From Medieval Voluntarism to Hursthouse’s Virtue Ethics

The Thomist 73 (2009): 621-46 FROM MEDIEVAL VOLUNTARISM TO HURSTHOUSE'S VIRTUE ETHICS KEVIN E. O'REILLY Milltown Institute Dublin, Ireland IN RECENT DECADES there has been an attempt to reinstate virtue ethics in moral theorizing and debate. One contribution in this regard is that of Rosalind Hursthouse, whose book On Virtue Ethics, 1 seeks a rapprochement between an Aristotelianinspired virtue ethics and Kantian deontology. Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics captures the interest of a Thomist in part because of her discussion of the ends in the light of which we evaluate plants, animals, and human beings as members of their respective species. Her reflections bear a certain resemblance to Thomas Aquinas's observations concerning the natural inclinations (at STh I-II, q. 94, a. 2). While Philippa Foot pioneered contemporary discussion concerning the subject of ethical naturalism,2 Hursthouse, building upon Foot's work, has led the way in discussing the "ends" (which bear a certain similarity to Aquinas's "natural inclinations ") that are characteristic of embodied beings, that is to say, of humans and of other animals. Her project, however, reveals a certain operative anthropological dualism. Put briefly, rationality is not constrained in its deliberations by the parameters suggested by our animal "ends"; it ultimately enjoys an absolute freedom in imposing its own "ends" as though from outside the corporeal conditions of our being. Thus, in transcending the 1 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 2 P. Foot, "Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?" OxfordJournal ofLegal Studies 15 (1995): 1-14. 621 622 KEVIN O'REILLY bodily dimensions of human being, rationality is free to manipulate them according to its own designs. As I will demonstrate, Hursthouse's account betrays some of the same features as are found in the theorizing of John Duns Scotus concerning the ethical life, albeit in a mutated form.3 Scotus's conception of ethics, however, constitutes a rupture with an Aristotelian-inspired virtue ethics, whose major medieval proponent was Thomas Aquinas, not least because of his treatment of the natural inclinations-which treatment also results, I will argue, in an operative anthropological dualism. If, however, we are hylomorphically constituted as body-soul unities, our bodies and their natural inclinations must necessarily enter into our appraisal of what conduces to human flourishing; if it does not, ethics becomes voluntarist in nature. History shows that Scotus's speculations contributed to the death of the virtue-ethics tradition that arguably culminated in Aquinas. Clearly, it is not possible to predict the future of contemporary virtue ethics; nevertheless, given the historical precedent of Scotus, there are grounds for grave misgivings about a virtue ethics grounded in a dualistic anthropology. Ultimately, 3 My line of argument does not require me to establish a causal link between Scotus and Hursthouse. It simply hinges on the similarity between Scotus's and Hursthouse's attitudes towards the will and human nature. Nevertheless, Hursthouse's speculations do unfold in dialogue with Kant, whose moral philosophy arguably traces its genealogy back to Scotus. In particular, she attempts to effect a rapprochement between Aristotle and Kant when dealing with emotion and motivation (On Virtue Ethics, 91££.), seemingly unaware of the kind of developments indicated in this article, developments which arguably render such a rapprochement impossible. For a treatment of the significance ofScotus's treatment of the will and morality for Kant's ethics, see Hannes Mohle, "Will und Moral: Zur Voraussetzung der Ethik des Johannes Duns Scotus und ihrer Bedeutung fiir die Ethik Immanuel Kants," in Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood and Methchild Dreyer, eds.,]ohn Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 573-94. Ingham and Dreyer summarize Scotus's historical legacy as follows: "Scotus's philosophical legacy ... can be summarized as an attention to personal, subjective awareness, in the light of rational principles. These principles link logic, ontology, and ethics to form a whole whose unifying principle is the person in the act of selfreflection . In his followers, these principles will be developed and enhanced throughout the fourteenth century. The principles will influence the thought of Ockham, as we know, but also thinkers such as Suarez, Molina, Leibniz, Wollf, and Kant" (Mary Beth Ingham...