Some Questions about Language: A Theory Of Human Discourse And Its Objects by Mortimer J. Adler (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 601 individual author's mind (prescind from the author's mind/text controversy ) is interpretation, not history. On this view history is not simply meant. It should be admitted that a philosophy of history is not Patte's central concern and that to some extent at least he is using " the historian " as a pedagogical contrast to make his own views appear more clearly. Another example of contentious rhetoric. In summary, then, while both books make good introductions they should be used carefully and argumentatively. I have indicated some points of argument. Argument would be fruitful and would assist in carrying out the task which the books set themselves, namely the introduction of a mode of analysis. The mode is still, within the English-speaking world, somewhat foreign; it is not yet the domesticated mind. University College Cork, lrelan4 GARRETT BARDEN Some Questions about Language: A Theory Of Human Discourse And Its Objects. By MORTIMER J. ADLER. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1976. Pp. 189. $17.50. The strongest asset of Mortimer Adler's book is its systematic and structured analysis of language. Clarity reigns throughout Adler's exposition of his philosophical doctrine. And his is a systematic and wide-ranging presentation and study of the problems and questions he raises. From the outset, he states the scope of his philosophy of language, and says that its task is " to construct a theory that attempts to explain the reality or fact of communication which I have taken as its point of departure " (p. 5) . Adler's main concern lies in discussing how men communicate on the level of common discourse. From this, one can appreciate how men are able to communicate on a philosophical level: only a selected number of refinements have to be made. Furthermore, Adler then asks: With what aspects does a philosophical theory of language not involve itself? Even though it obviously concerns itself with statements whose purpose is communication , he says it does not involve itself with their truth or falsity. Furthermore, as one develops a philosophy of language, it should be free from any prior ontological, psychological, and epistemological commitments. Neutrality is required. The author summarizes his own task in stating that any theory of language must raise and answer three central questions: 1) What confers referential meaning on marks and sounds which are otherwise meaningless? Adler answers that the development of referential meaning occurs by " the 602 BOOK REVIEWS voluntary imposition of meaningless notations on the objects of our apprehension " (p. 171). 2) What do meaningful words refer to when they have referential significance? He argues that " apprehended objects are the referents of the name-words we use" (p. 171) . 3) Does ordinary language do what it appears to do? By answering the first two questions, Adler says that this third question is answered affirmatively. It has already been mentioned that Adler has achieved clarity in presenting his philosophy of language. He consistently defines his terms. For one of the problems which has plagued philosophy throughout the ages has been this failure to use terms and words critically. Philosophers have used words interchangeably, they have failed to express clearly what these involve, and this in turn has resulted in misrepresentations and misinterpretations . Adler has rendered the reader {and philosophy) an important service in the clarity and precision of his presentation. There is a need to pursue Adler's contention that a theory of language should not involve any prior ontological, psychological, and epistemological commitments. The reason is obvious: the aim is to develop a philosophy of language in itself; it should attempt to be as independent as possible from any unnecessary philosophical pre-suppositions. However, Adler admits that one has to make a selected number of commitments to account for the existence of things other than language. " The only justification it (a theory of language) can ever give, or ever needs to give, for such posits is that they are indispensable to the explanation that is called for " (p. 8) . Adler states these posits: 1) the mind is at least analytically distinct from the body; 2) the existence of certain acts of the mind such as perception , memory, imagination, and conception...