. Thomas-Ars Logica. (Reiser ed.), S!i!!i!b, 17-!i!O, q. XXVII-" De Unitate et Distinctione Scientiarum "). In this article I will be concerned only with Cajetan's doctrine. In any case, of the two, it was Cajetan who first introduced " abstractio totalis" to the traditional philOsophy. " ABSTRACTIO TOTIUS " AND " ABSTRACTIO TOTALIS " 73 edge and the question of the distinction of the speculative sciences. As principle in both respects, its importance is manifest -" a small error in the beginning is great in the end." 3 In its general outlines, the traditional doctrine on abstraction has certain essential features. By virtue of the cognoscitive power called intellect, man can know the quiddity of material things as represented in the phantasms of the higher internal senses.4 Such intellectual knowledge, of its nature, abstracts from the hie et nunc inasmuch as it is knowledge which lays aside the individuating material conditions of the thing known and considers only the quiddity or essence. This act of abstraction is attributed to the agent intellect.5 An essence or quiddity is therefore capable of being understood according as it is abstracted from individuating material conditions, which is to abstract it from individual matter. But individual matter is twofold-sensible and intelligible.6 All understanding abstracts from individual sensible matter inasmuch as it abstracts from the individual sensible appearances as represented in the phantasm, which is to abstract the universal from the particular.7 What remains as the object of intellection, is a quiddity in whose definition is put common sensible matter, but not individual sensible matter. For instance , man is known as a being composed of rational soul and a human body of flesh and bones, but not, however, as this being (i.e., Socrates) composed of this rational soul and this flesh and these bones.8 Man is known in this latter fashion by reflection, which is in a certain way the reverse of abstraction. It is also possible for the intellect to abstract from all sensible matter in its understanding. Therefore even the above common sensible matter is left aside. So the intellect can understand triangle, not only apart from this color (i.e., green) and this • De Ente et E$sentia, prooemium. 4 Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 1, corp.; In d.e Anima, Lib. ill, lect. viii, (Marietti ed.). "Ibid., I, q. 79, a. 8, corp.; In de Anima, Lib. ill, lect. x; Q. de Anima, a. iv. 8 Ibid., I, q. 85, a. 1...