Modern Philosophy: An Introduction by A. R. Lacey (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 483 Modern Philosophy: An Introduction. By A. R. LACEY. Boston, London, and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. Pp. vii + 246. $20.00. The blurb announces that "Modern Philosophy ... will provide an introduction to the subject for intending students, first-year undergraduates and interested laymen such as academics from other disciplines." If "modern philosophy " is restricted to philosophy as it has been done in the last forty years or so in the English-speaking world-too restrictive a scope, I think-then this book starts out well enough. Lacey begins by proposing to give his reader, first, a "tour of some run of the mill problems " of philosophy, such as " Freewill", "Mind and Body", "The Basis of Morality", "Works of Art " (all chapter headings in Part One), and then, in Part Two, " to survey by helicopter the course we have hacked with the machete, and map out the landscape into its main regions " (p. 12). I think Lacey's proposal to engage the nonphilosophical reader in philosophical problems and then to discuss the nature of philosophy by reflecting on the way in which philosophical problems arise, are developed, and (one hopes) clarified is a useful way to introduce interested and intelligent lay people to philosophy. Lacey fails to implement his proposal as well as he might have done, however, in part because he misses his audience . By this I do not mean that Lacey overwhelms his reader with terminology (or jargon); nor does he write obscurely or ponderously. 'l'o his credit, Lacey consciously minimizes technical terminology, and, when technical terms seem useful, Lacey is usually careful to explain and illustrate their meaning and relevance. Indeed, his chapter on " Some Philosophical Labels " (chap. 13) could be very useful for beginners in philosophy. Yet, for all his clarity and care to avoid technical language, Lacey seems to forget who his intended audience is. He starts off well enough in the opening chapter on "Freewill". Lacey begins by evoking the feeling that many people have at least some of the time that events are not influenced by human desires and actions but are determined by God, or Fate, or Nature. He then leads the reader to the problem, first posed by Aristotle, of the truth or falsity of future statements (Can I say truly or falsely today that tomorrow California will have a major earthquake, since there is not at present any ' reality' to which the statement may truly or falsely correspond?). In turn, the problem of the truth or falsity of future statements leads to the general question of the nature of truth, which is the subject of the second chapter. The transition from the chapter on freewill to the chapter on truth, by the way, illustrates one of Lacey's strengths : showing the logical connections between issues. A good start, 484 BOOK REVIEWS especially if one is willing to set aside one's qualms about Lacey's restriction of " modern philosophy " to English-speaking philosophy in the last forty years or so. Unfortunately, by the time Lacey gets to implication (chap. 4) and meaning (chap. 6), he has left the beginner behind. The arguments and distinctions in these chapters are, save for the exceptional beginner, far too subtle and sophisticated. I think asking the novice to grasp the arguments of a Donald Davidson, a Dummett, a Kripke and a Putnam-all in one chapter !-is too much. The difficulties attendant upon the subtleties and sophistication of these chapters is intensified by Lacey's increasing allusions to the works of Quine, Frege, Chomsky, and the like. The middle chapters of this book read like articles from Mind or the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Although Modern Philosophy is not a book for beginners, as the blurb claims and as Lacey himself suggests in his Preface, some of the chapters in this book might well be used in a course on analytical philosophy or Wittgenstein or contemporary philosophical problems. For example, in chapter 8, on scepticism and language, Lacey carefully and clearly shows how Wittgenstein's interest in ordinary language was stimulated by his attempts to overcome the forms of scepticism which derive from the egocentric predicament. Lacey avoids overwhelming his reader...