Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? by Henry Veatch (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 535 . ···"'"' By and large, however, Profes,sor Hallett Clondenses much helpful theory in his "Background Remarks", including a treatment of positive and negative norms, moral acts and mor·al rules, rules of preference for distributive justice, and the relation of morality and the law. In the discussion of the last topic the author derives guidelines for the legal regulation of morality by relating J.S. Mill's principles to those of Basil Mitchell, which the author embraces. This is but one instance of Professor Hallett's references to figures in the history of philosophy and his attempts to apply their thinking to contemporary problems. Similarly, conditions for justified civil disobedience are articulated in the context of a look at the Grito. The wide range of contemporary issues offered for discussion, the frequent invitation to students/readers to reflect further on various subjects (often sections close with questions even on points tentatively settled), the bibliographies for further reading accompanying "Background Remarks ", and the explicit request by the author for suggestions for improvement reveal an attitude of openness and genuine desire for continued exploration . Particularly in skillful hands Reason and Right oon convey this sense to students, helping to make a philosophy course as stimulating as philosophy truly is. JANICE L. SCHULTZ Ganisius College Buffalo, New York Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? By HENRY VEATCH. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. Pp. xi + 258. $30.00. In a clear and readable fashion, Veatch presents a nrutural law foundation for human rights. He begins (Chapter I) by portraying law as being in search of an ethics. Using very colloquial language, Veatch diseusses a variety of efforts to found ethics and finds them all wanting. He rejects both standard teleology and deontology. "Put baldly the principle that was used against the teleologists was that the mere faet that someone desires something can never, as such, be a ground for saying that it is therefore only right that he should have what he desires. Likewise . . . [there is] no judgment of duty or obligation, but what it demands a justifying reason; and no justifying reason can ever be given for an obligatory action, unless it be in terms of some end or purpose which such an action serves" (p. 26). Veatch also presents an interesting discussion of the libertarian stance as a possible foundat,ion for law but ultimately eoncludes that rational egoism is not an ethics at all. 536 BOOK REVIEWS Veatch dialogues with libertarians in various parts of the volume. And well he might, not only because two foundations " of a more or less Libertarian persuasion" (p. ix) provided him some funding, but also because the arguments advanced are exteremely interesting if not ultimately convincing . Throughout his work, however, the main partners in dialogue are teleology and deontology. Evident early on is Veatch's knack for summarizing other positions in a lucid and interesting way. At times, he seems a bit too summary or short but main line of the argument is always easily detected. Having written off "practically the whole of contemporary ethics as being largely bankrupt" (p. 49), Veatch proceeds in Chapter II to argue for natural law. He believes tha.t an Aristotelian teleology is still quite plausible and builds his case with reference to Aristotle, Aquinas, and, occasionally, Richard Hooker. He enlivens his argument in this chapter and throughout with reference to life and literature-here in particular referring to Jane Austen's Persuasion and Henry Adam's account of General Ulysses S. Grant. Ethics for Veatch must be based on the real world and the nature of things. There is a moral dimension to nature. There is "a veritable natural end, or natural perfection, or natural telos, of human life" (p. 56). This is no