Abstract

The question concerning the moral status of living beings is a central one within current bioethical debates, and many life and death issues are connected to it. The field of discourse is divided up between Catholic thinkers like Spaemann who argues for the validity of human dignity which starts with the fertilization of the egg cell and naturalist philosophers like Singer who puts forward reasons for associating the moral status with personhood, as only persons possess morally relevant qualities, i.e. self-consciousness and sentience. I argue for a concept of human dignity which considers Singer’s criticism concerning speciesism and moves beyond a rigid anthropocentric position as it was proposed by Spaemann. Thereby, I progress as follows: In part one, I present some methodological reflections which support the following argument of parts two and three. In part two, I present selected aspects of the debate concerning the moral status of living entities and also explain scientific insights concerning various types of organisms. In part three, I suggest a concept of dignity and personhood which I regard as plausible and appropriate for our times.

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