Harman’s “Refutation” of the Flourishing Ethics

HARMAN'S "REFUTATION" OF THE FLOURISHING ETHICS IN HIS "Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty," 1 Gilbert Harman argues that an ethics of flourishing-roughly of the sort I have called classical ethical egoism 2-implies "moral relativism, since what counts as 'flourishing' seems inevitably relative to one or another set of values" (p. 3rn) . He adds that " it is difficult to see how one rather than another conception of flourishing is to be validated simply in ' the nature of things ' or in the ' nature ' of persons-except in the sense in which different sets of values yield different conceptions of nature or of the nature of a person" (p. 313). Harman dislikes the argument that maintains we have basic (negative) rights since these rights are necessary for one to pursue one's happiness or flourishing: "From the mere fact that it ought to be the case from my own point of view that others not prevent me from developing my potential it does not follow that this ought to he the case (is desirable) from anyone else's point of view and certainly does not follow that others have sufficient reason to refrain from interfering with me" (p. 319). So Harman thinks an ethics of flourishing fails to support natural individual human rights. Finally Harman concludes that " the source of morality lies not in the nature of things hut in human arrangements" (p. 321). He suggests that such a conventionalist view of morality also gives support to the doctrine of rights to (negative) freedom. t Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12 (Fall, 1983), pp. 307-322. A difficulty with arguing with Harman arises from the fact that although he mentions many people who advance a version of the flourishing ethics, he does not provide us with any of the arguments in their own terms. Moreover Harman does not fully develop any of his arguments, partly because he is aiming at too diffuse a target to be very specific. 2 Tibor R. Machan, "Recent Work in Ethical Egoism", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 16 (January 1979), pp. 1-15. 887 888 TIBOR R. MACHAN There are several ways in which one could respond to Harman 's criticism and I will put forth only some of the points one could advance. First, Harman misunderstands the kind of value theory advanced by those who talk about the kind of flourishing relevant to ethics. They have in mind flourishing as the framework by which to evaluate conduct and institutions. By claiming that "what counts as ' flourishing ' seems inevitably relative to one or another set of values " he betrays his misunderstanding . Any set of values pertinent to ethics is theoretically tied to flourishing for those who advance the viewpoint he is criticizing. For these philosophers, to know whether some course of conduct or some institution is of value, to evaluate some act, to criticize someone's behavior, the standard for doing so is supposed to be whether human flourishing is enhanced or thwarted. Flourishing, then, cannot itself be " relative to one or another set of values" since there are no values apart from flourishing, not at least in the morally relevant sense. Harman appears to hold that one somehow has some values or standards of value (judgment) and then draws on these whenever some evaluative task arises. But what those who are talking about human flourishing are after is something Harman seems to take for granted, namely, where these values for judging various matters come from, what is their actual, best source. Their answer is, consider what constitutes flourishing for human beings, and that is where your standards lie. It is akin to medicine. If you want to know what doing well or badly comes to as regards your physical constitution, see whether it enhances or thwarts your life processess. There can be a lot of variation within all that, but at least in a very broad sense a standard of evaluation is availahle. If one appreciates the significance of this analogy, one will also see how Harman's talk about the alleged relativism of any flourishing ethics really amounts not to relativism but to contextualism: given certain basic valuations or theories of the morally good...