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HUSSERL ON GALILEO'S INTENTIONAI,ITY 1JHE PROBLEM OF THE compatibility between pheomenology and history is the unique problem characterizing Edmund Husserl's The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.1 Husserl attempts to resolve the pvoblem by directly investigating the crisis of the modern sciences-a crisis which he claims begins with Galileo. The aim of this essay is to evaluate critically Husserl's assessment of Galileo as the originator of the crisis. I hope to show that, given Husserl's own demands for the proper historico-phenomenological investigation of the crisis, his conclusions about Galileo are not justified. This will be accomplished , in part, by using some of the work on Galileo done by William A. Wallace, 0.P. THE "ORIGIN" OF THE CRISIS Husserl describes the crisis of European sciences in terms of a teleological movement. The telos began with the radical change effected by the ancient Greeks in their recognition that reason is essential to humanity, and that reason is the entelechy of humanity.2 For the Greeks, one of the exigencies of reason is a universal knowledge of what is, in which truth in itself, episteme, is attainable. The telic character of reason is revealed in the fact that reason in its philosophical mode continually moves from latent to manifest reason beginning with the Greeks. Husserl writes: "... the telos ... was inborn in 1 Translated, with an introduction, by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) ; abbreviation: Orisis. 2 See Carr's Introduction p. xxxviii to the Orisis for a discussion of the sense in which the Greeks' change was a radical one. 680 HUSSERL ON GALILEO'S INTENTIONALITY 681 European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy-that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is only possible, through philosophical reason, moving endlessly from latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through this, its truth and genuine human nature ..." 3 The search for a universal knowledge initially had a " na'ive obviousness " which from the very beginning was not immune to transformations that eventually would increase and achieve greater and greater sophistication. For Husserl, the transformations are brought about by skepticism , which, in its denial of the presence of reason in " the factually experienced world," finally reaches the point where "... the deepest essential interrelation between reason and what is in general, the enigma of all enigmas, has to become the actual theme of inquiry." 4 This inquiry ought to be the task for contemporary philosophy. Such a task has been recognized to a certain extent beginning with Hume and on through Kant and beyond. What Hume and Kant attempted with regard to the Renaissance renewal of the ancient Greek ideal of a universal philosophy, Husserl prescribes in a more radical way for Hume and Kant themselves, indeed, for the whole of the history of philosophy and (modern) science.5 Husserl's immediate task will be to overcome the naive rationalism of the eighteenth-century and the "unnoticed na'ivetes" of the present day, so that the genuine sense of rationalism may be established. A philosophy is needed which would bring the entelechy of reason to its realization; this is, Husserl explains, reason "... fully conscious of itself in its own essential form, i.e. the form of a. universal philosophy which grows through consistent apodictic insight and supplies its own norms thl'ough an apodictic method." 6 Such a task is intrinsically historical since the manifestation of reason can only come about through concepts, problems, and methods which s Husserl, p. 15. 4 Ibid., p. 13. s Ibid., p. 1. 6 Ibid., p. 16. 682 PETER J. CATALDO are themselves inescapably inherited. We must proceed, then, by "exhibiting" and "testing" the "inner meaning and hidden teleology" of philosophy's history. Husserl concludes: What is clearly necessary (what else could be of help here?) is that we reflect back, in a thorough historical and critical fashion, in order to provide, before all decisions, for a radical self-understanding ; we must inquire back into what was originally and always sought in philosophy, what was continually sought by all the philosophers and philosophies that have communicated with one another historically; but this must include a...