Situationism and the New Morality ed. by Robert L. Cunningham (review)

716 BOOK REVIEWS cipline as did Frazer's Golden Bough and Eliade's Patterns in Comparative Religion. The sophistication and complexity of religionswissenschaft in gathering and integrating anthropological, sociological, and linguistic data do not lend themselves to this general type of study in the future. The Catholic University of America Washington, D. C. WILLIAM CENKNER, 0. P. Situationism and the New Morality. Edited by RoBERT L. CuNNINGHAM. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970. Pp. 281. $3.50. Situationism and the New Morality is apparently intended as an introduction to the recent debates centering on the status of moral principles which have interested not only theologians and philosophers but have at times been the subject of popular discussion. The editor has divided the book into two main parts. The first is an original essay of fifty-one pages in which the editor explains at an introductory level the background from which the situationist movement seems to have developed and the issues with which it is concerned. Each of us would, of course, choose slightly differing ways to introduce such a subject, but it would seem unprofitable for me to quarrel with small points in the Introduction in this space. The second part of the book consists of selected readings and is itself divided into three sections. The first section is a set of exchanges between Professor Joseph Fletcher (surely the best-known exponent of situationism) and Father Herbert McCabe. The second section consists of eight essays, concerned in some cases with the situationist debate directly, but in others merely with issues relevant to the debate. In this section such secular writers as B. J. Diggs and Jonathan Bennett are included as well as religious writers. Thus, this section illustrates even in its selection of writers one of the best things about the situationist movement-it has led to discussion in depth between secular and Christian moral philosophers of a kind which is all too often lacking. The third section of readings is a critique of Fletcher's position and defense of " intrinsicalism " by Professor Aurel Kolnai with a response by Fletcher written for this book. The book does not, alas, contain an index which would have been particularly helpful given the wide range of interrelated views and topics scattered throughout its contents. A book divided into so many discreet units obviously presents a reviewer with difficult choices, and these choices are made more difficult in the present case by the fact that as a secular moral philosopher I have a certain BOOK REVIEWS 717 feeling of entering a family quarrel in discussing the two most interesting (to me) parts of the book-the debates between Fletcher and McCabe and Kolnai and Fletcher. Since, however, I can hardly take the space to introduce and comment on each essay in the second section, it seems best for me first to make some comments on the two debates just mentioned and then to raise some general issues about situationism which arise as one reflects on the whole book. In this way I can perhaps best illustrate the philosophic interest and usefulness of the work as a whole. Professor Fletcher's version of situation ethics is, of course, that which most of us have in mind when we discuss situationism, and most readers of this journal will not need any introduction to it.l The first essay in Fletcher's exchange with Father McCabe does, however, present a good introduction to his views, and it will facilitate later discussion if we are reminded of their basic outline. Generically, situationism is a thesis about the status of principles of rightness. Basically, the situationist recognizes as binding only one principle of rightness, namely, the promotion of whatever he takes to be ultimate intrinsic value. All other principles of rightness are employed only as guides or illuminators and may be overridden in any situation if this value is better promoted by doing so. Thus, as Fletcher sees clearly, there may be as many versions of situationism as there are positions on value. Fletcher's own theory makes agapic love the focus of value, and he may most properly be called an agapic or Christian situationist. Since Fletcher is...