Religion and Artificial Reproduction: An Inquiry into the Vatican “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Human Reproduction” by Thomas A. Shannon and Lisa Sowle Cahill (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 158 But his analysis shows how it can distinguish as well as relate opposed positions, and so shows how theology contributes to our hope for a common community in and with vigorous dissent from each other. Loyola College of Maryland Baltimore, Maryland JAMES J. BUCKLEY Religion and Artificial Reproduction: An Inquiry into the Vatican "Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Human Reproduction." By THOMAS A. SHANNON and LISA SowLE CAHILL. New York: Crossroad, 1988. $17.95 (cloth). This volume supplies a great deal of useful information on this in· struction which it prints in full in an appendix. Chapter 1 supplies an up-to-date survey of available reproductive technologies. Chapter 2 summarizes the Catholic tradition on sexual morality. Chapter 3 an· alyzes the Instructions, and 4 compares this to the regulations of the American Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1979) , the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1983), the American Fertility Society (1986), the British Medical Resarch Council (1982), the British Medical Association (1982) the Warmock Report (1984), the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (1982) and the Victoria Government Committee (1982, 1983, 1984). Chapter 5 reports American reactions including those of Cardinal Bernadin and Archbishop Daniel E. Pilarczyk, theologians Richard A. McCormick, S.J. and James T. Burtchaell, C.S.C., and the columnist Charles Krauthammer. In Chapter 6 the authors draw their own conclusion. They think the Instruction has performed a service in calling attention to the need to set reasonable limits on the use of reproductive technologies, but they believe " The Vatican's call for legal prohibition of all reproduction technologies that eliminate sexual intercourse extends further than is morally necessary" (p. 138). They show, correctly, Humanae Vitae's principle of the inseparability of the unitive and procreative meaning of the marital act is the guiding principle by which the Instruction limits technological reproduction, but they reject this principle and propose in its stead that it is " the committed love relationship of the couple in its totality that gives the moral texture both to their sexuality and to their subsequent role as parents ", since " it is from the wholeness of the relationship that their specific physical acts of sex and 154 BOOK REVIEWS conception take their moral purpose. " Hence they would only exclude technologies that use gametes from donors other than the married couple. They omit discussion of another important principle proposed by the Instruction, namely the right of the child to be born of legitimate parents in a normal manner. They themselves seem to admit that the principle they propose to limit permissable techniques is not very helpful since after excluding donor methods they add, " although the authors recognize that further discussion may be necessary to clarify this point" (p. 138). In fact, couples consenting to insemination of the woman with a donor's sperm or contracting with a surrogate mother can easily justify their action as contributing to the wholeness of their loving relationship. Theologians who use this principle without further specification are logically forced to accept homosexual marriages and the artificial production of children for such marriages. This book simply ignores such obvious objections to their proposal. Indeed it does not seriously address in any detail the problem which the Instruction faces frankly and honestly, namely, what kind of reproductive acts are consistent with the totality of a committed loving relationship. Certainly, as the authors admit, some kinds of acts are not consistent with such a relationship, but they do not show critically how the principle they want to substitute for that of the Instruction can determine which reproductive technologies are not morally acceptable. The Instruction, on the contrary, took the necessary responsibility of proposing such a specification, by defining the structure of the marital act which is essential to this relationship. This does not mean that it defines it merely in its physical character, but in its specifying moral intention (its moral object) as an act which keps intact the intrinsic relation between the expression of love and the transmission of life. Since the authors never explain why this principle, so deeply rooted in the Catholic tradition, is false, nor...