Bernard Lonergan’s Philosophy of Religion: From Philosophy of God to Philosophy of Religious Studies by Jim Kanaris (review)

340 BOOK REVIEWS rightness or wrongness, whether proximate or remote, or direct or indirect, or slight or readily apparent ... Fuchs expand[s] our understanding of an action's moral import. (250) I do not know how such complexity assists the "unintelligent" any better than the simple norm of "do not engage in sex outside of marriage," or "do not kill innocent persons," or "do not beat your spouse." How does this level the playing field and deliver a more "egalitarian" moral method? Whether or not one accepts the revisionist school, Graham has given us a vital source of reflectioll'on the method itself which can be utilized to argue for its demise or, for those so interested, its ongoing development. Ifrevisionists are practical absolutists in the area of intrinsically evil acts, we can continue to engage in dialogue about the theoretical level. With so much work left unfinished by Fuchs, Graham will be working hard over the next decade to complete it himself. I look forward to him developing a moral method and the conversation that ensues. Graham's take on the revisionist approach is expressed in such irenic tones one can only wonder what his voice would have contributed to lessening the shrill pitch and personal veriom during the 1970s and 1980s in American moral theological circles. Perhaps we could only have such a voice because of the passage of time. Conversation with such a partner as Graham promises to be both civil and quite productive. Pontifical College ]osephinum Columbus, Ohio JAMES KEATING Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of Religion: From Philosophy of God to Philosophy of Religious Studies. By JIM KANARIS. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2002. Pp. xii+ 200. $21.95 (paper). IBSN 0-7914-5466-5. In this insightful study, Jim Kanaris successfully demonstrates his thesis that we should refer to Bernard Lonergan's "philosophy of religion as it is literally, as a philosophy ofreligious studies, distinguishing it firstly from his philosophy of God and secondly from his model of religion" (6). Following the historical method, he traces the emergence of Lonergan's philosophy of religion and aptly demarcates it both from his older philosophy of God and from his model of religious experience, which is more or less concomitant with his philosophy of religion. He considers the notion of religious experience as the linchpin between Lonergan's early philosophy of God and his later philosophy of religion (5; see chart, 145). BOOK REVIEWS 341 Kanaris rightly sees that Lonergan's philosophy of religion is a "foundational methodology of religious studies" (131). It plays two roles. First, its ground in cognitional theory provides a heuristic structure for research; second, it proceeds in a dialectical fashion as it critically examines actual practices in religious studies. "Dialectic is all about engaging implicit and explicit assumptions (cognitional, metaphysical, ethical, and religious) that shape methodical and methodological inquiry and their horizons" (121). Again, Lonergan's philosophy of religion is not the same thing as his model of religion. "The shift, then, is from articulating his own model to scrutinizing the philosophical assumptions of models proposed by religion scholars" (123). While the model is undoubtedly valuable, the foundational-dialectical tool offered by Lonergan is methodologically more basic. Kanaris's complex interpretation ofLonergan is soundthroughout. He shows his understanding to be nuanced as he characterizes two stages in Lonergan's development, that is, from an intellectualist stance to a position that covers the whole of human intentionality, culminating in the fourth level (the level of values and religion). He is also balanced as he does not want to exaggerate the reorientation: Lonergan's Kehre seems to have been more a shift than a break (11, 62, 80, 95, 98, 104). Kanaris is generally favorable to Lonergan while being aware of his limitations, for instance, the use that Lonergan makes of Heiler, which seems to have misled Lindbeck in his construing ofLonergan (111-12). He situates the issues and options within a contemporary context and shows that some of Lonergan's solutions overlap with those of other philosophers. At other times, he clarifies Lonergan's thought by contrast, for instance with Chalmers on co11sciousness (32-35). Or he elucidates with clarity the debate between...