St. Thomas and the Moral Agent

ST. THOMAS AND THE MORAL AGENT T:HE PERSON who is a fit subject for moral praise or moral blame is, for the purposes of this paper, the moral agent, and being morally praiseworthy or morally blameworthy, again for the purposes of this paper, constitutes the moral worth of the moral agent. For many, the free performance of an action and knowledge of that action's moral quality are both necessary and together suffice for a person's having the status of a moral agent. For them, the person who freely performs an action the moral quality of which the person knows is the prime example of the moral agent. Such a person may freely perform an action, say z, knowing it to be wrong (morally forbidden) 1, and such a person may freely perform an action, say x, knowing it to be right (morally required ) .2 In the first case, the moral agent is blameworthy, and in the second case, the moral agent is praiseworthy. With respect to this account and example of the moral agent, what is in truth the moral quality of the action of the person who knows its moral quality seems both necessary and sufficient for the moral worth of the moral agent.3 Many other people hold, however, that persons who do not know the moral quality of their actions are moral agents. St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, taught that a person who performs an action, y, thinking it to be wrong, is a moral agent 1 In what follows, I shall always mean morally forbidden by "wrong." 2 In what follows, I shall always mean morally required by " right." 3 If the action of the person who knows its moral quality be right, the person who performs it knowing it to be right is a praiseworthy moral agent, and if the person who knows the moral quality of his or her action be a praiseworthy moral agent, his or her action is right; moreover, if the action of the person who knows its moral quality be wrong, the person who performs it knowing it to be wrong is a blameworthy moral agent, and if the person who knows the moral quality of his or her action be a blameworthy moral agent, his or her action is wrong. 307 308 MATTHEW J. KELLY and is blameworthy,4 and others, influenced by his views, thmk he should also have taught that a person who thinks about the moral quality of the action he or she freely performs is a moral agent, and if no moral fault can be found with that moral agent for thinking as he or she does, then that moral agent is praiseworthy if the moral agent does y thinking it to be right.5 This emendation of Aquinas's views, which is the modern position of those who suppose that non-culpable conscience obligates, suggests that free performance of an action and thinking about its moral quality are both necessary and together suffice for a person who performs that action having the status of a moral agent. Leaving aside for now the question of who is right about the conditions which account for a person being a moral agent, the upholders of the claims of non-culpable conscience seem committed to the view that the moral agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy independently of what is in truth the moral quality of the action of the moral agent.8 Indeed, for the upholders of conscience, what is necessary and sufficient for the moral worth of the moral agent seems to be some relationship between what a moral agent non-culpably thinks about the moral quality of his or her action and the action itself, which relationship is independent of the real moral quality of the action.7 • Quodl. III, rn, 2: " Si ergo aliquid quod secundum se non est contra legem Dei, ut levare festucam de terra, vel iurare, apprehendatur, errante conscientia, ut contra legem Dei existens, et sic voluntas in ipsum feratur, manifestum est quod voluntas fertur, per se loquendo, et formaliter, in id quod est contra legem Dei; materialiter autem in id quod non est contra legem Dei; immo forte...