Ockham on Nature and God

OCKHAM ON NATURE AND GOD I I SHOULD LIKE TO discuss the Ockhamist argument for the existence of God from efficient causality. In particular , I intend to focus on the relation, in Ockham, between the universe and God, insofar as that relation can be elaborated by reason without the aid of Revelation. Briefly, I desire to indicate the kind of being in which Ockham's proof for the existence of God terminates. The principal philosophical enterprise of the Middle Ages is usually referred to as Fides quaerens intellectum. This means, I take it, that mediaeval thinkers, possessing the Christian faith, desired to penetrate it, to draw out its implications, and to discover in their experience the vestiges and traces of that of which the faith speaks. The mediaeval thinker, at least up to the fourteenth century, wanted to illuminate his experience by the light of his faith and to understand his faith through the reflection of its object in his experience. Knowing by faith that the world was related to God in certain ways, he wanted to discover in his experience evidence of these relations, and, in general, the manifestation of this God in whom he put his faith. The principal means used to accomplish this was philosophy . Now, of course, the term "philosophy" had a pagan connotation for these men. The ancient philosophers tried to attain by the power of human reason the beatitude that was attainable only through the grace of God. The question confronting the mediaeval theologian, to call him by his proper name (and this includes Ockham), was how much of Divine Things can human reason know. How much can the mind unillumined by Revelation know of the origin of the world, the existence and nature of God, and the destiny of man? Our task here is to bring out the answer to one of these questions by one mediaeval theologian. 69 70 EARL R. WOODS Concerning the proofs for the existence of God, it is important , especially for the Christian thinker, to determine as precisely as possible what sort of being he would denominate as "God"; that is, one must first ask what kind of being one would recognize as God. For the Christian thinker, it is not sufficient simply to arrive at a first cause in some order or at an ultimate principle of explanation beyond which it is not necessary to go. If that were all there was to it, then this area might not be the subject of dispute it is. It is quite conceivable that the atheist or materialist could admit the existence of some such first principle, although he would deny that it is God in any usual sense of that term; it could be the universe as a whole, or some primaeval cloud of gas rotating in space, or some elementary particle. If naturalism (namely, the position which holds that " nature is all there is ") is to be avoided, then more than a mere first cause or ultimate ground is required. The real task is to identify such a cause or ground. One must show that it is neither nature nor a part of nature. The mediaevals for the most part held that transcendence was necessary. It is with this in mind that I should like to examine Ockham's proof for the existence of God. Do the principles upon which his argument rests enable him to transcend the limits of nature? Can the first cause at which he arrives be readily identifiable with the Christian God? II Ockham's philosophy has been the subject of considerable controversy. This is especially the case with regard to the question as to what place he should be assigned in the development of mediaeval philosophy. Is he a radical innovator or the representative of a well-established tradition? Is his thought a sign of the breakdown of mediaeval philosophy or no? Both sides of the controversy are provided with eminent representatives. It is sufficient to note that in his Unity of Philosophical Experience, E. Gilson discusses Ockham in a chapter entitled " The Road to Scepticism." 1 B. Geyer char1 New York: Scribners, 1937, pp. 61-91. OCKHAM ON NATURE AND GOD 71...