In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

BOOK REVIEWS 159 of mental intentionality that the eliminative materialist does not grant. Arguing that the same problem holds for any materialist view, Feser states, “The conception of matter that modern materialism inherited from the Mechanical Philosophy, since it strips of matter anything that might smack of Aristotelian form and final causes, necessarily strips from it also anything like qualia and intentionality, and thus anything that could possibly count as mental” (236). He then shows that scientists and philosophers of science, including Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, unconsciously import formal and final causality into their language in order to speak coherently about empirical things. Regarding consciousness, for instance, Dennett and others have argued that thoughts are nothing more than distinct neural firing patterns that function as symbols (or algorithms, etc). Without an interpreting intellect, however, how could the neural patterns, which are themselves certainly not like what they symbolize, be connected with particular things so as to symbolize them? If one supposes that particular neural patterns are triggered by particular chains of causes and effects, one faces the problem that, absent interpretation, “there is just the ongoing causal flux” (242). To solve problems of these kinds, scientists appeal unconsciously to final causality by supposingthat some neural patterns are “directed toward” producing specific other ones (245). Feser concludes by showing in detail that final causality is at the heart of scientific language about biological phenomena (not least of all DNA), complex inorganic systems such as the water cycle, and basic laws of nature regarding the powers and tendencies of things. Indeed, as he points out, many philosophers of science advocate a “new essentialism” whose principles are none other than formal and final causality, although these philosophers are often unconscious of this fact. This book places Feser at the forefront of contemporary philosophy. He is the author of books on Locke, philosophy of mind, and Aquinas that are notable for their clarity and largely neutral tone; here he adopts a combative tone in hopes of getting his bold message out to a popular audience. It is the message, however, that truly captures attention. Could it be that the anti-Aristotelian emperor has no clothes (or at best is wearing scraps of Aristotle’s clothing)? With a brilliant grasp of the salient points of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary philosophy, and with clear and lively prose, Feser argues that it is so. Given faith’s urgent need for its preambles, his arrival on the scene is a cause for rejoicing. MATTHEW LEVERING University of Dayton Dayton, Ohio Speaking of God: Theology, Language, and Truth. By D. STEPHEN LONG. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2009. Pp. 341 + ix. $32.00 (paper). ISBN: 9780 -8028-4572-6. BOOK REVIEWS 160 D. Stephen Long is a Methodist theologian who has taught at Garrett Evangelical Theological Seminary and who now teaches systematic theology at Marquette University. The present volume appears in the Eerdmans Ekklesia Series, which identifies itself as associated with the Ekklesia Project, “a network of persons for whom ‘being a Christian’ is seen to be the primary identity and allegiance,” superseding and ordering allotherclaims bycontemporary social and cultural forces. In this book, Long’s argument is that to be a Christian properly, to take seriously the robust truth claims that Christianity makes, requires a turn to metaphysics. With this insistent argument, Long separates himself from a good deal of contemporary theology. Recent theological thinking, as everyone knows, has generally disdained metaphysics in favor of a postmetaphysical, posttranscendental thought, with metaphysics supplanted (particularly in Catholic theology) by some species of hermeneutical or neo-pragmatic philosophy. Long resists this trend, arguing that metaphysical thinking is essential if we are to explain how we speak of God truthfully within our circumscribed social, cultural, and (particularly) linguistic milieux. At the outset of the book, he offers a helpful taxonomy delineating five uses of the term “metaphysics,” identifying both proper and improper understandings (9). Of course, he wishes to avoid any use of the term that might be appropriately labeled as “onto-theology,” meaning by this slippery word a notion of being that is a totalizing discourse unto itself, seeking to enslave biblical truth within an allegedly “wider” horizon or principle. But...

pdf

Share