New Approaches to God by Jules M. Brady, S.J. (review)

638 BOOK REVIEWS Throughout the book Marshall is able to support his arguments from major figures in the Western tradition of Christian thinking, notably Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Luther, Barth, and Balthasar; and there are hints of its congruity with the East, especially with Athanasius, the Cappadocians, and Palamas. In the face of postmodern tendencies to fragmentation and even nihilism, Marshall sides with those philosophers who stick to a unitary concept of truth. Indeed he proposes to them what should be a congenial account of the Christian faith which the Holy Spirit may perhaps integrate into his work of persuasion. To theologians and all thinking believers Marshall displays the intellectual superiority of a robust version of the historicfaith over reductionist restatements of it. In highly technical style, he furnishes a surround for the kind of advocacy that has been conducted in evangelistic, apologetic, and pastoral mode by Lesslie Newbigin and other significant theological writers of the late twentieth century. GEOFFREY WAINWRIGHT Duke University Durham, North Carolina New Approaches to God. By JULES M. BRADY, S.J. North Andover, Mass.: Genesis Publishing, 1996. Pp. 136. $19.95 (paper). ISBN: 1-886670-099 . In NewApproachesto God, Fr. Jules Brady attempts to synthesize arguments from Anselm, Aquinas, and Kant in order to propose his own argument for God's existence. This compact text is written in a clear and succinct style. Brady often uses familiar analogies or examples to help the reader grasp his ideas. Furthermore, he prefaces each chapter with a question or a set of questions and then endeavors to answer them for the sake of clarifying its important themes. This seems like sound pedagogy. Unfortunately, the editing and proofreading at times leaves something to be desired. For example, the endnote chapters are mislabeled (e.g., the notes for chapter 4 are labeled "chapter seven," those for chapter 5 are labeled "chapter eight"). Brady's compact text contains three distinct sections or parts. The first section, chapters 1 through 3, consists of primary source selections from Anselm, Aquinas, and Kant. The translations of Anselm and Aquinas are Brady's. The passages again are clear and concise. The Kant selection is takeri from Norman Kemp Smith. BOOK REVIEWS 639 The second part of Brady's text, chapters 4 through 7, contains commentary on the classic debates between Anselm, Aquinas, and Kant regarding the Ontological and Cosmological Arguments. Chapter 4 is a defense of Anselm's (first) theistic argument, found in chapter 2 of the Proslogion. Brady argues that Anselm's argument can be read on three different levels. The first regards the crucial premise (i.e., God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived) as grounded in faith, and so fails to be a demonstration for God's existence (50-51). The second level simply leaves the crucial premise unjustified. This version also fails as a demonstration, according to Brady, and he cites Aquinas's objection that it illicitly moves from the concept of something to its (actual) existence. What the second level lacks, according to Brady, is "a foundation in the real (i.e., extra-mental) order for the concept" (52-53). Brady believes that Anselm accomplishes this in his response to Gaunilo: "Anselm proposes a method of arriving at the concept of that than which nothing greater can be conceived by starting with something that is objective, extra-mental and in the real order outside the mind, the degrees of good" (51). Since the highest degree of goodness corresponds to that than which nothing greater can be conceived, the third level of Anselm's argument is immune to Aquinas's criticism. Thus while the first two readings of the Ontological Argument are not demonstrations for God's existence, Brady argues that the third is. That Anselm makes such a response to Gaunilo is not always noted in the literature. In this regard Brady's defense seems rather novel. However, I anticipate two objections, both of which deal with justifying the claim regarding degrees of goodness. On the one hand, if goodness (or degrees thereof) is a mind-independent object due to empirical considerations (e.g., witnessing that certain things in nature are better than others for various reasons...