The Logic of Creation: A Note

THE LOGIC OF CREATION: A NOTE RCENT DISCUSSIONS of the Christian conception of creation have made it clear that the relation between the claims of science and the claims of religion has been widely confused. It would be extravagant, indeed, to presume that in the course of this brief analysis the myriad difficulties surrounding the Christian view of creation will adequately be resolved. However, it is the purpose of the following examination to take one step toward clarifying what has seemed irremediably confused. Presumably, the creation of the world has been explained in such radically different ways by science and the JudeaChristian tradition that many have concluded that the explanations are contradictory and thus one explanation must be admitted while the other rejected. Without describing the intricacies of either the Christian or the scientific view of creation, I think it can be demonstrated that the two divergent conceptions are not necessarily contradictory. Therefore, the appropriation of one conceptual scheme does not necessarily affirm the exclusion of the other. Moreover, I suspect that it is feasible for one to hold both the Christian conception and the scientific description of creation without logical contradiction . Suppose that one could very roughly unpack the creation claims of science and Christianity into the following over simplified linguistic forms: A) The world was "created" because of an explosion (the Big Bang Theory). B) The world was "created" because of God (that is to say, God created the world). Surely, the grammatical structure of the two linguistic forms inclines one to accommodate the rather attractive , most simple form of contradiction as an evaluation here. It seems as though the same subject is being " explained " by two divergent theses, and thus one thesis must be incorrect. But one is obliged to be hesitant about being misled by 852 THE LOGIC OF cl:rEATlON superficial similarities between certain forms of expression, and moreover, to avoid philosophical confusions, one must distinguish the " surface grammar " of linguistic forms £rom their " depth grammar " or logical structure. The following analysis may be helpful to elucidate the problem. If two observers watch a bucket fall from a workman's ladder, in the particular context envisaged, at least the subsequent sets of statements might be proposed to capture the sense of what has been seen. Set A) 1. A bucket is hanging on a workman's ladder. 9l. The bucket is subject to the law o£ gravity. 3. The bucket falls because it is subject to the law of gravity. Set B) 1. A bucket is hanging on a workman's ladder. Q. The bucket is knocked off the ladder by the workman . 3. The bucket falls because the workman knocked it off the ladder. For the purpose of our analysis, careful attention will be given to statements Q and 3 in both of the represented sets above. It is contended that statement 2 of set A, " the bucket is subject to the law of gravity," is not being used to report an occurrence. The law of gravity, in this context, cannot be claimed to happen at a definite time, and surely it would be logically odd to ask how long gravity took. The bucket is subject to the law of gravity whether it is hanging from the workman's ladder or is held in the workman's hand. The statement implies that, if the bucket is not supported by some means, then it will fall according to the law of gravity. Such statements as "the bucket is subject to the law o£ gravity" may be given the appellation, as Ryle suggests, " hypothetical statements" 1 to distinguish them from other statements which display important differences in terms of logical status. An 1 Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson, London, 1949. 354 RONALD S. LAURA example of a statement which conveniently differs in logical environment from the " hypothetical statement " is statement Q of set B. Statement 2 of set B, " the bucket is knocked off the ladder by the workman," is a report of something being done or something that has happened. Such statements which are used to report an occurrence or occurrences are generally called "categorical statements," 2 and they logically entail the possibility...