On Judging Existence

ON JUDGING EXISTENCE IN A PREVIOUS, mainly historical, article 1 I drew attention to a general trend among reputable Thomists to jettison the notion of judgment as the mental synthesis-or disjunction-of two concepts, and to envisage it as a simple and original act of the intellect by which a conceived form is attributed to a reality that is, ultimately, apprehended as singular and denoted by the subject of the judgment, with the result that only one concept is implied in the act of judging. This conclusion seems to be implied even in the opinion of those who hold the " two concept " theory, for they require a final act by which the mind compares its conceptual union with a like synthesis in what is objectively known and then pronounces on the identity-or lack of it- of both syntheses, in an assertive act which completes the judgment. In that case, it is only this final act which is characteristic of the judgment; the preceding acts (apprehension, conception, comparison, perception of the identity or diversity of the terms) are at most preliminary. It is clear that to understand a proposition is not the same as to judge. One can understand without judging, as when one grasps the meaning of a question or posits a hypothesis before it has been verified. At the end of the same article I surmised that the chief reason why the "two concept" theory found favor is the assumption that our primary judgments are ideal ones, such as first principles, predicated definitions, and other such abstract and universal judgments, which are all essential rather than existential . This assumption may be due to the fact that both in logic and in critical theory there was an almost exclusive concern with the type of knowledge found in science; and science 1 " On Judging," in The Thomist 88 (1974), pp. 768-8~5. I must apologize for my delay, due to other commitments, in completing the article. 507 608 AMBROSE MCNICHOLL is expressed in the form of statements that are ideal and universal . Science however is a highly sophisticated and artificial kind of knowledge; and it should surely be evident that one cannot even begin to examine the nature and validity of such an organized and derivative form of knowledge unless one has first of all inquired into the nature and validity of basic human knowing as such. This is the line taken by those who are most prominent in critical theory today. It can hardly be denied that ideal and essential judgments may be formed out of two concepts that have previously been abstracted. But the question is: is it necessary that it should be .so? Are two concepts required by the very nature of the act of judging? Moreover, granted that there may be two concepts which are used as subject and predicate, it can be asked whether the concept used as subject functions as a concept? The essential question must be this: what is required by the very nature of the act of judging? If it is found that there are authentic judgments which do not involve more than one concept , then no more can or need be postulated. At the outset it is well to note that we are not here concerned primarily with propositions but with judgments. Peter Strawson has insisted on the difference between what he calls the " sentence " and the " assertion." He holds that the sentence , or proposition, is what carries meaning but is never, as such, either true or false. Only when it is asserted does it become capable of being true or false.2 Although some of the Oxford school of Analysts disagree with Strawson I accept his distinction, in the .sense that to form a proposition is not the same thing as to judge. It is the logician who studies the nature and forms of propositions; and from his point of view he is entitled to speak of two concepts as of two terms. The perspective adopted in this article is more psychological than logical; •"On Referring," Mind 59 (1950); also in A. Flew (Ed.): Essays mConceptual Analysis, London, 1956, pp. ~0-5~. For qualifications cf. E. J. Lemmon...