Non-Aristotelian Prudence in the Prima Secundae

The Thomist 64 (2000): 401-22 NON-ARISTOTELIAN PRUDENCE IN THE PRIMA SECUNDAE ROBERT C. MINER Boston College Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts It is often assumed that ThomasAquinas teaches an Aristotelian doctrine of prudence in the Summa Theologiae. Impressed both by the richness ofAristotle's conception of phronesis and by the extent to which Thomas seems to rely on Aristotelian authority for his own notion of prudentia, some commentators have held that Aquinas's doctrine is essentially Aristotelian.1 The non-Aristotelian authorities that do appear in the inquiry can be regarded as marginal figures to be reconciled to the dominant Aristotelian teaching, accidents incapable of changing the Aristotelian essence. However eclectic Thomas might be in his metaphysics or in his theology as a whole, at least the doctrine on prudence is straightforwardly Aristotelian. Against this view, R.-A. Gauthier has argued that while Thomas uses Aristotelian formulae to articulate his notion of prudence, he does so by systematically misreading Aristotle and doing violence to the spirit of his texts.2 Both views of the relation between Thomas 1 This is implicit, for example, inYves Simon's writing on the virtues. Simon dissents from Gilson's view that Aquinas is not best regarded as an "Aristotelian" on the ground that "to say . . . that Thomas Aquinas is not an Aristotelian obscures rather than clarifies our understanding of historical developments in philosophy" (Yves Simon, The Definition of Moral Virtue [NewYork: Fordham University Press, 1986], 125). For a nuanced defense and expansion of Gilson's view, see Mark Jordan, The Alleged Aristotelianism of Aquinas (Toronto: PIMS, 1990). 2 R.-A. Gauthier, "Introduction," in Aristote, L'Ethique aNicomaque, introduction, translation, commentary by Rene Antoine Gauthier and Jean Yves Jolif, 2d ed., with a new introduction, 3 vols. (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1970), 1:276. A spirited reply to 401 402 ROBERT C. MINER and Aristotle have exerted significant influence beyond the narrow circles ofacademicThomism. References to "AristotelianThomistic " virtue are commonplace.3 Almost as plentiful are versions ofthe sentiment, recently expressed by Allan Bloom, that the medieval use of Aristotelian authority "was, of course, an abuse of Aristotle."4 The goal of the present essay is to reject both extremes by paying close attention to what Thomas says about prudence, and how he says it, in a cluster of questions within the Prima secundae of the Summa Theologiae. The reading will be set out in a series of steps. First, I will consider the presentation of prudence as an intellectual virtue in questions 56-57 of the Prima secundae. Here the central elements of the Aristotelian doctrine of prudence with which Thomas seems to identify his own teaching will emerge. The second section of the paper will examine the handling of prudence among the moral virtues. Close reading of questions 58-61 will show that, while the recognition of the circle between prudence and the moral virtues is indeed similar to that of Aristotle, the consideration of prudence as one of the four cardinal virtues affords Thomas the opportunity to qualify and enrich the teaching with doctrines taken from other authorities, including the Augustinian linkage ofprudentia and ars. The third part of the paper will focus on article 4 of question 61. In attending to this absolutely vital text, I will show that Aquinas situates Aristotelian phronesis on the lowest rung of a hierarchy consisting of various levels of prudence. The highest prudence attainable by human beings turns out to be essentially contemplative. Here the preferred authority is Neoplatonic rather than Aristotelian. The fourth and final section will take up the issue of infused prudence Gauthier can be found in Ralph Mcinerny, Aquinas and Human Action (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 161-77. 3 One author even speaks of the "Aristotelian and Aquinian [sic] systems" (Anthony J. Lisska, Aquinas' Theory ofNatural Law [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996], 99). 4 Allan Bloom, The ClosingoftheAmericanMind (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 252. Later in his book, Bloom is somewhat more generous to Aquinas (see, e.g., 376). PRUDENCE IN THE PRIMA SECUNDAE 403 and its relation to acquired prudence, analyzing the dependence of both on the un-Aristotelian virtue of caritas. Two comments about what my...