Response to Bernard Reginster, Jorah Dannenberg, and Andrew Huddleston

This is a response to Bernard Reginster’s, Jorah Dannenberg’s, and Andrew Huddleston’s comments published in the Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47.3, on Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I address the main points raised in their critiques: Dannenberg’s concerns about whether I have adequately characterized nihilism and his argument that Nietzschean constitutivism would be of no help to the nihilist; Reginster’s argument that constitutivism offers no interpretive advantage over internalism and subjectivism, his contention that it is a mistake to see all drives as aiming at expression, and his arguments against my claim that all actions aim at power; and Huddleston’s critiques of the will to power thesis and objections to the constitutivist project. I argue that these objections and concerns can be answered.