The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics by Martin Rhonheimer (review)

135 BOOK REVIEWS The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics. By MARTIN RHONHEIMER. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011. Pp. 496 $40.00 (paper) ISBN: 978-08132 -1799-4. A version of this book came out in its original language, German, in 2001, but it was first published in Italian in 1994. The German version contained additions to the Italian and this English version contains additions to the German in which Fr. Rhonheimer answers his critics and discusses other literature that has appeared in the last ten years or so. The book is intelligent, well-researched, interesting and informative, although (as I shall seek to demonstrate) it is not without its flaws. Rhonheimer does a very good job of positioning himself with respect to other authors, especially—but by no means exclusively—authors writing in German. He often brings in Immanuel Kant, for instance, and he engages in frequent (and fruitful) polemic with various consequentialists, including such classical figures as David Hume but also representatives of the proportionalist school in contemporary moral theology. He also makes good and enlightening use of contemporary philosophers such as Julia Annas, Elizabeth Anscombe, Wolfgang Kluxen, and Robert Spaemann. The book comprises five chapters, plus a lengthy introduction and brief epilogue. The first chapter situates ethics within the context of other philosophical disciplines and discusses also the role of God in ethics. With respect to the latter issue, Rhonheimer contrasts his own approach with that of Kant. Chapter 2 is on “human action and the question of happiness.” It is one of the best in the book, especially for its depiction, in very precise terms, of Thomas Aquinas’s use of Aristotle’s various levels of happiness. Chapter 3 is on “moral actions and practical reasoning.” Nearly a hundred pages in length, it sets out the action theory behind the often controversial theses for which Rhonheimer has become known over the past two decades. Chapter 4 is on the moral virtues and is largely devoted to expounding Aristotle’s understanding of the same. Chapter 5 is entitled “structures of rationality.” In it, Rhonheimer discusses such general topics as the nature of moral principles and their ordering, but also more concrete issues or cases, such as that in which the life of both mother and child will be lost if an abortion is not performed but, if it is performed, the mother will live. BOOK REVIEWS 136 Although chapter 2 is one of the best in the book, it is not without its problems. I would like to examine one such now, since the corresponding position informs Rhonheimer’s entire moral theory (and certainly this book). At one point, he argues that, although metaphysically man’s “ultimate goal” is God himself, “this is not at all the perspective of practical philosophy” (67). He draws upon the Aristotelian distinction, employed by Thomas in question 1, article 8 of the Prima Secundae, between two “aspects under which we can speak of ‘end’” (or finis): the finis cuius and the finis quo, the first (according to Rhonheimer’s interpretation) being metaphysical, the second practical and human. It is well worth noting that, in both the Italian and the German versions of the book, Rhonheimer says that this pair should be translated as “the end of something” and “the end for something” (“il fine di qualcosa” / “il fine per qualcosa”; “Ziel von etwas” / “Ziel für etwas”—emphasis in the originals). He goes so far as to argue that Thomas ought to have used the expression finis cui rather than finis quo, since the former is a better rendering of Aristotle’s to en hôi (De anima 1.4.415b3 and 21), which might be translated “that to the advantage of which.” A translator’s note in this new English version argues, however, that we should stick with finis quo—which is, after all, what Thomas wrote—and translate the quo as a dative of instrument: “that through which we acquire [the end]” (66 n. 48). Despite this revised translation, Rhonheimer’s more general position remains the same, that is to say, that Thomas separates the metaphysical aspect from the practical. We...