The Error of the Passions

The Thomist 73 (2009): 349-79 THE ERROR OF THE PASSIONS STEVEN J. JENSEN University of St. Thomas Houston, Texas IN HIS 1970 ARTICLE on weakness of will, Donald Davidson faults Aquinas for presenting the weak person with two onesided arguments, that of reason and that of the passions.1 Since these two arguments reach contrary conclusions, and since they are both valid, Davidson concludes that Aquinas must maintain that the argument of the passions contains a false premise, which Davidson plausibly supposes to be the major premise. The upshot, says Davidson, is that Aquinas's moral universe is rather flat and one-sided. It cannot contain conflicting goods that pull the agent in opposite directions and which the agent must weigh in his deliberations. Is Davidson's portrayal of Aquinas fair?2 If one takes Aquinas's descriptions of the reasoning of the weak person absolutely literally, then it would seem so, but reflection upon other statements of Aquinas concerning practical reasoning reveals that the rather didactic syllogisms of the weak person must be nuanced. Given these nuances, the views ofAquinas and Davidson may not be that distance from one another. In particular, the premises of practical reasoning turn out not to be one-sided categorical statements but sometimes quite elaborate evaluations 1 Donald Davidson, "How ls Weakness of Will Possible?", in idem, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980): 21-42, at 33-36. 2 Bonnie Kent notes that several authors argue, contrary to Davidson, that according to Aquinas the will is involved in weakness (see "Aquinas and Weakness ofWill," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 [2007]: 70-91). The focus of this article, on the other hand, is the faulty reasoning that Davidson attributes to Aquinas's weak person. 349 350 STEVEN J. JENSEN of the pros and cons of a course of action. Furthermore, reason can consider what the passions have to say, for the error of the passions resides primarily in the minor premise rather than in the major.3 I wish to locate this error of the passions, and in so doing to reveal some elements of practical reasoning common to Aquinas and Davidson. I will begin with Davidson's portrayal of Aquinas (section I). I will then show that Aquinas seems to think, contrary to Davidson, that the error of the passions is found in the minor premise (section II). Explaining how this can be so, however, is no simple matter. It demands, first, an explanation of the major premises (section Ill): how reason can consider both the pros and cons, by using propositions that are not straightforwardly categorical, but rather involve the consideration of actions in themselves. These universal major premises of actions considered in themselves, however, must be applied to actions as they actually are by way of a minor premise that eliminates further consideration (section IV). Precisely in this elimination, the weak person errs; he cuts from his deliberation that which should not be eliminated. I conclude by returning to the major premise, considering how it can be true even while the weak person abandons the human good (section V). I. DAVIDSON'S PORTRAYAL OF AQUINAS Davidson faults Aquinas for presenting the weak person with two one-sided arguments, that of reason and that of the passions. The passions pull the weak person away from the judgment of reason, so that he acts contrary to what is best. A person tempted 3 By speaking of the error of the passions or the syllogism of the passions I do not mean to intellectualize the passions. The passions themselves do not present this reasoning. Passions desire; they do not reason. The error is an error of reasoning, prompted by the passions. The syllogism of the passions is simply that line of reasoning that takes the side of the passions. Aquinas says that the passions suggest premises or focus a person's attention upon them. Any reference in this paper, then, to the argument of the passions, or to the error of the passions, is to an argument or error of reason, but as influenced by the passions. THE ERROR OF THE PASSIONS 351 to commit adultery, for instance, might have the...