The Metaphysics of Émile Meyerson: A Key to the Epistemological Paradox

THE METAPHYSICS OF EMILE MEYERSON: A KEY TO THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADOX FROM THE FIRST appearance of Identite et nEalite in 1908, Emile Meyerson has been acclaimed as one of the most stimulating thinkers of our time.1 The title of " Profound Philosopher," which Bergson conferred upon him in 1909, has never left him. Einstein published an article in 1928 in which he expressed approval and admiration of Meyerson 's doctrine. George Boas wrote a book in which he was highly appreciative of Meyerson's work. J. Lowenberg hailed him as a new Kant and thought that Meyerson had provided an important refutation of positivistic epistemology. L. Lichtenstein at the University of Leipzig and C. DeKoninck at Laval University presented courses on his philosophy. Competent critics such as Blumberg, Bachelard, Brunschvieg, Lalande , Maritain, A. Metz, Schlick, and See, to mention only a few, have each been impressed by his work. But this attention notwithstanding, the critics of Meyerson generally proffer widely ranging interpretations of his work. A probable source of this disagreement is that the work of Meyerson terminates in a severe epistemological paradox from which there is no easy escape. The point of our essay is to investigate the metaphysical foundations of this paradox. Such a study has not been undertaken before, but it is worthwhile since, as Boas has pointed 1 References to the work of Emile Meyerson will be abbreviated as follows: I. R., for Identite et realite (Paris: F. Alcan, 4• ed., 193!'l), trans. K. Lowenberg, Identity and Reality (London: Macmillan, 1930); E. S., for De l'explication dans les sciences, !'l vols. (Paris: Payot, 1927); D. R., for La deduction relativiste (Paris: Payot, 19!'l5); C. P., for Du cheminement de la pensee, 3 vols. (Paris: F. Alcan, 1931); R. D., for Reel et determinisme dans la physique quantique (Paris: Hermann, 1933). These along with Essais (Paris: J. Vrin, 1936), a posthumous publication of Meyerson's major articles, make up the whole of his work. 119 120 KENNETH A. BRYSON out, the study of Meyerson's metaphysics would clarify matters somewhat. It seems that the impasse in Meyerson's philosophy is the direct result of the critical problem. We situate our problematic within the perspective of a Thomistic critique of Cartesianism. The essay is divided into three sections. The first is a study of those psychological principles which Meyerson says accompany all forms of scientific induction. This matter is important as the activity of these principles ultimately leads the Meyersonian scientist to the epistemological paradox. The nature of the epistemological paradox constitutes the subject matter of our second section. In effect if the principles of reason actually accompany all forms of scientific induction (and Meyerson presents a strong case that this is so) , it seems that, while the structure of reason is allegedly ontological, nevertheless the activity of reasoning will dissolve this ontology. This is a restatement of the epistemological paradox. Finally, our third section connects the epistemological paradox and the critical problem. In particular, we attempt this through a study of the concept in Meyerson's philosophy. * * * * * Certain distinctions must be kept clearly in mind. Meyerson 's work is factual, not normative.2 The ontological character of scientific theories is not put forth by him as the guarantee of correct thinking in science but as a statement of fact. In effect, Meyerson's argument is that the experimenter, whenever he thinks, is psychologically predisposed in advance of experimentation to posit ontology at any cost. Meyerson's study of the history of scientific induction is unequivocal on this point. 2 The greatest consequence of this distinction is felt in Meyerson's doctrine of the irrationals. If Meyerson's work is epistemological or normative in any sense of the term, it follows that his doctrine of the irrationals will function as a mediator in the dispute between Idealism and Positivism. But Meyerson expressly disavows any such ambition. Cf. I. R., ch. IX. The clea!'est expression of the psychological character of his work is contained in the article "Philosophic de la nature et philosophie de !'intellect." It first appeared in The. Review of Metaphysics, 41, !i!, (1934) and later in Essais (Paris: J. Vrin, 1986), pp...