Political Philosophy, Political Theology, and Morality

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, AND MORALITY LO STRAUSS'S recently published lectures on" Jerusalem and Athens " 1 compel one to consider criticisms which have been made against him, not by positivists or existentialists but by men identified with the Christian and natural law traditions. These criticisms, provoked by Strauss's "What is Political Philosophy?" essay, were directed against his work in its entirety.2 What disturbs these critics is Strauss's silence about the relationship between political philosophy and theology. Unlike Plato, he fails to search into the depths of the human soul to gain experience of the good and knowledge of virtue. He does not transcend the merely political order, the human things, toward knowledge of the Divine which is the measure of all things. This failure is no accident, for Strauss, according to this criticism, repudiates any connection between theology and political philosophy; or he asserts that theology has nothing to do with political philosophy. Accord1 " Jerusalem and Athens: Some Preliminary Reflections," The City College Papers, No. 6 (New York: The City College, 1967). Strauss's lectures were the inaugural " The Frank Cohen Public Lectures in Judaic Affairs." • What follows is based on the remarks of William C. Havard, " The Method and Results Qf Political Anthropology in America," Archiv fur Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie , XLVII (1961), 395-415 and especially 411-14, and Gerhart Niemeyer, "What is Political Knowledge? " Review of Politics XXIII (Jan. 1961), 101-07 and especially 101-04. However, similar criticism are made in three articles by Dante Germino, "The Revival of Political Theory," Journal of Politics XXV (Aug. 1963), 437-60; "Eric Voegelin's Contribution to Contemporary Political Theory," Review of Politics XXVI (July 1964), 378-40~ (especially 386-87); and "Second Thoughts on Leo Strauss's Machiavelli," Journal of Politics XXVIII (Nov. 1966), 794-817. For a related criticism, more sympathetic to Strauss, see G. P. Grant, "Tyranny and Wisdom: A Comment on the Controversy between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojeve," Social Research XXXI (Spring, 1964), 45-7~. A rather vitriolic criticism was also made by Robert J. McShea, "Leo Strauss on Machiavelli," Western Political Quarterly XVI (Dec. 1963), 789-97. 307 308 JAMES STEINTRAGER ingly, he fails to indicate that Christian political philosophy added anything that was relevant for understanding the right order of political life. He refuses to admit that the novel view of transcendence embodied in the Incarnation made an essential difference for political thought. But any attempt to pursue political knowledge apart from these religious insights constitutes a rejection of transcendence. Strauss's political philosophy is as earthbound as the modern political philosophy he has so soundly criticized. Consequently his thinking is often moralistic rather than metaphysical or ontological. He is content to leave the quest for fundamental truth at the level of moral approval or disapproval. In fact, he comes dangerously close to a moralism where authoritative approval rests with men whose character has been formed by a classical education, i.e., there are no objective standards outside the individual. The lectures on "Jerusalem and Athens" are not likely to answer such criticisms. It is true that Strauss is no longer silent on the subject of Revelation, i.e., he now speaks openly of Jerusalem. But he still depreciates, not merely by his silence , the Christian tradition. Moreover, he explicitly states that Jerusalem, the Biblical faith, and Athens, Greek thought, are representative of contradictory principles. Each tradition claims to embody " true wisdom, thus denying to the other its claim to be wisdom in the strict and highest sense." He claims that we are " compelled . . . to make a choice, to take a stand " between these two contradictory principles. Yet in the very act of listening to each side, prior to deciding, " we have already decided in favor of Athens against Jerusalem." The reason for this is the following: " According to the Bible, the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord; according to the Greek philosophers, the beginning of wisdom is wonder." By wondering, we show we do not simply fear, i.e., we question the authenticity of Revelation. Yet having suggested this, Strauss immediately and characteristically blurs the picture. He defends the Bible against Biblical criticism, against that form...