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BOOK REVIEWS 7Q5 respects a critical realist philosophy of science, rather than in terms of arguing that any particular reference is correct, or even justified. The project is an important one because, as the author correctly notes, "much of the Christian tradition has been undeniably realist in sensibility," whereas much modern philosophical theology has an "anti-realist drift" (137). In sum, the quality of the book as a whole makes it one which deserves to be widely read. University of Virginia Charlottesville, Virginia M. JAMIE FERREIRA Moral Action: A Phenomemological Study. By ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1985, Pp. ix + 225. $24.95 (cloth). In this carefully written study of the constituents of human decision making, the author lays an elaborate groundwork to develop the importance of the distinction between choice and the voluntary in moral discourse . In order to differentiate between choice and the simple voluntary, we must look at that which is chosen. Choice leaves its mark. There is a difference between doing something willingly and choosing to do something . I give my child medicine. He takes it willingly, but he may not have chosen it. Everything chosen is voluntary, but not everything that is voluntary is chosen. The voluntary is a genus with two species: the chosen and the willed but not chosen. Choice emanates from a simple voluntary. It is done with a view to an end, although not simply as a means to an end. Still, the distinction between the chosen and the voluntary lies in the end results. In the former a thing is done for something else, while in the latter voluntary actions are done for themselves. Choice can also be the preference of one voluntary over another. When I am thirsty, for example, I can drink water or milk. By my choice I am comparing one drink to another. This differs from the choice made in view of something. Finally, routine choices can become simple voluntaries , which the author calls " sedimented " voluntaries. These, in turn, may become the base or matrix for further articulated choices. Choice and the chosen can be further analyzed as one option among many: one choice may be substituted by another. If it can't be, it is not a choice. Furthermore, as a possibility among alternatives, the chosen is involved in a chain of consequences and implications: a concatenation. In order to bring about a simple choice, many words and events are required. 7~6 BOOK REVIEWS Thus, a chosen is always seen against a background of purpose, substitution , and concatenation. These the author calls the "categorialities" of choice. A practical, responsible, clear-thinking agent articulates choice in all three directions. This is triangulating the chosen, according to the author. Two factors enter in this triangulating process. Imagination allows the possibilities of choice to arise. Ambiguity, on the other hand, can suffocate the process. Thus, if one is slothful, dim, or mindless, the triangulalation analysis will not work. If, however, the choice is thoughtfully made, the analysis can be effective. We can readily distinguish between the two. Choice in view of something can be triangulated; choice as preference cannot be because it is done simply because we want to do it, or have it over another. It is based on taste. Likewise, the simple voluntary is done for itself. Simple observation usually enables us to distinguish whether a thing was chosen in view of something else, over against something else, or simply willed for itself. The simple voluntary immediately .engages us. We are always involved in it. It is the most elemental of our realities, and it becomes the matrix for the chosen. The chosen is a voluntary but it is no longer simple since it is done in view of something else. It pushes me away from my immediate conscious experience, away from my consciousness of what I am doing now, and what I will do. This is the mediated voluntary, and it is philosophically different from the simple voluntary. All moral acts are embodied in the human performance of them. They are affected by the historical situation in which they are performed. What we do in these situations are moves in human relationships...

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