The Aristotelian Conception of Epistēmē

THE ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF EPISTEME T HE AIM OF THIS communication is to provide a succinct account of the Aristotelian conception of bncrr~p,YJ. (This term shall be rendered by variations on " science," " scientific knowledge," or " scientific understanding .") Aristotle articulates its inner structuration primarily in the Posterior Analytics. Hence the exposition will concentrate on this treatise. The antecedent task of interpretation is to locate the concept in its milieu and in the corpus as a whole. Against Sophistic skepticism of it, Plato urges the essential possibility of an organized field of knowledge that justifies, according to principles , every new apprehension. To an arbitrary conglomeration of impressions he contrasts a realm of consistent and founded cognitions. Such a realm comprises one or another domain of meaning, i. e., it is relatively universal; and it counters a naive miscellany of data, i.e., it is necessary. Plato raises the question of its inner logic, but Aristotle presents the first extensive articulation of that structure. In him, the term e1rurr~p,YJ becomes technical and especially names this realm of consistent and founded cognitions.1 Among the sciences that make up his corpus is that " science which inquires into demonstration 1 The original sense of the term e7run1u.) ·11 That is the issue now to be exhibited. "A single science is one whose domain is a single genus." 12 " Hence it is not possible to prove a fact by passing from one genus to another." 13 Indeed, the fact-to-be-proved is precisely an internal possibility (vmipxov) of a specific genus, and it is reached somewhere along a (logical) series of internal possibilities (middles or reasons[aiTta]).14 Now the subject-genus (To yivo<; To V1ToKEtfLEVov) 15 forms a universal (To Ka86A.ov) .IR But " it is clear that the fact is not scientized in any unqualified fashion but is rather scientized as pertaining to a universal." 17 7 I 2, 72 a 19-23; I 10, 76 b 3-7, 35-38. An. Pr. I 30, 46 a 17-22. E. N. VI 3, 1139 b 26-30, and VI 6. 8 I 1, 71 a 24-26 cf. b 6-8. • John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960)' p. 40. 1 °For this whole paragraph, see in general I 2, 4, 6, 10, and II 3. 11 For the identification of ro 1rep~ ll and ro "'ivas, cf. I 7, 75 b 7; I 10, 76 b 12-23; and I 11, 77 a 25. 12 I 28, 87 a 37. 18 I 7, 75 a 38. 14 I 6, 75 a 28-37; I 7, 75 a 37-b 2; I 10, 76 a 81-34; II 14, 98 a 1-13. 15 I 7, 75 b 1. 16 II 19, 100 a 15-b 3. Cf. I 18; I 24, 85 h 24-28; I1 13, 76 b 2-6, 15-25; IT 14; IT 16, 98 b 32-33; Top. I 5, 102 a 32-b 5. 17 I 1, 71 a 28-29; cf. 16-23. 844 DANIEL GUERRI:ERE Thus any fact is to be known scientifically only as subsumed under a universal. " Objects so far as they are an indeterminate manifold are not understandable scientifically, so far as they are determinate, understandable: they are therefore knowable scientifically insofar as they are universal rather than insofar as they are particular." 18 It is manifest that" by or in a universal we see the particulars." 19 One would never recognize which facts belong to a specific science did he not already know them "in" that (framework) which underlies a science (i.e., TO v1roKe£p,evov), the genus. If the facts are knowable scienfically , or intelligible, insofar as universal, then the universal will be the intelligibility of the facts, " the one beside the many which is the single identity within them all." 20 If science presupposes knowledge of the fact-to-be-proved, and this comes to pass only within a universal (genus), then science assumes knowledge of that genus. And Aristotle is explicit . The first step in science is " to posit the genus which is common to all the particulars." 21 Now the genus and that which belongs (v7r(£pxet) to it 22 are precisely the first principles (apxa£) that science assumes and that constitute the premises from which the fact (-to-be-proved), i.e., another peculiar possibility , will be concluded: " First principles are of two kinds: the premises by means of which demonstration proceeds [sc., the logical rules], and the genus with which the demonstration is concerned. The former are common, while the latter are peculiar." 28 As first principles, the genus and what immediately belongs to it comprise nothing other than the subject of the science.24 A science begins by delimiting them. " The definition of immediate terms consists in an indemonstrable as18 I 14, 86 a 5-7. 10 An. Pr. II ~1, 67 a ~7 (rii p,ev ovv tca.86Xov 8ewpovp.ev rO. ev p,epe• •••) ; cf. b 1-8. Cf. also An. Post. I 1, 71 a 17-19, ~8-29; II 19, 100 a 16-b ~. •• II 19, 100 a 6-7. Cf. I 11, 77 a 5-9; II 8, 98 a 19-~1. 21 II 14, 98 a 8. •• II 14, 98 a 8-5. •• I 8~, 88 b ~6-~9. Cf. I 10, 76 b 10; I 8~, 88 a 86-b 8. •• I 10, 76 a 81-87, b 8-7, and esp. b 12-~8, 85-88. THE ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPT OF " EPISTEME " 345 sumption of the essence [Tt €a-rtv] . Thus in one sense definition is an indemonstrable account of the essence." 25 This type of definition " is a first principle of demonstration." 26 " In all demonstration a definition of the essence is required as first principle." 27 The inner possibilities or attributes (ra 1nn£pxovra) of a genus are explicitated into definitory premises by means of division, generalization,28 and especially dialectic.29 From these premises another definition is eventually concluded, sc., of what belongs (lmr£pxe~) to the genus, or the fact-to-beproved .30 Science, then, will be the systematization of prior knowledge: on the one hand, of the principles (ai apxat), the premises (ra 1rpwra), the "about which" (ro 'li"Ept o) the genus (ro "fEVoc;), the subject (ro V'li"OKEtfJ-EVov), the universals (ra Ka06J...ov), the one (o ev), or the internal possibilities (ra v7rapxovra); and on the other hand, of the fact (ro 1rpuy11-a), the "that" (ro on), the "self-display" (ro i)HKVVfJ-EVOV), the "in-turn" Or "successive shares" or particulars (ra Kara 11-f.poc;), or the many (ra 7roAA.r£, ro a1rav). This twofold prior knowledge Aristotle already intimated at the opening of the Posterior Analytics: "All teaching and all learning that involves thought proceeds from pre-existent knowledge [yvwa-ewc;] ." 31 Even though twofold at the beginning of scientific construction, this knowledge (yvwa-~c;) is at its origin the simple act of knowing (yvwpt,ew) the universal, since it is only " by or in the universal that we observe the particular." 32 Thus it may be said: "Science depends upon knowledge of the universal" (Tj 8'€ma-T~fl-"'J r0 25 II 10, 94 a 9-11. Cf. II 9, 93 b fl1-fl4. 26 I 8, 75 b 3fl. 27 De An. I 1, 40fl b fl5-fl6. 28 II 8, 13, 14. 29 An. Pr. I fl7, 30. Top. I 2, 101 a 37-b 4; I 12-17 VII 4-5, Vill. 80 I 30, 75 b 31-33 II 10, 94 a 13-24. For the main t~eatment of the whole scientific process, see I 2-4, 6, 8, esp. 9; II 1-3, 10, 13, 19; An. Pr. I 27, 43 b 1-38; I 30; Top. I 14; and E. N. VI 3,6. 81 I 1, 71 a 1-fl. Cf. E. N. VI 3, 1139 b fl6. 82 An. Pr. II fl1, 67 a fl7. 346 DANIEL GUERRIERE Ka06A.ov yvwpt,ELV E(rrtv) .33 What more does Aristotle disclose about this knowledge (yvw<:n~)? Knowledge (yvw