Proportionalism and the Pill: How Developments in Theory Lead to Contradictions to Practice

The Thomist 63 (1999): 269-81 PROPORTIONALISM AND THE PILL: HOW DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY LEAD TO CONTRADICTIONS TO PRACTICE CHRISTOPHER KACZOR Loyola Marymount University Los Angeles, California ONE MAY BE TEMPTED to think that thirty years after the publication ofHumanae vitae scholars have heard almost every argument for and against contraception and almost every argument for and against the moral theory most commonly invoked to justify contraception, namely, proportionalism. Authors on both sides of the matter have pointed out the connections between the theory of proportionalism and the practice of contraception. All proponents of proportionalism argue that this theory justifies the use of contraception at least under some circumstances, and most, but not all, critics of proportionalism hold that contraception is an intrinsically evil act that cannot be justified. As Edward Vacek notes: An argument could be made that Humanae vitae has fueled the development of P[roportionalism] in Catholic thought, and that the birth control debate has been so drawn-out and intense precisely because it is really a debate over a style of moral reasoning and a vision of what it means to be human, not to mention over what God is doing in the world-therefore over much larger matters than the use of a pill.1 Vacek is absolutely correct in saying that Humanae vitae led to a greater and greater questioning of traditional formulations of 1 Edward Vacek, "Proportionalism: One View of the Debate," Theological Studies 46 (1985): 293. 269 270 CHRISTOPHER KACZOR moral theory.2 If one surveys the literature that began what was later called proportionalism,3 one will find a recurring pattern; first basic principles are laid down and defended, and then, invariably, it is shown that these principles justify the use of contraception. John Finnis puts the point as follows: The formal attack on the moral absolutes emerges, among Catholics, in response to the problem of contraception. Not in response to the desire to maintain a counter population deterrent strategy of annihilating retaliation; or to tell lies in military, police, or political operations; or to carry out therapeutic abortions; or to arrange homosexual unions; or to relieve inner tensions and disequalibria by masturbation; or to keep slaves; or to produce babies by impersonal artifice. Those desires were and are all urgent enough, but none of them precipitated the formal rejection of moral absolutes. The desire to practice and approve of contraception did.4 Indeed, early formulations of proportionalism, formulations that understood proportionate reason simply as the injunction to choose the lesser of two evils and lacked a developed application of the goodness/rightness distinction, seemed to justify the use of contraception in most cases. What has been overlooked, however, is how the development of proportionalism itself leads to the conclusion that the use of contraception, for the most part if not entirely, is illicit. In other words, proportionalism itself, given a proper understanding of proportionate reason and the goodness/ rightness distinction, leads one to a rejection of the use of contraception. Unlike consequentialism or act-utilitarianism, proportionalism is not mere maximization of premoral goods or minimization of premoral evils. Though maximization of premoral goods and minimization of premoral evils primarily define proportionate reason, there are other, secondary conditions that establish it as 2 In his book Proportionalism: TheAmericanDebateandIts European Roots (Washington: Georgetown University, 1987), Bernard Hoose makes similar remarks (p. 37). 3 See, for instance, Readings in Moral Theology vol. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition , ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (NewYork: Paulist Press, 1979); ChristopherKaczor, ed., Proportionalism: ForandAgainst (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, forthcoming). 4 John Finnis, Moral Absolutes (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 85. PROPORTIONALISM AND THE PILL 271 well.5 These conditions were worked out through the responses to critics who suggested that proportionalism justifies any sort of behavior whatever, even for example allowing a sheriff to frame and execute an innocent man to prevent a riot. Proportionalists responded by clarifying that proportionalism does not advocate the maximization of nonmoral goods irrespective of all other considerations. Certain secondary conditions must be met for there to be a truly proportionate reason. First, proportionate reason includes a condition ofnecessity of cause...