Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science by Mary Hesse (review)

148 BOOK REVIEWS stated his own position toward the end of the book, if for no other reason than to stimulate the reader to a personal critique and synthesis. Hudson's work also might prove helpful in stimulating thought on the state of Catholic moral theology. Currently there is a widespread move to embrace a theory of proportionate reason which is consequentialistic in nature and seems to be akin to utilitarianism. While the debate over this proposed move is intense and complex and thus cannot be related in a simplistic way to Hudson's work, yet the century of debate in philosophical ethics offers insights into the contemporary debate in Catholic circles. Certainly, there is a need for a clarification of the philosophical presuppositions of the move to proportionate reason. Likewise might not the difficulty of measuring consequences which Whewell raised long ago be raised against any new consequentialistic theory? Furthermore, won't the problem of content raised above against Hare also have to be dealt with in any new system? Will the departures from moral rules for proportionate reasons not lead to the vitiation of such rules (see p. 174)? These and other serious questions arise as one seeks to relate the century of debate in philosophical ethics to the current controversy in Catholic moral theology . If Hudson's work is any indication, this complex debate will be long lasting, if not everlasting. DeSales School of Theology Washington, D.C. JOHN w. CROSSIN, O.S.F.S. Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. By MARY HESSE. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980. Pp. xxvi + 271. $22.50. This volume can be looked at in two ways. It might be seen as simply a collection of reprinted essays by a philosopher of science widely respected in English and American academic circles. Or it might be seen as more, as a relatively coherent compendium of the most important pieces in the developing corpus of one of the first and most influential female philosophers of science in our day. Two things favor the more pretentious claim. Appended to the collection of essays is a complete bibliography of work by Hesse-the sort of bibliography most- often found in collections of authors whose published works the editors think important enough to list in full. And, the feminist aspect aside, the works chosen from that bibliography do represent a judicious selection of essays calculated to display the current state of thinking in the intellectual development of an independent · thinker in philosophy of science with a distinct enough perspec- BOOK REVIEWS 149 tive to warrant the attention of historians of twentieth-century philosophy of science. In any case, the volume will here be treated as such a major statement rather than as a mere collection of essays. The distinctiveness of Hesse's approach and of the volume shows up best not only in the inclusion of Part IV," Science and Religion" (which includes just the final chapter), but in the central role that chapter plays in the unfolding synthesis sketched out in the volume. Parts I and II, " The Historiography of Science," and " Objectivity and Truth," represent what, in recent years, Mary Hesse has come to be known for in philosophy of science circles. The final chapter in the second part, for instance, was presented at the 1976 Philosophy of Science Association meeting and is readily available in PSA 1976, volume ~. The presentation is clear and precise-and dry. The viewpoint expressed is sympathetic toward the newer movements in philosophy of science. As Hesse herself sums up the situation: "The papers ... in this collection all address themselves in one way or other to a critique of . . . empiricist presuppositions , and try more positively to steer a course between the extremes of metaphysical realism and relativism" (p. xiv}. In Hesse's view, recent developments in philosophy of science-she associates them principally with Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Stephen Toulmin, as well as W. V. Quine-only serve to reinforce the untenability of scientific realism. One chapter in this earlier part of the volume stands out as demonstrating Hesse's openmindedness. In " The Strong Thesis of Sociology of Science," Hesse shows herself to be remarkably open...