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## HUMANISM AND HELLENISM: LUCIAN AND THE AFTERLIVES OF GREEK IN MORE'S *UTOPIA*

BY JANE RAISCH

In one of the many letters prefacing Thomas More's *Utopia*, Guillaume Budé jokingly recounts his attempts to locate the mysterious island: "I personally . . . have made investigation and discerned for certain that Utopia lies outside the limits of the known world. Undoubtedly, it is one of the Fortunate Isles, perhaps close to the Elysian Fields, for More himself testifies that Raphael Hythlodæus has not yet stated its position by giving its definite bearings."<sup>1</sup> This observation might seem to be simply an instance of fanciful geography on Budé's part; the Fortunate Isles and the Elysian Fields were mythological destinations in the ancient Greek afterlife, and thus locating Utopia among them playfully underscores its notorious inaccessibility. But Utopia resembles the islands of the Greek afterlife in another way as well: Hythlodæus informs us that "[the Utopians] believe that the dead move about the living and are witnesses of their words and actions" (*U*, 225). Budé thus extends into the paratexts More's desire to locate Utopia—that eternal non-place—in a liminal space between the living and the dead, one haunted by the afterlives of texts as much as by the ghosts of former residents. From Homer to Aristophanes to Lucian—from epic to comedy to satire—the afterlife routinely enabled both authors and characters to confront their own mytho-literary lineages, provoking both metacritical and intertextual self-examination.

Budé's positioning of *Utopia* within the generically and historically layered space of Greek storytelling inserts More's fictional universe—and More's way of constructing fictions—within this self-referential Greek narrative tradition. This tradition combines scholarly modes of investigation with fictional modes of representation to produce the kind of speculative fantasy at work in *Utopia*.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, depictions of the afterlife in Greek literature crystalize this synthesis of the scholarly and the fictional, revealing how the energies of cultural recovery come to be represented in narrative form.<sup>3</sup> A social interaction in Homer's underworld, for instance, where Odysseus confronts his old comrade Achilles, is also an intertextual reflection on Odysseus's poetic and heroic origins in the *Iliad*.<sup>4</sup> This interaction is both a meeting

between two epic heroes and between two models for the epic genre. In Aristophanes's comedy the *Frogs*, the underworld becomes an even more explicit stage for generic self-consciousness when Dionysus, the god of tragedy, oversees a contest between Aeschylus and Euripides to decide who should be literally revived in order to culturally revive Greek tragedy.<sup>5</sup>

But it is in an imaginative travel narrative by the second-century satirist Lucian, *A True Story*, that the afterlife becomes an essentially pure metafictional space, one that affords Homer's characters the same ontological status as Homer himself. By having authors and characters inhabit—and interact within—the same postmortem landscape, Lucian uses the imaginative workings internal to literature to structure the external workings of literary history.<sup>6</sup> The afterlife for Lucian thus becomes a space where the Greek tradition can be both preserved and interrogated, subtly shifting the narrative register of his fictionality from the solidly mythological to something closer to the fictional. This highly self-reflexive brand of fictionality was a product of Lucian's belated position in the Greek tradition. Like other postclassical Greek authors active during the Hellenistic and imperial periods, Lucian inherited a profound sense of coming after a Greek golden age: his fictions almost universally concern themselves with both imitating and mocking the classical Greek authors he was understood to be not just following, but preserving. Fiction, for Lucian, was inextricably tied to cultural recovery and critique, and he repeatedly returned to the afterlife to imaginatively stage these processes.

While the influence of Lucian on More has not gone unnoticed, that influence has been almost exclusively understood through the lens of satire.<sup>7</sup> But what this focus on satire has failed to recognize—and what I will argue here—is that Lucian's belated, self-reflexive, and hybridized mode of imaginative fictionality guides the very construction of *Utopia* and its preoccupation with the recovery of Greek antiquity.<sup>8</sup> Like postclassical Greek authors, More and other humanists understood themselves to be coming after a golden age of classical culture that they desired to preserve, revive, and, at times, irreverently reimagine.<sup>9</sup> Lucian's postclassicism offered More a palimpsestic model for negotiating belatedness through fiction, combining scholarly modes of conservation with destabilizing fictional modes of representation. Through this historically stratified perspective—akin to what James Porter has called “mediated classicism”—adventure, exploration, heroism, and the imaginative construction of new worlds all become vehicles through which the reception and recovery of the past are made legible.<sup>10</sup>

This mediated perspective offers an alternative to conventional readings of *Utopia's* Hellenism. While Eric Nelson has convincingly demonstrated that *Utopia* allies itself with the socio-ethical values of Hellenism in opposition to Italianate conceptions of *romanitas*, the question remains: what did Greek mean to More? For Nelson and others, Greek has simply meant Plato, the political theorist who wrote the *Republic*.<sup>11</sup> But as I contend, the undeniable influence of Plato on *Utopia* cannot be understood without considering Plato's lengthy reception within the Greek world, which, in turn, shaped how More would have encountered Plato's writings: through the *vita* of Plato by Diogenes Laertius that introduced most printed editions of Plato before (and after) 1520 and, most especially, through the Lucianic dialogues parodying Plato that More and Desiderius Erasmus had been translating.<sup>12</sup> These imaginative rewritings of Plato are a crucial missing piece for understanding *Utopia's* literary investment in the Platonic tradition—an investment modeled on a Lucianic project of putting Plato's dialogic mode of investigation to imaginative work.<sup>13</sup>

#### I. UTOPIAN CONTEXTS: MORE'S GREEK HUMANISM

An underlying conceptual connection between the afterlife and cultural recovery continued to characterize depictions of scholarship well after Greek antiquity. In the Renaissance, the figure of the scholar and the figure of the necromancer were often evoked interchangeably; Petrarch famously feared that his obsession with uncovering the past would be misconstrued as a kind of dark art, an impression he certainly didn't discourage by writing several letters to the ghosts of ancient authors.<sup>14</sup> The continued currency of the terms "revival" and "Renaissance" today to describe the period suggests even we remain attached to this semi-mystical vision of cultural rediscovery as a form of revivification.

The Renaissance association between scholarship and necromancy particularly speaks to the socio-historical conditions surrounding the recovery of Greek. While Latin remained at the center of Western European literary and religious culture throughout the Middle Ages, Greek was essentially a lost language and textual tradition for most of the medieval period through the early Renaissance.<sup>15</sup> For More, the language and texts of the Greek world had only recently been recovered by Italian humanists in contact with Byzantine exiles, and though Greek learning was slowly making its way into Northern European intellectual circles, for many, it remained unreachably distant.<sup>16</sup> Even

as late as 1584, the German humanist Martin Crusius believed that Athens was essentially a lost world, a historical legend more than an actual place, an idea and ideal rather than a reality.<sup>17</sup>

*Utopia's* own preoccupations with the ideal thus make it a fitting—and in some ways inaugural—intervention in this moment of cultural recovery, one that deploys processes of both world-making and scholarship to depict Greek's intellectual promise and its cultural remoteness, its position just beyond the horizon of the knowable and discoverable. *Utopia's* investment in constructing communities—both transnationally and transhistorically—reflects a desire to correct the lingering reality of cultural loss. More locates his true ideal community within *Utopia's* frequent representations of the scholarly practices of recovery and reception: Greek scholarship produces community on the island of Utopia in book 2, in sixteenth-century Antwerp in book 1, and in the friendly correspondence among fellow-intellectuals that constitute the paratexts.<sup>18</sup>

This contemporary scholarly community is mirrored in the intertextual community of (deceased) Greek authors who structure More's text and through whom the Greek tradition is represented, preserved, and understood. Indeed, the pressures of cultural identity that influenced the postclassical Greek authors More would have been reading inextricably linked their sense of community to their scholarly and pedagogical exposure to an inherited and interpreted tradition. As Eleanor Dickey points out, “educated Greeks and Romans did not read Homer (or other poets) in a vacuum; they studied Homeric poems at schools in which obscure words and complex passages were authoritatively explained, and they discussed criticism and interpretation.”<sup>19</sup> The Renaissance reading experience of the classics, as Anthony Grafton has shown, was similarly an intertextual and transhistorical team effort, routinely informed by commentaries and lexica produced out of the postclassical Greek world.<sup>20</sup>

In representing and foregrounding a layered Greek interpretive community, More creates a new Hellenic model of humanism.<sup>21</sup> This humanism uses its Hellenic associations to offer a pointed critique of—and alternative to—the Latinity associated with dialectical theology and scholasticism that More, along with almost all of his intellectual coterie, saw as insipid, overly hermetic, and bogged down in trivial detail.<sup>22</sup> More paints this Latinity as hopelessly out-of-date when he famously writes to Martin Dorp (a defender of scholastic pedagogy) in defense of this new, Hellenic humanism: “I continue to long, indeed still dare to hope, for the day, none too long in the future, when the debates on

[the knowledge of Greek] have ceased, when your long-winning streak in the schools has stopped making you loath to give way on this point, and when you do what I can see no one else can do, namely, persuade yourself to learn Greek.”<sup>23</sup> Greek studies offered a model of interpretation that privileged community and tradition, conveniently new such that it could be disassociated from intellectual trends of the past but also usefully old—older even than Latin—such that it retained links to the venerated tradition of classical antiquity. Greek’s simultaneous newness and oldness allowed More to craft a hermeneutic space that avoided the encroaching sprawl often associated with scholastic marginalia while retaining the intellectual benefits of carefully curated and deployed interpretive apparatuses and commentaries.

In these ways, More’s Hellenism conformed to the conventional values of humanism: against scholasticism, in favor of print, and optimistic about the interpretive lessons offered by recovered classical texts. But, as *Utopia* illustrates, More also crafted a distinctive vision of Greek humanism, one that departed in significant ways from the version of Greek humanism endorsed by his friend Erasmus. Most significantly, More engaged in none of the allegorizing of the Classics that was so characteristic of Erasmian Christian humanism. Uninterested in reading Christian figures into classical texts as a way of reconciling the two traditions, More seemed content to let pre-Christian/pagan and Christian discourses exist in two, distinct intellectual realms, each governed by their own interpretive tradition. As he writes in the dedicatory epistle of his translations of Lucian, “I’m not much troubled by the fact that the author [Lucian] seems to have been disposed to doubt his own immortality. . . . For what difference does it make to me what a pagan thinks about those articles contained in the principal mysteries of the Christian faith?”<sup>24</sup> Implicitly appealing to both historical and cultural context, More suggests that Lucian and Christian faith are located in distinct intellectual spheres; Lucian can’t actually challenge Christian truth because his work means nothing within that context. In this way, More was able to nullify a common charge leveled at Lucian during the sixteenth century: that he was the epitome of moral corruption and a clear atheist.<sup>25</sup>

In contrast to such anxious condemnations, *Utopia* confidently displays its Lucianic Hellenism: intertextual compilation and collaboration remain firmly within the Greek tradition; Greek commentators and authors, not Christian texts or figures, provide *Utopia*’s hermeneutic mediators. Instead of, for example, staging a prefiguration of Christ via the Silenic Socrates as Erasmus does in his famous adage “The

Sileni of Alcibiades” (1515), *Utopia* mediates its Greek preoccupations exclusively through a lens of Greek reception. Indeed, despite the popularity amongst Renaissance Hellenists of projects that sought to Christianize Plato, exemplified by Marsilio Ficino and his (often allegorical) revival of Neoplatonism, More remained committed to the more literary and more skeptical mode of Lucian.<sup>26</sup>

The stratification of tradition preserved within a text, not superimposed from without, provided More with a structuring mode of speculative inquiry attentive to the contextual layers of reception history; experimental fictionality thus replaces dogmatic or schematic philosophy as a vehicle for speculative inquiry. By using both prose and the dialogue for imaginative—even fantastic—ends (following Lucian), More’s *Utopia* enacts this turn formally and conceptually. Prose fiction, itself an invention of the postclassical Greek world, is marked by a memory of its history and becomes, as Tim Whitmarsh describes it, “the literary space in which the accumulated knowledge of a tradition folds back upon itself, the medium for a self-reflexive meditation upon Greek identity.”<sup>27</sup> With the Greek afterlife as its implicit fictive and communal *topos*, *Utopia* conjures an image of interpretive practice grounded in a quasi-archaeological sensitivity to intertextual stratification and historical return. More’s attention to the importance of ancient tradition thus goes beyond the conventional humanist preference for the ancient over the modern; he embeds scholarly preoccupations into the fabric of *Utopia*’s imaginative constructions, replacing figuration with speculation as a mode of textual engagement. *Utopia* imaginatively maps the recovery of Greek antiquity and gives a narrative to the scholarly procedures that made that recovery possible, redefining, in the process, how reception participates in the making of fiction and the remaking of the past.

## II. DIALOGUING THE WITH DEAD: BEING GREEK IN THE SECOND SOPHISTIC, STUDYING GREEK IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

In 1519, a rogue edition of *Utopia* was published in Florence by the heirs of Filippo Giunta.<sup>28</sup> It contained only a handful of the numerous paratexts that typically accompanied *Utopia*, and most remarkably, it was included at the end—almost as “an afterthought,” as Terence Cave puts it—of a collection of Erasmus and More’s translations of Lucian.<sup>29</sup> *Utopia*, which had framed itself through layers of paratextual material in four previous editions, had, in this one, become a kind of paratext itself, subordinated to, and included within, the greater project

of translating Lucian. From a twenty-first-century perspective, this 1519 *Utopia* reveals a surprising fact about More's sixteenth-century authorial status. As B. R. Branham observes, "in More's lifetime he was probably more widely read as the translator of Lucian than as the author of *Utopia*" and indeed, more than 30 editions of More and Erasmus's translations of Lucian were published during Erasmus's lifetime (in comparison with only five of *Utopia*).<sup>30</sup> In this edition, *Utopia* becomes practically an extension of Lucian's corpus, the logical *telos* of Erasmus and More's efforts to introduce Lucian, and Greek, to the sixteenth century.

Crucial to Lucian's inaugural role in Erasmus and More's Greek humanist program was the self-conscious belatedness of his post-classicism. Indeed, this belatedness resonated with similarly belated humanists, negotiating their own feelings of anachronism, and made Lucian's texts models for how coming after could be an empowered—and even privileged—position. Lucian used the fictional templates of Platonic dialogue and epideictic oratory to navigate an extensive inherited textual tradition and to investigate cultural recovery; he transformed his postclassical belatedness into an instrument of and catalyst for imaginative fictionality. Lucian's postclassical belatedness has its roots in the Second Sophistic, a rhetorical and literary movement that dominated Greek intellectual life from approximately 60 to 230 CE. Operating under the control of the Roman empire, the writers, orators, and scholars associated with the Second Sophistic constructed a Greek cultural and intellectual identity by self-consciously turning to the classical Greek past for models of how to read, write, and think as a Greek. For Second Sophistic authors, forging a textual and cultural Greek identity was a necessarily scholarly and reconstructive process that looked back not only to classical Greece but also to the postclassical origins of scholarship itself at the library of Alexandria. Scholarship is, after all, necessarily a product of authors and readers who understand themselves to be coming after.<sup>31</sup>

An awareness of coming after as a marker of belonging in this hyper-erudite imperial Greek culture explains why the afterlife was so thematically resonant for a Second Sophistic author like Lucian.<sup>32</sup> Lucian wrote an extended and extraordinary afterlife scene in *A True Story*, as well as a series of comedic dialogues called *The Dialogues of the Dead* and an extremely influential dialogue set in the underworld, *Menippus* (which More translated). The necessarily communal nature of the afterlife made it an ideal imaginative space to not only animate the intertextuality of Greek literary history, but to offer a scholarly



interrogation of that history. (Lucian's afterlife, as Jacques Bompaire puts it, is "a librarian's dream" [un rêve de bibliothécaire]).<sup>33</sup> In *A True Story*, for example, Lucian has his unnamed protagonist use the opportunity of meeting Homer (who, incidentally, isn't blind at all) to quiz him on details of how the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were written—details that, the narrator gleefully informs us, end up discrediting two prominent Homeric scholars, Zenodotus and Aristarchus (see *T*, 2.20). In a *Dialogue of the Dead* between Menippus and Cerberus, Menippus interrogates Cerberus about the death of Socrates, seeking out a bit of revisionist mythography. Cerberus obligingly reveals that for all of Socrates's brave-faced acceptance of death-by-hemlock while alive, he "shrieked like an infant, and cried for his children" when he actually arrived in the underworld.<sup>34</sup>

Lucian thus participates in Greek canon formation not by placing legendary figures such as Homer or Socrates on an untouchable pedestal, but by presenting them as objects of skeptical and irreverent scrutiny. In both scenarios, the proximity to mythological and historical persons enabled by the space of the afterlife—what Froma Zeitlin calls "close encounters"—allows for a dramatization of scholarly inquiry by using, in Zeitlin's words, "pseudo-necromantic consultation" to "gain more 'authentic' knowledge" and to explore "the possibility of direct communication with [figures from the past] in the here and now."<sup>35</sup> When, in Lucian's *Menippus*, Menippus returns from the afterlife to share what he has learned, he is so affected by his recent proximity to poets like Homer and Euripides that he catches himself speaking in archaic verses—a situation not so unlike the use of the outdated Attic Greek dialect by Lucian and other Second Sophistic writers.<sup>36</sup>

While the afterlife is the site where Lucian most self-consciously confronts tradition, every fantastical stop his narrator and crew make on their journey in *A True Story* imaginatively manifests an intellectual attribute of Hellenic civilization. Addressed explicitly "to book-enthusiasts" (*T*, 1.1) (literally "to those enthusiastic about stories and/or reason/arguments" [τοῖς περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐσπουδακόσιν] [*T*, 1.1]), the narrator acknowledges that "everything in my story is a more or less comical parody of one or another of the poets, historians and philosophers of old" (*T*, 1.2) and collapses exploration and intellectual discovery as twin motivations for his voyage/narrative: "Once upon a time, setting out from the Pillars of Hercules and heading for the western ocean with a fair wind, I went a-voyaging. The motive and purpose of my journey lay in my intellectual activity and desire for adventure" (*T*, 1.5). Imagining the Greek tradition as a series of landmarks within

his fantastic geography, Lucian in turn makes the process of traveling between those landmarks an act of reception—intellectual precepts or concepts are conveniently transformed into inhabitable, imaginative places. Thus, Lucian's narrator explores and satirizes an aspect of Platonic philosophy when he visits the Moon, a place where Socratic pederasty has been taken to such an extreme that men only marry other men and conceive children in their thigh (also a reference to the miraculous rebirth of Dionysus). This encounter with a fragment of the Platonic corpus is mediated by the voice of the narrator, who takes special care to note down details about the practices he witnesses (see *T*, 1.22). The heroic protagonist is thus again the scholar, mapping his scholarly preoccupations onto an epic and proto-novelistic adventure. Inverting Odysseus's desire to simply return to his home and reestablish his community in Ithaca, this hero craves ever more encounters with new worlds that, taken all together, form his new community. Travel analogizes reception, mapping a tradition through a series of interconnected intellectual and literary encounters.

The way in which a Second Sophistic author like Lucian used the self-consciousness of his texts to return again and again to the same set of Greek figures and themes must have appealed to Renaissance readers and writers similarly trying to negotiate the classical legacy. Branham has usefully characterized Lucian's appeal to More in these very terms: "the broad similarities in [Lucian and More's] cultural contexts and interests must have contributed to Lucian's appeal for More by providing a 'classical' precedent for . . . characteristically humanist predilections . . . above all, the use of an acknowledged canon of classical authors as a constant frame of reference."<sup>37</sup> Renaissance readers saw both an intrinsic worth and an exegetical function to many Second Sophistic texts, which explains why Diogenes Laertius's biography of Plato became standard front matter for most editions of Plato printed in the late fifteenth to mid-sixteenth century and why Hellenistic commentaries on Homer were frequently taken up by bewildered first-time readers.<sup>38</sup>

During the first two decades of the sixteenth century, thanks to the efforts of Erasmus, More, John Colet, Thomas Linacre, and many others whom More affectionately called *Graecistes*, Greek learning was being revived in Oxford and London as an essential component of a humanist education.<sup>39</sup> For these pioneering *Graecistes* and their vocal opponents, however, more was at stake than just pedagogical reform. As their moniker suggests, the *Graecistes* saw themselves as a discrete community whose identity as intellectuals and scholars was

tied to the new Greek learning. In various letters, More describes how the opponents of the *Graecistes* had responded by calling themselves “Trojans,” defending against what they perceived was an attack on Latinity and Roman learning by deriding Greek and its legacy:

Their senior sage christened himself Priam; others called themselves Hector, Paris, and so forth. The idea, whether as a joke or a piece of anti-Greek academic politics, is to pour ridicule on those devoted to the study of Greek. And I hear that things have come to such a pass that that no-one can admit in public or in private that he enjoys Greek without being subjected to the jeers of these ludicrous “Trojans” who think Greek is a joke for the simple reason that they don’t know what good literature is.<sup>40</sup>

For the Trojans, the institutional presence of Greek at Oxford represented the overturning of traditional forms of education and intellectual inquiry. John Skelton viewed Latin learning and scholastic logic as the twin victims of Greek’s intellectual tyranny in his 1520 poem denouncing Cardinal Wolsey, *Speke Parott*:

In Achademia . . . *Greci fari* so occupyeth the chayre,  
That *Latinum fari* may fall to rest and slepe,  
And *silogisari* was drowned at Sturbrydye Fayre.<sup>41</sup>

In this moment at least, Greece and Rome were understood to be not unified halves of a classical whole, but embodiments of two essentially incompatible intellectual ideals.<sup>42</sup>

The Greek learning so championed by the Oxford *Graecistes* was deeply grounded in the texts of the postclassical Greek world, which too was preoccupied with establishing Greekness as a discrete, and elite, intellectual identity. Lucian in particular was an important cultural anchor for this English community of Hellenists: the 1520 catalogue of an Oxford bookseller, John Dorne, attests to the increased popularity of Lucian’s dialogues during this period.<sup>43</sup> Thomas Linacre, noted *Graeciste*, sums up Lucian’s influence well when writing to friend: “The true learning you seek is acknowledged by all to be enshrined in the wisdom of the Greeks. Your toil will become light and amusing and your progress sure, if only you read a little Lucian every day.”<sup>44</sup> While Greek printing was slow to come to England (and never really took off) it is fitting that the first use of Greek movable type in England was in a 1521 Latin translation of Lucian’s *Dipsades* by Henry Bullock, friend of Erasmus and pioneer of Greek studies at Cambridge.<sup>45</sup>

It is thus the postclassical perspective of More's early intellectual context that most obviously differentiates *Utopia* as a project from both Plato's *Republic*, which, though certainly possessing literary qualities, clearly prioritizes philosophical debate, and the descriptions of Atlantis in Plato's *Timaeus* and *Critias*, which prioritize allegory over adventure (and in which Atlantis is, strictly speaking, not an ideal place at all). As Branham observes, the mode of dialogue employed in *Utopia* is structurally most similar to Lucian, not to Plato or to Cicero (the two conventional Renaissance models of dialogue): "instead of Socratic interrogation we have a conversation, an exchange of views, that is not used to familiarize us with a body of doctrine, as in Cicero, but to typify the divergence of two familiar but incompatible perspectives."<sup>46</sup> Perhaps more significantly, More transforms Plato's entirely discursive, virtual republic—which functions as a kind of intellectual laboratory—into a thoroughly un-Platonic, tangible world of travel narrative and New World exploration.<sup>47</sup> This world most closely resembles Lucian's *A True Story*, in which the purely philosophical motivations of the thought experiment are joined with the imaginative motivations of fictional world-building.<sup>48</sup>

More's introduction of the narrator, Hythloday, offers a striking example of this collision of the classical and postclassical, the philosophical and the fantastical. Though Hythloday has obvious affiliations with Plato and the Platonic philosophy of the dialogues (he considers himself to be, after all, a student of philosophy), those affiliations are directly mediated by the postclassical Platonic tradition. On the one hand, when we meet Hythloday, he is dressed (almost comically so) exactly like the typical philosopher, with a "long beard and cloak hanging carelessly from his shoulder" (*U*, 49). This unkempt, bearded figure who stands out amongst the cosmopolitan populous of Antwerp is clearly evocative of the frequently disheveled Socrates. On the other hand, Hythloday is further distinguished by his "sunburnt countenance," which suggests he is a significantly more adventurous traveler than Socrates who almost never ventures outside the walls of Athens (*U*, 49). This fact is corroborated by Peter Giles's report that Hythloday has even traveled with the famed Amerigo Vespucci (see *U*, 51).

Indeed, Giles emphasizes Hythloday's status as traveler with an explicit appeal to the Greek literary corpus, remarking that "[Hythloday's] sailing has not been like that of Palinurus but that of Ulysses, or, rather, of Plato" (*U*, 49). But the Plato Giles calls to mind here is a reference not to the Plato of the Platonic dialogues (in which travel occurs only locally, if at all), but to the Plato of Diogenes

Laertius's *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*. In Diogenes Laertius, Plato becomes a seasoned traveler, sailing all over the Mediterranean and continuously running into trouble; Plato's traveling and his reception are inextricably linked since his various mishaps while traveling are almost without exception the result of the lackluster reception of his philosophy. In one particularly problematic encounter, Plato explains the philosophical and political limitations of tyranny to a tyrant in Sicily, who doesn't take very kindly to Plato's volunteered wisdom and shortly after sells Plato off as a slave.<sup>49</sup> It's this Plato—a palimpsest of Plato's actual writings and his inventive postclassical reception—that Giles conjures here, one who is the product of an historical community of both Platonic readers and whimsical Platonic rewriters.

### III. "THE INCREDIBLE TEACHABLENESS OF THE UTOPIANS:" GREEK SCHOLARSHIP FROM PARATEXT TO TEXT

*Utopia's* paratexts clearly model the primacy of textual analysis and scholarly labor in the production of an ideal intellectual community. Indeed, at times, it is in the paratexts more than in the text itself that *Utopia* seems to be at its most utopian. One of the most memorable paratexts, the image of the Utopian alphabet and language printed with the 1516 and both 1518 editions (designed either by More or Giles), models not just scholarly collaboration but invites scholarly participation (Figure 1).<sup>50</sup>

The simple poem written in Utopian is helpfully both transliterated into the Roman alphabet and translated—"literally" [ad verbum]—into Latin. Neither an untouched linguistic artifact of Utopian nor a Latin translation of a Utopian poem, it is a record of the material procedures and strategies used to make that artifact legible. The Utopian language is thus presented as indivisible from its scholarly reception, a reception the reader is encouraged to take part in and mimic. Readers of *Utopia* could match the Utopian letters to Roman ones and reconstruct for themselves the translation of the poem; one could even fashion a Utopian phrase or two of one's own (albeit with an extremely limited vocabulary). *Utopia* thus frames itself as always already the object of scholarly examination and scrutiny. The participatory nature of this paratextual invitation is enacted in a remarkable copy of a first edition of the text now housed at Yale. This copy, possibly a gift from More to Cuthbert Tunstall, includes the 1516 *Utopia* bound together with "a collection of elementary texts for teaching Greek."<sup>51</sup> As Lisa Jardine has pointed out, such a compilation not only underscores *Utopia's*





investment in a humanistic model of Greek intellectual culture, but also anchors this investment in an interactive program of philological discovery.<sup>52</sup>

The philological reconstruction presented by this paratext is mirrored in the image of geographical construction depicted in the opening line of the poem:

Utopus, my ruler, converted me, formerly not an island, into an island. Alone of all lands, without the aid of abstract philosophy, I have represented for mortals the philosophical city. Ungrudgingly do I share my benefits with others; undemurringly do I adopt whatever is better from others. (*U*, 19)

Referring to the remarkable fact reported in book 2, that King Utopus transformed Utopia into an artificial island by digging a massive ditch, the poem offers the reader two somewhat irreconcilable visions of Utopia. On the one hand, since it is written in Utopian and is accompanied by a Utopian abecedarium, the poem bolsters the verisimilitude of More's narrative by presenting itself as pseudo-archival evidence of Utopia's existence. On the other hand, the content of what it describes—Utopia's constructedness as both a fantastical fiction and a product of intellectual competition with Plato's *Republic*—reminds us of its fabrication. This collision of the scholarly and the fictional presents a precarious image of their mutual dependency. The verisimilar impact of a paratext like this one only succeeds because the reader brings an expectation that scholarly apparatuses operate outside the domain of fiction—they explicate fictions, they don't participate within them. Yet fiction in turn is able to convincingly represent the procedures and methods of scholarly labor, suggesting an underlying affinity between fictional construction and scholarly reconstruction.

The mode of scholarly reconstruction enacted via the image of the Utopian alphabet has Greek resonances on several levels. As the transliteration makes clear, Utopian is a language with Greek roots and grammatical endings ("-a," "-on," "-in," "-os," and so on). The alphabetic unfamiliarity of Utopian also evokes Greek's non-Roman alphabet, and Marina Leslie goes as far as to suggest that its geometrical nature might allude to Aristophanes's geometric description of Cloudecuckooland in the *Birds*, which is also a destination in *A True Story*.<sup>53</sup> The scholarly apparatuses also emphasize the mediated nature of any encounter with Utopia. The poem's voice is necessarily experienced through its Latin translation and the reader accesses information concerning the island

itself exclusively through the narrative of Hythloday as recorded by More. Like Greece, which was itself essentially inaccessible, Utopia remains experienced through the scholarly lens of sixteenth-century Europe.

By going to such lengths to reproduce not just the alphabet of Utopia but its grammatical structures, More also evinces a postclassical philological preoccupation with cultural preservation and conservation through grammar.<sup>54</sup> This preoccupation is then taken a step further by *Utopia's* overall fictional conceit: *Utopia's* scholarly structures literally write Utopia into existence, thus quite directly collapsing textual conservation with textual creation. Utopia is here assembled from grammatical and semantic pieces since the poem, written from the point of view of Utopia personified, literally voices its own origin story. Yet the fact that that voice is mediated through the scholarly labor of translation and annotation in effect merges authorial invention with scholarly intervention. Since the scholarly apparatus of the alphabet is implicated within the fictional construct of Utopia's linguistic reality, scholarship plays a vital role in *Utopia's* fictional inventiveness and experimentation. Indeed, *Utopia's* paratexts most clearly illustrate the interconnectedness of its innovations in fictionality and its scholarly self-awareness; More uses scholarship to reimagine the textual and conceptual boundaries of fiction both inside and out. At the same time, since the scholarly paratexts act as an introduction and frame to the text of *Utopia*, they act as a reminder that fiction is always truly invented *post facto*, not only by the authors who write but, later, by the scholars who interpret.

But *Utopia* doesn't just use scholarship to tell its story. It's also, fundamentally, a story about scholarship. Nowhere is this clearer than on the island itself, beginning with its structures of leadership. Here, More reimagines Plato's philosopher kings, one of the most memorable features of the *Republic*. Instead of locating ideal leaders, and by extension principles of ideal leadership, in the practice of philosophy, More locates them in the practice of scholarship:

The same exception is enjoyed by those whom the people, persuaded by the recommendation of the priests, have given perpetual freedom from labor . . . so that they may learn thoroughly the various branches of knowledge. . . . It is out of this company of scholars that they choose ambassadors, priests, tranibors, and finally the governor himself, who they call in their ancient tongue Barzanes but in their more modern language Ademus. (*U*, 131–33)



The marginal note appended to this description likewise proclaims: “Only Scholars Are Chosen to Official Posts” (*U*, 133). Giving both political and religious authority to those who dedicate their life to the pursuit of knowledge, More clearly aligns the skills of textual and intellectual interpretation with political, social, and economic decision-making; scholar-kings replace philosopher-kings.

The long-standing political privilege afforded to scholars on Utopia resonates with the emphasis Hythloday places on Utopian history when first introducing the island. Its founding myth of origin centers on the legendary conqueror, King Utopus, and a discussion of the physical and cultural formation of modern Utopia vividly opens book 2. This myth quite literally connects the geographic formation of land with the historic formation of a culture since Utopus is responsible for both ideologically founding Utopia as a state and turning Utopia into an island by digging the ditch between the island and the mainland (see *U*, 112–14). Utopia’s transformation into an island nicely aligns it with the fantastic islands that dominate the mytho-fictional geography of Homer, Lucian, and the Greek tradition. In *Charon, or the Inspectors*, for instance, Lucian humorously imagines Homer as the poetic architect of all of Greek geography, and quotes various geographic descriptions from Homer’s epics so as to collapse the act of constructing a tradition with constructing a topography.<sup>55</sup> Lucian, in turn, is poking fun at ancient geographers like Eratosthenes and Strabo, who spent considerable portions of their geographical works condemning or defending Homer’s validity as a geographic authority.<sup>56</sup> Even in the relatively new field of geography, postclassical Greek authors found themselves negotiating the cultural authority of the Greek literary past.

But Utopia’s history doesn’t only exist in this one myth of Utopus. Hythloday insists upon the importance of a long historical tradition recorded in Utopian chronicles: “As for the antiquity of commonwealths . . . you could give a sounder opinion if you had read the historical accounts of [Utopia]. If we must believe them, there were cities among them before there were men among us. Furthermore, whatever either brains have invented or chance has discovered hitherto could have happened equally in both places” (*U*, 107). By drawing attention to this historical tradition, Hythloday locates Utopia in an historical universe governed by the reception, preservation, and interpretation of historical texts.<sup>57</sup> Learning from Utopia, Hythloday implies, requires more than just hearing about it; it requires study of the texts that document and construct its origins. Utopia’s written historical record differentiates it

too from emerging Renaissance narratives surrounding the New World, which often erroneously understood New World cultures to be without history or a sense of the past. While Utopia is newly discovered, it must also be properly recovered. At the same time, however, More is suggesting a conceptual connection between the newness of Greek in Western Europe and burgeoning New World discovery.

In this sense, as something both brand new and exceedingly old, Utopia's position within the English imagination becomes parallel to that of Greek: recently recovered and almost primordially ancient. This parallel is made quite explicit when Hythloday surmises that the Utopians are descendent from the Greeks—something already suggested by the Utopian alphabet—making the story of the recovery of Utopia a story of the recovery of Greek: “According to my conjecture, [the Utopians] got hold of Greek literature more easily because it was somewhat related to their own. I suspect that their race was derived from the Greek because their language . . . retains some traces of Greek in the names of their cities and officials” (*U*, 181). The Utopian's filiative relationship to Greek is underscored by an affiliative appreciation of, and adeptness for, Greek:

When they had heard from us about the literature and learning of the Greeks (for in Latin there was nothing, apart from history or poetry, which seemed likely to gain their great approval), it was wonderful to see their extreme desire for permission to master them through our instruction. . . . They began so easily to imitate the shapes of the letters, so readily to pronounce the words, so quickly to learn by heart, and so faithfully to reproduce what they had learned that it was a perfect wonder to us. (*U*, 181)

While these details winkingly acknowledge More's authorial infusion of Greek into the Utopian language and Utopian institutions, this depiction of Greek learning as unchallenged and seamlessly integrated into Utopian society must have also had a genuine appeal. One appended marginal note praises the “extraordinary teachableness of the Utopians,” while another following bemoans that “nowadays blockheads and loggerheads devote themselves to scholarship” (*U*, 181). An ideal scenario in which Greek's value is self-evident and unquestioned (and linguistic proficiency so easily acquired) was still a far cry from the intellectual climate of early sixteenth-century Oxford, in which More felt obligated to write an excoriating letter to the entire institution condemning the continued resistance to, and suspicion of, Greek learning.

Indeed, Hythloday's motivations for leaving Europe and never wanting to return from Utopia—"I lived [in Utopia] for more than five years and would never have wished to leave except to make known that new world"—are clearly influenced by his disenchantment with European morality, something made quite apparent throughout the debate in book 1 (*U*, 107). His preference for Greek over Latin is implicitly wrapped up in this narrative of disenchantment: the old, morally tainted world of European Latinity versus the new, unsullied world of Hellenic promise. He describes the act of taking his (exclusively) Greek library from Europe to Utopia as a sign of "having made up my mind never to return rather than come back soon" (*U*, 181). Hythloday's Greek library constitutes the closest thing we have to an early sixteenth-century canon of Greek, in which Plato, Aristotle, and the tragedians sit comfortably next to the postclassical likes of Hesychius of Alexandria, Pedanius Dioscorides, Herodian, Theophrastus, Lucian, and Plutarch (see *U*, 181). When recounting this catalogue, Hythloday makes sure to mention that "[the Utopians] are very fond of the works of Plutarch and captivated by the wit and pleasantries of Lucian," further cementing a connection between Utopian intellectual predilections and those of More and Erasmus's Hellenophilic circle (*U*, 183).

While Utopia therefore becomes a kind of Greek-enthusiast's fantasy, the narrative of Utopia's recovery or discovery includes challenges that mimic the material recovery of ancient Greek. Even the Utopians admit that "[they] were able to peruse good [Greek] authors without any difficulty unless the text had faulty readings" (*U*, 181). In particular, knowledge of Utopia is fragmented by gaps in information, gaps that resemble the lacunae that were especially common in the Renaissance reception of Greek, since Greek texts suffered doubly from material degradation and linguistic obscurity. Alluding to such losses in knowledge, Giles describes the troubled reception of Utopia's exact geographic location in his letter to Busleyden:

As to More's difficulty about the geographical position of the island . . . an unlucky accident caused us both [More and Giles] to fail to catch what [Hythloday] said. While Raphael was speaking on the topic, one of More's servants had come up to him to whisper something or other in his ear. I was therefore listening all the more intently when one of our company, who had, I suppose, caught cold on shipboard, coughed so loudly that I lost some phrases of what Raphael said. (*U*, 23)

Transforming textual lacunae into vocal disruption, Giles explains how the nature of this "unlucky accident" [*casus malus*] permanently

obscured knowledge of Utopia's whereabouts (*U*, 22). Giles's "casus malus" evokes another unfortunate accident in book 2, the famous incident with the monkey in which some actual pieces of classical learning are permanently lost: "[the Utopians] received from me most of Plato's works, several of Aristotle's, as well as Theophrastus on plants, which I regret to say was mutilated in parts. During the voyage an ape found the book, left lying carelessly about, and in wanton sport tore out and destroyed various pages in various sections" (*U*, 181). These anecdotes document how easily information and textual material can be lost or fragmented and reflect upon the manifestly contingent nature of historical loss. For Giles, it's the story of an untimely cough, the product, he specifically notes, of being too long exploring at sea (literally "picked up during the voyage" [navigatione collectum]) (*U*, 22). Hythloday's mishap is similarly connected to exploration since the image of the intruding monkey at least in part evokes exotic, non-local sea travel.<sup>58</sup> Exploration provides the narrative of cultural recovery by reimagining the movement of history as spatial rather than temporal. Though playful, these stories locate questions of cultural recovery within conventions of epic journeys.

Both the silliness and the epic undertones of the textual loss caused by the monkey evoke a similar incident in Lucian's *A True Story*, in which the narrator also loses track of a crucial part of the Greek epic tradition. After a war breaks out in the Elysian Fields between the Blessed and the Damned, the narrator describes how "an account of this battle was written by Homer, and as I was leaving he gave me the book to take to the people at home, but later I lost it along with everything else. The poem began: *This time sing me, O Muse, of the shades of the heroes in battle*" (*T*, 2.24). (The opening line employs a self-consciously reiterative invocation—"this time" [νῦν δέ]—appropriate to Homer's third, rather belated, epic attempt [*T*, 2.24].) By implicitly blaming the accidents natural to exploration for the loss of this Homeric epic, Lucian alludes to the losses of Greek literature already being experienced in his time and the tantalizing effect produced when only single lines or fragments remain. In all three scenarios, the situation evokes the symbolic connection between reception and exploration, and all three substitute the hazards of exploration for those of reception. Instead of describing the perils of shipwreck or any of the other numerous dangers faced by explorers at the time, Hythloday only notes this incident with the monkey as the primary accident of his many long voyages. It is thus Hythloday's scholarly aspirations that seem to be most at risk at sea.

The idea that Utopia's intellectual development offers a microcosm of the recovery of Greek is underscored by Hythloday's introduction of the technology of print (see *U*, 183). In the eyes of humanists like More and Erasmus, no story of Greek's recovery in the West could be complete without acknowledging the impact of print as a tool for cultural preservation and dissemination. In an unusual example of Europe actually having something to teach Utopia, it is Hythloday who brings the technology of paper and print to the Utopians (who pick up the skill with their usual enthusiasm and efficiency). That it is Hythloday who teaches the Utopians how to print allows him, and European Hellenophiles like him, to retain their sense of agency over technologies of cultural recovery.

But Hythloday doesn't instruct the Utopians in print practices from just any press. Rather, he quite intentionally introduces them to the practices and stylistic characteristics of Aldine press books only, the press known to be the personal favorite of More and Erasmus (see *U*, 183). Famous for comprehensively and elegantly printing Greek texts, and for standardizing Greek typeface, the Aldine Press was an institution that in many ways embodied More's vision of Hellenism as a catalyst for intellectual community. Aldus oversaw the thoroughly utopian "New Academy," a nebulous association of Hellenophiles interested in reading—and speaking—Greek, that, in Martin Lowry's estimation, was more of a dream or ideal than a fully elaborated academic organization.<sup>59</sup> In printing too, the press made cultural recovery and the learning of Greek its guiding principles: the earliest Greek books Aldus printed were grammars, lexica, and short Greek texts ideal for beginning Greek readers.<sup>60</sup> Aldus clearly understood the intellectual economy that governed the printing of texts and the recovery of lost manuscripts, and he appreciated that print's ability to publicize Greek would result in larger cultural and textual gains: "the fame and the use of my books increase from day to day, so that even the 'book-buriers' [βιβλιόταφοι] are now bringing their books out of their cellars and offering them for sale. . . . Greek volumes are made available to me from many sources."<sup>61</sup> The fame of the Aldine press is not (entirely) overstated by Aldus, since the Greek library Hythloday brings with him to Utopia explicitly contains "Sophocles in the small Aldine type," and based on *Utopia's* publication date, at least ten additional authors of the seventeen he mentions would have been in Aldine Greek editions (see *U*, 180–83).<sup>62</sup> Thus, Hythloday's library becomes a microcosmic homage to Aldus the Elder's legacy of Greek

print, one that particularly demonstrates the interest of both the press and its readers in a postclassical Greek canon.<sup>63</sup>

This moment thus reflects upon Utopia's own status as printed text—and the crucial role print played in enabling More's real, and imagined, intellectual communities.<sup>64</sup> Both the dialogic frame of book 1 and the epistolary frame of the paratexts establish *Utopia* as a narrative of layered receptions, first conversational then textual then scholarly. The printed marginalia that accompany the body of the text similarly frame More's narrative as already an object of reception and commentary. More's text materially echoes the reception of the Greek tradition by imitating its structures of interpretation and by making those interpretive structures enmeshed within, scattered, and indeed constitutive of its narrative. Moreover, in altering the paratextual prefatory material between the four earliest editions (different combinations of letters and maps accompany these editions), More presents his own text's interpretive structures as unstable and shifting, aptly reflecting the shifts and inconsistencies that plagued the Greek manuscript tradition and its appearance in print.

In a dynamic we've already seen play out in the paratextual Utopian alphabet, *Utopia's* vivid endorsement of this philological scholarship—one inflected by the proto-philological scholarship of the Hellenistic and imperial Greek worlds—routinely cements its intellectual primacy at the expense of philosophy.<sup>65</sup> Though philosophy permeates both the structure and content of Utopian life, the Utopians themselves have an unorthodox relationship to philosophical inquiry. Though they have a clear interest in philosophical questions, Hythloday makes sure to ironically remark that they are untouched by the petty and distracting allegiances to particular philosophers and schools:

Of all those philosophers whose names are famous in the part of the world known to us, the reputation of not even a single one had reached [the Utopians] before our arrival. Yet in music, dialectic, arithmetic, and geometry they have made almost the same discoveries as those predecessors of ours in the classical world. But while they measure up to the ancients in almost all other subjects, still they are far from being a match for the inventions of our modern logicians. In fact, they have discovered not even a single one of those very ingeniously devised rules about restrictions, amplifications, and suppositions which our own children everywhere learn in the *Small Logicals*. (*U*, 159)

Understanding philosophy and scholasticism alike to be unnecessary excesses of European learning (the *Small Logicals* is probably a reference to Peter of Spain's thirteenth-century *Summulae Logicales*, a supposedly convoluted scholastic textbook More specifically attacks in his letter to Dorp), Hythloday paints a picture of Utopian education in which tortuous, jargon-laden system-building is not a prerequisite for intellectual discovery. The Utopians' success, their mastery of all major arts and letters without the aid of philosophical doctrines, calls into question the utility of such doctrines in enabling actual intellectual progress. Indeed, the Utopians' overall metaphysical and religious beliefs are an assortment of the best components of a whole range of philosophical (almost exclusively Greek) and religious systems, but as such resist being clearly affiliated with any single one (see *U*, 166–79). Almost like the survey of philosophical schools present in Lucian's *Icaromenippus*, *Menippus*, or *Philosophies for Sale*, the Utopians' philosophical notions seem more like a catalogue of major philosophical systems rather than practiced and professed convictions.<sup>66</sup>

In articulating its own geographical, historical, and textual origins, the poem that accompanied the Utopian alphabet, spoken by Utopia personified, specifically distanced itself from such philosophical abstraction: “alone of all lands,” the poem goes, “without the aid of . . . philosophy, I have represented [expressi] for mortals the philosophical city” (*U*, 18–19). The line explicitly privileges the representation, or poetic expression, of philosophy over philosophical discourse itself. As Leslie nicely puts it, “More's rebuttal to Plato's banishment of poetry is cunningly accomplished in the personification of Utopia as/ in a poem.”<sup>67</sup> The Utopian word for “philosopher” presented in this poem—“gymnosophaon”—further complicates Utopia's relationship to philosophy. It is the only direct loan word from Greek (that we know of) in Utopian and is a term that pops up in Lucian, Plutarch, Athenaeus, Philostratus, and other postclassical Greek authors. In fact, the word is believed to be postclassical in origin, and has a rather ambiguous meaning; most commonly, it refers to the “naked philosophers” of India.<sup>68</sup> It is always a term that designates a non-Greek other, and famously appears in the prologue to Diogenes Laertius as part of a refutation of the idea that philosophy could have originated anywhere but Greece.<sup>69</sup> It is therefore a term not only produced from an intellectual context historically, geographically, and even culturally distant from Plato, but designates non-Greek, pseudo-philosophical practices (according to Greeks). Thus, an instability is encoded into the Utopian's philosophical lexicon; *gymnosophist* is deployed as a concept from



which Greek philosophy differentiates itself and as such conjures at once both Greekness and its other. The word in effect complicates any direct connection between the Utopians and conventional Greek philosophy. Instead, it signals a postclassical Greek anxiety about maintaining Greek identity, one largely foreign to the Greek world of Plato. The Utopian word for “philosopher” thus comes from Greek, but not from the Greek of Plato.

What this prefatory poem ultimately offers is more than just a jab at Plato’s *Republic*. Rather, it is a declaration of *Utopia*’s textual and intellectual identity that importantly distinguishes itself from the project of abstract philosophy by appealing instead to the mimetic power of fiction. Indeed, the claim that *Utopia* surpasses Plato’s *Republic* precisely because of its vivid and imaginative representational powers is something of a refrain throughout other paratexts. In the “hexastichon,” a paratextual poem purportedly by Hythloday’s nephew “Anemolius, poet laureate” included with the 1516, 1517, and 1518 editions, the island is hailed as “a rival of Plato’s republic, perhaps even a victor over it” because “what he has delineated in words I alone have exhibited in [or excelled through] men and resources and excellent laws” (*U*, 21). Like the Utopian poem, these Latin verses use their poetic form to underscore the message of mimetic differentiation: the vividness of representation, rather than philosophical truth, is singled out as the feature that distinguishes *Utopia* from the *Republic*.

In a similar vein, Giles’s letter to Busleyden, which also related the story of that unlucky cough, proclaims that:

[*Utopia*] is eminently worthy of everyone’s knowledge as being superior to Plato’s republic. This statement is true especially because a man of great eloquence has represented, painted, and set it before our eyes in such a way that, as often as I read it, I think I see far more than when, being as much a part of the conversation as More himself, I heard Raphael Hythlodæus’ own words sounding in my ear. (*U*, 21)

Distinguishing the accomplishment of More’s *Utopia* not only from Plato but even from Hythloday’s very own eyewitness account, Giles advocates for a mimetic power conveyed solely by the pictorial vividness of More’s written narrative. Giles’s letter reminds us too, of course, that the difference between More’s account and Hythloday’s account is entirely a product of More’s invention, implicitly drawing our attention to the richness of fictive layers made possible by More’s storytelling. Whether or not such layered vividness is truly so different from Plato’s narrative style (the opening of the *Symposium* is a clear



example of Plato's experimentation with dizzying narrative mediation), these paratexts (with the relatively unmediated *Republic* as their more immediate point of reference) clearly understand *Utopia* as embarking on a project that exceeds the representational confines of Platonic philosophy. While Plato undoubtedly offers a model for proto-fiction, his professed (if not practiced) antagonism toward Homeric poetry enacts a project in which philosophy understands its authority as threatened by both fiction and cultural recovery.<sup>70</sup>

These examples speak to *Utopia*'s larger project of subordinating the discourse of philosophy to that of fiction, a project undoubtedly influenced by Lucian and his investment in satirizing Greek, particularly Platonic, philosophy by making it the victim of its own fictionality.<sup>71</sup> By either making the philosopher a figure of ridicule, as he is in Lucian, or by making philosophy dreary, dogmatic, and unimaginative, as it is in More, both authors bound philosophy within the purview of fiction and assure its literary legacy. And by portraying Plato as most important for his participation within a written and received Greek textual tradition—overlooking Plato's own anxieties about the ossification of written discourse—they compromise Plato's authority as a philosopher.<sup>72</sup> While Lucian's playful encounter with Homer portrayed him as a sage, though misunderstood, cultural authority, Lucian's depictions of philosophers are almost universally negative: they become caricatures of their own philosophical hypocrisy and their doctrines become bizarre curiosities that ornament fictional worlds. The fictionality built into the structure of Platonic dialogue is, in essence, turned inside out; the conventions of fictional representation assume and subsume philosophical universals. Instead of philosophy instrumentalizing fiction, as Socrates does with the myth of Er at the end of the *Republic*, fiction instrumentalizes philosophy.<sup>73</sup>

The philosopher's position of cultural authority is thus subtly rendered vacant, and in turn, is filled by the scholar, as are the positions of political authority on Utopia. In privileging the mimetic power of fiction to represent philosophy, Lucian and More make philosophy, like fiction, a discourse subject to scholarly interpretation and preservation. The scholar, as guardian of the intellectual legacy of the Greek world, is responsible for the curation, organization, and, most importantly, explication of philosophical thought, which becomes only one of several categories of knowledge under the scholar's supervision. By constructing a vision of intellectual labor as necessarily historical, textual, and philological, the fictions of More and Lucian privilege an ideal of cultural authority based on scholarly hermeneutics rather than

philosophical inquiry. While the philosophy of Plato frequently strove to distinguish the work of the philosopher from the work of the poet, the fictions of More and Lucian consistently connect the speculative duty of the scholar to the imaginative capacity of the author.

Lucian's afterlives are particularly unkind to philosophers. Lucian, for whom the absurdity of the philosophers was something of a refrain, routinely stages the superiority of the intellectual independence of an unattached scholarly protagonist over the hypocrisy and narrow-mindedness of doctrinaire philosophers.<sup>74</sup> After being disappointed by every philosophical school he encounters on earth, for example, Menippus descends to the underworld in the hope of discovering the best life. While there, he sees both Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic mingling not with other philosophical figures, but with the fictional and mythological likes of Odysseus, Nestor, and King Midas. The great lesson Menippus ultimately learns is to avoid philosophical investigation all together.<sup>75</sup> In *A True Story*, Lucian mocks Plato's antisocial tendencies and unappealing idealism by excluding him from the afterlife completely. Though Socrates has happily set up a "Post-Mortem Academy" ["Νεκρακαδήμεια" ("Necro-academy") [T, 2.23]] Plato "alone was not there" (T, 2.17), apparently living all by himself in his republic—an insult that's repeated in a note to *The Praise of Folly* and may echo also Plato's absence from Socrates's last day in the *Phaedo*.<sup>76</sup> By absorbing Plato's republic into the landscape of his fictional narrative, and by reimagining that republic as a distinctly unpopular imaginative destination, Lucian diminishes the *Republic's* philosophical merits while simultaneously underscoring its fictionality. Indeed, by adapting the structure of Platonic dialogue for comedic and manifestly fictional ends, Lucian makes his career in innovating literary forms a larger exercise in the exploitation and subordination of philosophy. The afterlife becomes the ideal space in which to resituate and reimagine the Socratic method; characters engage in conversations with philosophers not to interrogate metaphysical truths but to revisit the Greek tradition and its legacy. More similarly exposes the underlying fictionality of Plato and his *Republic* through the very project of *Utopia*, which translates Plato's philosophical thought experiment into an experiment in fictional and generic hybridity. More finally evinces his true Hellenic credentials, and cements his place in the Platonic tradition, counterintuitively—not by wholeheartedly adopting Platonic philosophies, but rather by participating in an even longer-standing Greek tradition of turning those philosophies against themselves.<sup>77</sup>

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Guillaume Budé, “William Budé to Thomas Lupset, Englishman, Greetings,” in Thomas More, *Utopia*, ed. Ed. J. H. Hexter and Edward Surtz, vol. 4 of *The Complete Works of Thomas More* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1993), 13. Hereafter abbreviated *U* and cited parenthetically by page number. This particular epistle was printed with the 1517 and both 1518 editions.

<sup>2</sup> Though fiction as a term doesn’t have a direct equivalent in either ancient Greek or early modern discourses of imaginative writing, it usefully and fluidly designates a constellation of textual types that draw on both the conventionally literary and the extra-literary (as *Utopia* clearly does). Denis Feeney aptly notes “that the ancient poets and critics developed a range of concepts which may usefully be compared to what we call ‘fiction,’ even if there is no precise fit between our word or concept ‘fiction’ and their *fabula*, *plasma*, *mimesis*, *muthos*, *figmentum*” (“Towards an Account of the Ancient World’s Concepts of Fictive Belief,” in *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*, ed. Christopher Gill and Timothy Peter Wiseman [Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1993], 231).

<sup>3</sup> For a further discussion of the intertextual potential of the Greek afterlife see Froma Zeitlin, “Visions and revisions of Homer” in *Being Greek Under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire*, ed. Simon Goldhill (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007), 195–266.

<sup>4</sup> See Homer, *The Odyssey of Homer*, trans. Richard Lattimore (New York: Harper Perennial 2007), book 11, lines 467–540.

<sup>5</sup> See Aristophanes, *The Frogs*, in *Four Plays by Aristophanes: The Clouds, The Birds, Lysistrata, The Frogs*, trans. William Arrowsmith, Lattimore, and Douglass Parker (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 540–83.

<sup>6</sup> See Lucian, *A True Story*, in *Phalaris. Hippias or The Bath. Dionysus. Heracles. Amber or The Swans. The Fly. Nigrinus. Demonax. The Hall. My Native Land. Octogenarians. A True Story. Slander. The Consonants at Law. The Carousal (Symposium) or The Lapiths*, trans. A. M. Harmon (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1913), book 2, sections 6–36. Hereafter abbreviated *T* and cited parenthetically by book and section number.

<sup>7</sup> For the major treatments of Lucian’s satirical influence on More, see T. S. Dorsch, “Sir Thomas More and Lucian: An Interpretation of *Utopia*,” *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen* 203 (1967): 345–63; B. R. Branham, “Utopian Laughter: Lucian and Thomas More,” *Moreana* 86 (1985): 23–43; Greg Walker, “Folly,” in *Cultural Reformations: Medieval and Renaissance in Literary History*, ed. Brian Cummings and James Simpson (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2010), 321–41; and Warren Wooden, “Anti-Scholastic Satire in Sir Thomas More’s *Utopia*,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 8.2 (1977): 29–45. For an overview of Lucian’s influence on the Western tradition, including a brief discussion of his influence on *Utopia*, see Christopher Robinson, *Lucian and his Influence in Europe* (London: Duckworth, 1979).

<sup>8</sup> For the definitive account of Lucian’s hybridized, irreverent, and innovative fictionality, see Karen Ní Mheallaigh, *Reading Fiction with Lucian: Fakes, Freaks, and Hyperreality* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014). For a discussion of Lucian as a model for *Utopia*’s paradoxical presentation of incompatible perspectives, see Carlo Ginzburg, “The Old World and the New Seen from Nowhere,” in *No Island is an Island: Four Glances at English Literature in a World Perspective* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2000), 1–25.

<sup>9</sup> For further exploration of the intellectual affinities between Lucian’s rhetorical play with the classical tradition and humanist rhetorical practices and *imitatio*, see

David Marsh, *Lucian and the Latins: Humor and Humanism in the Early Renaissance* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1998), 2–13; and Branham. Marsh also offers a comprehensive overview of Lucian's influence in early modernity.

<sup>10</sup> James Porter, "Introduction," in *Classical Pasts: The Classical Traditions of Greece and Rome*, ed. James Porter (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006), 57.

<sup>11</sup> See Nelson, "Greek Nonsense in More's *Utopia*," *The Historical Journal* 44 (2001): 889–917. Though Nelson acknowledges that the Greek tradition is far more nuanced and complex than just Plato or Aristotle, he does not see a more extended treatment of the Greek tradition as complicating his argument that *Utopia* endorses Platonic values (see "Greek Nonsense," 895–96). See also Nelson, "Utopia through Italian Eyes: Thomas More and the Critics of Civic Humanism," *Renaissance Quarterly* 59 (2006): 1029–57. For the other major treatment of *Utopia* and Plato, see Thomas White, "Pride and the Public Good: Thomas More's Use of Plato in *Utopia*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 20 (1982): 329–54.

<sup>12</sup> For More's translations of Lucian, see More, *Translations of Lucian*, ed. Craig R. Thompson, vol. 3.1 of *The Complete Works of Thomas More* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1974). For general background on More and Erasmus's translations of Lucian see Thompson's introduction to that volume; Thompson, *The Translations of Lucian by Erasmus and Thomas More* (Ithaca: The Vail-Ballou press, 1940); and Erika Rummel, "A Friendly Competition: More's and Erasmus' Translations from Lucian," in *Erasmus as Translator of the Classics* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1985), 49–69. For the fullest account of Platonic anecdotes, from not only Lucian and Diogenes Laertius but other authors as well, see Alice Swift Riginos, *Platonica: The Anecdotes Concerning the Life and Writings of Plato* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976).

<sup>13</sup> Plato's literary qualities—or more accurately, the indivisibility of Plato's literary and philosophical aims—have been a recent topic of scholarly consideration. See, for instance, Ruby Blondell, *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002); and Andrea Nightengale, *Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995). Even in the Renaissance, it was a commonplace to understand Plato's hostility toward poetry as complicated by the clearly literary qualities of his dialogues. As Phillip Sidney writes in the *Defense of Poesy*: "And truly even Plato whosoever well considereth shall find that in the body of his work, though the inside and strength were philosophy, the skin, as it were, and beauty depended most of poetry." Cited in *The Major Works*, ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), 213.

<sup>14</sup> See Francesco Petrarca, *Letters on Familiar Matters*, trans. Aldo S. Bernardo (New York: Italica Press, 2005). Letter 13.6 contains his direct reference to himself as a necromancer; book 24 contains his letters to dead classical authors. Other notable instances of the interchangeability of scholar and necromancer are Christopher Marlowe's Faustus, who opens the play reflecting on how conjuring the dead would be the greatest possible scholarly accomplishment (see *The Tragical History of the Life and Death of Doctor Faustus (A-Text)*, ed. David Scott Kastan [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2005] act 1, scene 1, lines 23–26), and William Shakespeare's *Much Ado About Nothing*, in which the term "scholar" is used to mean "necromancer" (ed. Claire McEachern [London: Arden Shakespeare, 2006], act 2, scene 1, line 223).

<sup>15</sup> For an account of Greek's limited presence in the medieval world, see Walter Berchnin, *Greek Letters and the Latin Middle Ages: from Jerome to Nicholas of Cusa* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1988).

<sup>16</sup> For an overview of Byzantine Greeks in the Italian Renaissance, see Nigel Wilson, *From Byzantium to Italy: Greek Studies in the Italian Renaissance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1992).

<sup>17</sup> See John Considine, *Dictionaries in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 87.

<sup>18</sup> For an extended consideration of community formation via paratexts in *Utopia*, see Joshua Phillips, “Staking Claims to *Utopia*: Thomas More, Prose Fiction, and the Matter of Belonging” in *English Fictions of Communal Identity, 1485–1603* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 41–78.

<sup>19</sup> Eleanor Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship: a guide to finding, reading, and understanding scholia, commentaries, lexica, and grammatical treatises, from their beginnings to the Byzantine period* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), 4.

<sup>20</sup> Anthony Grafton’s test case, Guillaume Budé, tried to make his way through Homer not simply with the text of the *Iliad* and a Greek dictionary, but also with the aid of numerous commentaries from the Hellenistic period through late antiquity. See Grafton, “How Guillaume Budé Read his Homer” in *Commerce with the Classics: Ancient Books and Renaissance Readers* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1997), 135–83.

<sup>21</sup> Simon Goldhill offers an entertaining and persuasive account of the importance of Greek—Lucian especially—to early modern intellectual identity politics with a focus on the role of Erasmus. See Goldhill, *Who Needs Greek?: Contests in the Cultural History of Hellenism* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002).

<sup>22</sup> Nelson in “Greek Nonsense” also reads *Utopia* as deploying the Greek tradition in order to critique Latinity. However, he sees this critique as directed against the civic values of glory and honor associated with Italian humanism. David Lummus reads Giovanni Boccaccio’s *Genealogia* (1360) as a text also turning to the Greek tradition in an attempt to forge new interpretive paradigms, in his case ones that resist Petrarch’s pervasive “monumental” Latinity. See Lummus, “Boccaccio’s Hellenism and the Foundations of Modernity,” *Mediaevalia* 33 (2012): 101–67. A good example of More’s critique of scholasticism can be found in More’s letter to Martin Dorp; see More, *Defense of Humanism*, ed. Daniel Kinney, vol. 15 of *The Complete Works of Thomas More* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1986), 1–128. Wooden similarly reads *Utopia* as a satire on scholasticism and makes general reference to the satirical influence of Lucian.

<sup>23</sup> More, *Defense of Humanism*, 96–97.

<sup>24</sup> More, *Translations of Lucian*, 4–5.

<sup>25</sup> See Goldhill, 44–59, for a discussion of Lucian’s controversial position in the Renaissance.

<sup>26</sup> This argument is in contrast to Nelson’s claim that Erasmus and More were obviously influenced by Marsilio Ficino’s writings (see Nelson, “Greek Nonsense,” 900–901). While Nelson may be correct in suggesting that Erasmus’s *Handbook of a Christian Soldier* (1501) shows direct Neoplatonic influences, none of More’s writings evinces a similar indebtedness. Regardless of whether More consulted Ficino’s translation of the *Republic*, as Nelson claims, I remain unconvinced that this means More would have necessarily also subscribed to Ficino’s Neoplatonism.

<sup>27</sup> Tim Whitmarsh, “Quickening the Classics: The Politics of Prose in Roman Greece,” in *Classical Pasts*, 367.

<sup>28</sup> More took an active role in coordinating the earlier four editions of *Utopia*, but it seems safe to assume that he had no oversight, and probably no knowledge, of this one. For a brief discussion of this edition, the last printed during More’s lifetime, see Terence Cave, ed., *Thomas More’s Utopia in Early Modern Europe: Paratexts and Contexts* (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2008), 15–16

<sup>29</sup> Cave, 16.

<sup>30</sup> Branham, 23. See also Goldhill, 44. It is possible, though doubtful, that two additional editions of *Utopia* were published in 1519 and 1520, but only five are extant today. See More, *Utopia*, exc.

<sup>31</sup> For the definitive account of the rise of scholarship in the Greek world, see Rudolf Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age*, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968).

<sup>32</sup> For a discussion of Lucian's interest in the afterlife, hypertextuality, and its influence (primarily) in the Italian Renaissance, see Marsh, 42–75.

<sup>33</sup> Jacques Bompaire, *Lucien écrivain: imitation et création* (Paris: Ed. de Boccard, 1958), 672.

<sup>34</sup> Lucian, *Dialogues of the Dead*, in *Dialogues of the Dead. Dialogues of the Sea-Gods. Dialogues of the Gods. Dialogues of the Courtesans*, trans. M. D. MacLeod (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1961), 21.

<sup>35</sup> Zeitlin, 215–16. As Zeitlin notes, the term “close encounter” is adapted from Robin Lane Fox.

<sup>36</sup> See Lucian, *Menippus, or the Descent into Hades in Anacharsis or Athletics. Menippus or The Descent into Hades. On Funerals. A Professor of Public Speaking. Alexander the False Prophet. Essays in Portraiture. Essays in Portraiture Defended. The Goddess of Surrye*, trans. Harmon (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925), section 1.

<sup>37</sup> Branham, 25.

<sup>38</sup> For example, a 1485 Florentine Latin Plato, a 1491 Torresanus Latin Plato, a 1513 Aldine Greek Plato, and a 1534 Basel Plato all include the *vita* of Diogenes Laertius. See Grafton for an illustration of this reliance on the later, postclassical commentary tradition.

<sup>39</sup> For a nice encapsulation of this moment, see Nelson, “Greek Nonsense,” 897–901 and Goldhill, 38–43. For a general discussion of Greek learning in England throughout the sixteenth century with an emphasis on its continued relevance even after More and Erasmus, see Micha Lazarus, “Greek Literacy in Sixteenth-Century England,” *Renaissance Studies* 29 (2015): 433–58.

<sup>40</sup> Elizabeth Rogers, ed., *St. Thomas More: Selected Letters* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961), 96. Also cited in Goldhill, 39. See also More's “Letter to the University of Oxford,” in *Defense of Humanism*, 129–49.

<sup>41</sup> John Skelton, *Speke Parott*, cited in Alistair Fox, “Facts and fallacies: interpreting English humanism,” in *Reassessing the Henrican Age: Humanism, Politics, and Reform 1500–1550*, ed. A. Fox & John Guy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 13. A. Fox also offers a useful, extended discussion of Greek at Oxford.

<sup>42</sup> In both “Greek Nonsense” and “*Utopia* through Italian Eyes,” Nelson persuasively demonstrates that *Utopia* is a product of this heated debate over classical allegiances and that the work repeatedly exhibits its preference for Greek over Latin.

<sup>43</sup> See James McConcia, *English Humanists and Reformation Politics Under Henry VIII and Edward VI* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), 90.

<sup>44</sup> Goldhill, 45–46.

<sup>45</sup> See *Lepidissimum Luciani opusculu[m] περι διαδάων*, trans. Henry Bullock (Cambridge, 1521). This book is identified as the first example of movable Greek type used in England by Peter Blayney in *The Stationers' Company and the Printers of London 1501–1557*, 2 vol. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), 1:194. For a discussion of the importance of Lucian as an early classroom text throughout Europe,



see Paul Botley, *Learning Greek in Western Europe, 1396–1529: Grammars, Lexica, and Classroom Texts* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2010), 85–88.

<sup>46</sup> Branham, 37. Branham also points out many thematic similarities that link *Utopia* to Lucianic dialogue, such as the jester in book 1 and the “fabula elegantissima” of the Anemolians in book 2 (see 34–36).

<sup>47</sup> For a discussion of Lucian’s *A True Story* as a model for the “fantastic voyage” trope in *Utopia* and elsewhere, see Marsh, 181–210.

<sup>48</sup> For a general consideration of world-making as a fictional mode particularly employed by postclassical Greek literature, see Whitmarsh, 31–34. In connecting discovery to classical literature, my argument suggests that More’s conceptualization of new worlds isn’t solely informed by recent New World discoveries—although that is an indisputable source—but is also informed by experiments in fictional world-making already present in classical literature.

<sup>49</sup> See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, Volume 1, Books 1–15*, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925), book 3, sections 18–19. While the “Seventh Letter” of Plato (of disputed authorship) describes an encounter with the Sicilian tyrant Dionysius, Diogenes Laertius quite imaginatively and extensively elaborates on this incident.

<sup>50</sup> See Marina Leslie, *Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1998), 161n1.

<sup>51</sup> Lisa Jardine, *Erasmus, Man of Letters: The Construction Charisma in Print* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003) 177.

<sup>52</sup> See Jardine, *Erasmus*, 176–77.

<sup>53</sup> See Leslie, 60.

<sup>54</sup> See Leslie, 67. Leslie also notes the importance of grammar to this paratext and locates it within the context of More’s vindication of the study of grammar in his letter to Dorp.

<sup>55</sup> See Lucian, *Charon, or the Inspectors*, in *The Downward Journey or The Tyrant. Zeus Catechized. Zeus Rants. The Dream or The Cock. Prometheus. Icaromenippus or The Sky-man. Timon or The Misanthrope. Charon or The Inspectors. Philosophies for Sale*, trans. Harmon (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915), sections 3–6.

<sup>56</sup> For more on this issue see Lawrence Kim, “The Portrait of Homer in Strabo’s *Geography*,” *Classical Philology* 102 (2007): 363–88.

<sup>57</sup> These explicit discussions of history are somewhat at odds with the sense of historical stasis that permeates the description of Utopia, which explains the lack of scholarly attention given to Utopia’s history. As Leslie notes, “while utopia has with increasing frequency been taken as a figure for history . . . the representation or figuration of history within these early modern [utopian] texts has gone largely unexamined” (9).

<sup>58</sup> For an alternate interpretation of the monkey’s intrusion that emphasizes the local resonances of marmosets for More and reads the scene as enacting an anxiety concerning the wisdom of classical texts, see Jennifer Summit, *Memory’s Library* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2008), 75–78.

<sup>59</sup> On Aldine Greek typefaces, see Nicholas Barker, *Aldus Manutius and the Development of Greek Script & Type in the Fifteenth Century* (Sandy Hook: Chiswick Book Shop, 1985). On Aldus’s academy, see Martin Lowry, “The New Academy of Aldus Manutius: A Renaissance Dream,” *Bulletin of the John Rylands Univ. Library of Manchester* 58 (1976): 378–420.

<sup>60</sup> Such as Constantine Lascaris’s *Erotemata* (1495?), Musaeus Grammaticus’s *Hero and Leander* (1495?), Theodore Prodromus’s *Battle of Cats and Mice* (1495?), Theodore Gaza’s grammar (1495), and the *Thesaurus Cornuopitiae* (1496).

<sup>61</sup> Antje Lemke, trans., *Aldus Manutius and his Thesaurus Cornucopiae of 1496* (Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1958), 11; Aldus Manutius, ed., *Thesaurus Cornucopiae* (Venice: Aldus Manutius, 1496), 2.

<sup>62</sup> Specifically, the Aldine Press printed Plato in 1513, Aristotle in 1499, Theophrastus in 1497, Lascaris in 1495, Hesychius in 1514, Dioscorides in 1499, Lucian in 1503, Aristophanes in 1498, Thucydides in 1502, and Herodotus in 1502. For a (mostly) exhaustive list of Aldine press books, see *The Aldine Press: Catalogue of the Ahmanson-Murphy Collection of Books by or Relating to the Press in the Library of the University of California, Los Angeles, Incorporating Works Recorded Elsewhere* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2001).

<sup>63</sup> Of the 34 Greek authors and collections printed by Aldus, 21 are from postclassical periods.

<sup>64</sup> For more on the connection between print and community-formation in Utopia, see Phillips, 56.

<sup>65</sup> John Gueguen also reads *Utopia* as containing a critique of Platonic philosophy, although his focus is exclusively on the Christian shortcomings of Plato. See Gueguen, "Reading More's Utopia as a Criticism of Plato," *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 10 (1978): 43–54.

<sup>66</sup> White makes the similar point that *Utopia* never seems to articulate an allegiance to a particular philosophical position. He, however, sees this as an example of conventional humanist praises of philosophy. See White, 333–34.

<sup>67</sup> Leslie, 63.

<sup>68</sup> More, *Utopia*, 278n18/11. For a further discussion of the word *gymnosophaon*, see Leslie, 64.

<sup>69</sup> Diogenes Laertius, Prologue.1.

<sup>70</sup> In the *Republic*, Socrates acknowledges nostalgia for Homer's formative place in his education, but ultimately rejects the importance of that nostalgia, and implicitly of cultural memory more generally, in favor of an ethical program incommensurable with Homer's poetry. See Plato, *The Republic*, trans. G. M. A. Grubbe, in *Complete Works* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 595b, 603–607a.

<sup>71</sup> For a discussion of various philosophical and Platonic elements in Lucian's *A True Story*, see Andrew Laird, "Fiction as a Discourse of Philosophy in Lucian's *Variae Historiae*," in *The Ancient Novel and Beyond*, ed. Stelios Panayotakis, M. Zimmerman, and Wytse Hette Keulen (Boston: Brill, 2003), 115–27.

<sup>72</sup> Socrates famously cautions Phaedrus against hoping to learn too much from written texts in the *Phaedrus*. See Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, in *Complete Works*, 275d–e.

<sup>73</sup> Socrates famously calls this instrumentalization of fiction a "noble falsehood" (Plato, *Republic*, 414b). For a discussion of this very point and its relationship to fictionality in Plato more generally, see Christopher Gill, "Plato's Atlantis Story and the Birth of Fiction," *Philosophy and Literature* 3 (1979): 64–78; and Laird, "Ringing the Changes on Gyges: Philosophy and the Formation of Fiction in Plato's *Republic*," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 121 (2001): 12–29.

<sup>74</sup> In the dedicatory epistle to his translations of Lucian, More particularly admires the fact that Lucian "refrain[s] from the arrogant pronouncements of the philosophers" (*Translations of Lucian*, 3).

<sup>75</sup> See Lucian, *Menippus*, sections 18, 22.

<sup>76</sup> Lionel Casson, trans., *Selected Satires of Lucian* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962), 43. For the reference to *The Praise of Folly*, see More, *Utopia*, 375n100/9. For



Plato's absence during Socrates's death, see Plato, *Phaedo*, trans. Grubbe, in *Complete Works*, 59b.

<sup>77</sup> Lucian, Diogenes Laertius, and Plutarch are three clear examples, but in many ways this attitude toward Plato defines the Second Sophistic more generally. See Graham Anderson, *The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 69–84. For an exhaustive account of the long tradition of Platonic parody, see Riginos.