Abstract

Human dignity supports the equal value of all humans and their ethical treatment. While human rights conventions use the term frequently, it is rarely defined. The term dignity is used differently, and two dimensions are described in detail. Inherent dignity is an intrinsic dimension held by all humans and is the basis of equal rights for all humans. Circumstantial dignity is another dimension, but is variable and changeable. This is in mind when circumstances are said to enhance or diminish someone’s dignity. The recent critique of dignity arises in part because of conflation of these two dimensions. Others reject dignity because of its religious connections. Such criticisms will be responded to in defense of dignity.

Posthuman and transhuman enhancement also raise questions about the value of dignity because of its roots in humanism. Nick Bostrom defends posthuman dignity while critiquing Leon Kass’s bioconservative position. Bostrom’s argument will be critiqued because of his failure to distinguish between inherent and circumstantial dignity, and his misunderstanding of Kass’s claims.

In contrast to the transhumanist enhancement project, inherent dignity points to the givenness and limitations of human nature. This indicates the importance of developing gratitude for human nature and avoiding an endless pursuit of perfection. Such an approach is not antagonistic to medicine and science. Instead, it places priority on improving the circumstantial dignity of all human beings, especially those who live without their basic needs being met. Their inherent dignity places a moral obligation on those with resources to help them. Medicine and science should focus on relieving their needs, not enhancing those who already have most needs met. Justice for all humans based on their inherent dignity is proposed as a significant argument against the ethics of transhuman enhancement.

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