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THE QUEST FOR METAPHYSICS PART I. '' THE OLDEST as well as the most recent ontological claim is that the truths ontology gives us are about Being-about Being as such." 1 Professor Hook in disputing the existence of metaphysics here refers to the traditional concept, which originated in the works of Aristotle.2 The term itself, " metaphysics," was apparently first applied by the disciples of Aristotle to a group of books which were to be studied after the Physics. The metaphysical books explained the "science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature." 3 The study of being as being was intended to attain a knowledge of the first principles and highest causes of things. This knowledge, wisdom or philosophy in the fullest sense, was called first philosophy since it was highest in dignity, although it came after physics in the order of learning. The study of first philosophy was united by Aristotle with the study of theology.4 For him theology was the study of immaterial and immovable substances and so an extension of first philosophy, which dealt with being as being in relation to substance in general. The adequacy of the unification of first philosophy with theology has been widely discussed and disputed.5 How1 Sidney Hook, The Quest for Being (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1963)' p. 147. • Takatura Ando, Metaphysics: A Critical Survey of Its Meaning (The Hague: Martinus Nijhofi, 1963), pp. 3-16. • Metaphysics, IV, 1, 1003a20. 'Ibid., VI, 1, 1026a30. • Cf. Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951); J. D. Beach, " Separate Entity as the Subject of Aristotle's Metaphysics," The Thomiat, XX, (January, 1957), 75-95; Augustin Mansion, " Philosophie premiere, philosophie seconde et metaphysique chez Aristotle," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, XVI (Mai, 1958), 165-221. 519 520 JAMES COUNAHAN ever, there is no doubt that Aristotle himself made this unification and that it entered the common tradition of metaphysics . Conforming to the thought of Aristotle the ancients divided philosophy into practical and speculative branches. The latter was subdivided into physics, mathematics, and metaphysics or theology. This division was taken over by the Arabian philosophers , notably both Avicenna and Averroes, and it was passed on to the Scholastics by them. It was Avicenna who made the distinction between the subject of metaphysics and its goal (id quod quaeritur) . The subject of metaphysics was being as being but its goal was the knowledge of immaterial being. In this way the unity of metaphysics and theology was maintained.6 Modern thought tends to be shy of being, and metaphysics has been in difficult straights since Kant.7 However, to defend the existence of metaphysics as originally and traditionally understood we must claim that the truths it gives are about being as being. " Yet despite the enormous literature which has been written about Being, it is extremely difficult to find anything clear or intelligible in writings which contain that expression," Professor Hook rightly remarks.8 Certainly "being" is hard to define. It does not refer to a species. Being cannot be contrasted to its opposite, non-being, because non-being is nothing. Nor is being a genus. The limitless variety of things in being defies the discovery of any common trait. Everything from a glorious being to just being funny is "being." The use of analogy hardly improves matters if God be taken as primary in being. Introduction of the Infinite into" being" only makes the notion more foggy and burdens the discussion with theological overtones. Must we then agree with Professor Hook that " there is no such thing as 'Being,' i.e., it is a word that neither designates nor refers to anything observable or discernible in the world, • Takatura Ando, op. cit., pp. 17-39. 7 Ibid., pp. 40-70. 8 Ibid., p. 147. THE QUEST FOR METAPHYSICS 521 and has neither a substantive nor attributive character? " This study will answer this question in the negative. We shall show that traditional metaphysics does have a subject, being as such, sufficiently definite to be worthy of scientific study. We shall not attempt to...

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