The Range of Intellect by Barry Miller, S. M., and: Remembering: A Philosophical Problem by W. von Leyden (review)

BOOK REVIEWS The Range of Intellect. By BARRY MILLER, S.M. London, Geoffrey Chapman, 1961. Pp. ~~1, with index and glossary of selected terms. 30 shillings. The author of this quite abstruse treatise on the nature of knowledge through affective connaturality states, in the conclusion of one of his chapters, that " we can accommodate and incorporate what is true and valuable in the intuitions of other philosophical schools, without in the least compromising what is perennial in Thomism. Concern to preserve the perennial in Thomism is not to be identified with rigidity and insensitivity to modern developments " (p. 168) . With these sentiments we heartily concur. As long as Thomism is alive and growing, it will meet and engage other living currents of thought, not merely to essay a challenge against their systematic formulations but also to profit from their truths, and as long as Thomism remains true to its own essential spirit and principles, it will be validly Thomism in the midst of its growth and change. The Range of Intellect proposes to assimilate in Thomistic terms the currently much discussed theories of knowledge through affective connaturality . In this sense, the 'range of intellect' is presented as something broader than that which the Thomistic tradition has generally emphasized; it is broader than purely conceptual knowledge of the kind principally treated in Thomistic psychologies. So far this should cause no cavilling on the part of Thomists. It is generally recognized, for instance, that a good theory of intellectual knowledge of material singulars, or of experiential intellectual knowledge requires some elaboration of a thesis of non-conceptual knowledge. However, taking up one by one the several propositions for which Fr. Miller argues in the course of establishing his position vis-a-vis knowledge through affective connaturality, a number of difficulties appear, which, in the end, seem to cast considerable doubt over his final conclusion. What the root of the difficulties is not immediately apparent, but if a suggestion might be made at this point, it would be that the author's metaphysics builds itself up not wisely but too well. There is, of course, a somewhat widely-held opinion nowadays that metaphysics can proceed on its own power without deep roots (even without any roots) in natural philosophy. If this opinion is unsound, The Range of Intellect may perhaps be cited as an example. The author constructs his theory of knowledge mainly in the metaphysical terms of essence and existence. Essence is conceived as static, formal; existence is dynamic, activating. Hence, the author argues, since knowledge is clearly something dynamic, knowledge 112 BOOK REVIEWS 113 pertains by right to the existential order. Now if, on the other hand, the same problem-the theory of knowledge-is viewed from the point of view of the natural philosopher, the emphasis is immediately placed on the nature (the essence as nature) of the knower, and nature is dynamic, the principle of motion in a thing which is in it per se and primo. There is no need then to appeal to esse to find dynamism in things. The effects of ' metaphysicizing ' the terms of his discussion show up more or less clearly in many of the particular conclusions which the author proposes. His first major conclusion is that knowledge is " supraphysical esse." This is a good definition although it is somewhat abbreviated. If we are thinking of the very root of knowledge acts, we might well term it " supraphysical esse." Esse here need not signify the actus essendi, but rather whatever exercises that act. But if, on the other hand, we want to define knowledge itself, and not merely its root, and if we want to defin(! it as the natural philosopher meets it (and he is the first to meet and treat of knowledge) we cannot abstract from the fact that knowledge is always of something. Then we would have to include its object in the definition, and define knowledge as ' the possession of a form existing in a supraphysical mode," or something of that sort. This definition expressly removes knowledge from the existential order and places it in the order of nature. The author's definition does not expressly insert knowledge in the...