Philosophical Reasoning by John Passmore (review)

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXVI DECEMBER, 1963 No.4 BOOK REVIEWS Philosophical Reasoning. By JoHN PASSMORE. New York: Scribner's, 1961. Pp. ix, 150. $3.50. In this tidy little work, Professor John Passmore, of the Australian National University at Canberra, presents a deceptively simple yet powerful argument for the legitimacy of reasoning in philosophy-all reasoning is not, nor should it be, either mathematical deduction or causal inference from experimental fact. Passmore's argument is deceptively simple in that he does not set himself in violent and noisy opposition to anyone; he carries on a quiet polemic, critically examining the reasoning procedures of his fellow philosophers, most often those of an analytic bent like himself . At the same time, the argument is extremely powerful-one is tempted to say even radically revolutionary-in that its explicit purpose is to reinstate "metaphysical deductions" (though not "deductive metaphysics ") . General procedural lines are already clearly visible in the chapter, "The Infinite Regress "-the first of the types of reasoning discussed by Passmore . Names of philosophers referred to in the discussion range from Parmenides and Plato to Ryle, Popper, and Waismann. The argument is first set out in a quotation from Plato and objections to it are brought up principally in terms of evading the force of the infinite regress; contemporary use of the infinite regress is then referred to, the upshot of 139 140 BOOK REVIEWS which is the statement that the argument " has force only under relatively complex circumstances" (p. 28); and finally the chapter contains a rather sharp criticism of a rejection by Waismann of the infinite regress. This is the pattern in all the discussions that follow-discussions of " the twoworlds argument" (against dualism), of self-refutation, of arguments to meaninglessness (verifiability, arguments of "excluded opposites," and "paradigm cases "), and, Passmore's own tentative contribution, "allocation to categories." In some cases arguments are rejected, at least in the form proposed; in others they are not only accepted but insisted upon, though never without critical examination. A neat, compact analysis, it will be interesting to see how Philosophical Reasoning is received by Passmore's fellow analytical philosophers-provided , that is, that its deceptive appearance of lack of substance does not cause it, like Hume's treatises, to "fall dead-born from the press." Its main point will naturally be welcomed by philosophers of a tradition which has never doubted the validity of properly philosophical reasoning. The work can, then, be generally recommended to anyone familiar with or interested in analytical philosophy. Nevertheless, the work is presented as an exercise in philosophical reasoning , and on such grounds it should be fair game for controversy on the cogency of its arguments in particular instances. One argument must appear suspect to any convinced dualist-the " two-worlds argument " directed expressly against dualism. Passmore says he could, " more frivolously , have described it as the Humpty Dumpty argument" (p. 40), since its point is that if the world is broken down into a duality it can never be put together again. At the end of the chapter devoted to this argument Passmore states the thesis exactly as follows: " Even to state such a theory, its exponents are obliged to destroy the ontological contrast which the theory is supposed to be setting up" (p. 56). Arguing for the validity of the "two-worlds argument," what Passmore maintains is that there is a fairly general agreement among modern philosophers (perceptionists, phenomenalists, nab ·alists, etc.) to reject dualism-an agreement which is based on an at least implicit acceptance of the "two-worlds argument." In the discussion arguments for dualism are pronosed, and promptly demolished, in a haphazard series stretching from PLtto to "psycho-physical parallelism" (as a proposed way of avoiding the "two-worlds argument ") . In each case the form of the refutation is similar: to safeguard its value as an explanation, dualism must explain the interaction between the " two worlds," something usually done by postulating a " bridgeentity ," which partakes of both worlds; but such entities are destructive of their own purpose...