Civil Disobedience in the Social Theory of Thomas Aquinas

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN THE SOCIAL THEORY OF THOMAS AQUINAS SALLY J. SCHOLZ Villanova University Villanova, Pennsylvania INTRODUCTION I N HER ESSAY, "The Concept of Social Hierarchy in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," Katherine Archibald claims that the properly ordered society, according to Thomas Aquinas, is one that is based on the natural inequality of peoples, with dominance and subordination being the key to that order. Given her strong emphasis on social hierarchy in Aquinas's thought, she is led to the conclusion that "he who leads is wiser and better than he who follows, and rebellion on the part of the follower is treason and sin."1 While Aquinas does view sedition as "a special kind of sin"2 and obedience as "a special virtue,"3 one should be cautious in interpreting him as precluding all types of civil disobedience. On the contrary, Aquinas's social theory includes criteria for determining when civil disobedience is justified and perhaps even obligatory. After first defining civil disobedience and classifying it into four forms based on motive and extent of dissent, I shall present Aquinas's account of justified civil disobedience. The first question 1Katherine Archibald, "The Concept of Social Hierarchy in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," The Historian 2 (1949-50); reprinted in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, ed. & trans. Paul Sigmund (New York: Norton & Co., 1988), p. 139. 2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 11-11, q. 42, a. 1, from The Political Ideas ofSt. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Dino Bigongiari (New York: Hafner Press, 1953). 3 STh II-II, q. 104, a. 1. 449 450 SALLY J. SCHOLZ to be addressed is that of how one judges a law or system of laws to be unjust. Next, the duty (virtue) of obedience to just and unjust laws will be discussed. Finally, I shall argue that of the four possible forms of civil disobedience (as I have classed them) Aquinas only clearly allows the fourth, while at times also apparently allowing the third. My argument is premised on the fact that human law is derived from natural law as a means to the common good.4 In other words, "law must concern itself in particular with the happiness of the community."5 In addition, the law that the subject is obligated to disobey is the product of a system in which the representatives entrusted with the common good fail to enact laws directed toward this end (section Il). Since Thomas Aquinas uses "law" to indicate a wide range of rational orderings, from the rational ordering of the universe by God to the ordering of society by the sovereign, some distinctions need to be made at the outset. This paper pertains to the relationship between the ruler and the subjects of a civil society and therefore the "law" to which I refer is human law. More specifically , human law may be divided into the "law of nations" and "civil law." The law of nations covers "those things which are derived from the law of nature as conclusions from premises, e.g., just buyings and selling,"6 and civil law pertains to that which is derived from the law of nature "according as each state decides on what is best for itself."7 Thus, since civil law deals with individual states and more specifically, the relationship between the ruler and the subjects in these individual states, civil law is that with which this paper deals. One further note about human law is its teleological nature. On the microcosmic level, the purpose of human law is to bring 4 Daniel A. Degnan, S.J., "'I\vo Models of Positive Law in Aquinas," The Thomist 46 (1982): 1-32. "The end to which the judicial precepts are ordered is a structure of justice in society. The institutions of the actual, detailed structure ofjustice in society is the work of positive law" (p. 19). "The ordering of law is an ordering of just relationships among men and this ordering is, at the same time, an ordering to the common good" (p. 21). See also STh I-II, q. 90, a. 1. 5 STh I-II, q. 90, a. 2. 6 STh I-II, q. 95, a...